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CONGLOMERATE MERGER SYNDROME-A
COMPARISON: CONGRESSIONAL POLICY
WITH EIFORCEMENT POLICY
JAMES C. THOMAS*
661T is a sad thought... that the present system of production and of
exchange is having that tendency which is sure at some not very dis-
tant day to crush out all small men, all small capitalists, all small enter-
prises." This statement, descriptive of the present day corporate merger
activity, was first rendered by Senator George in 1890 when Congress
was considering passage of the Sherman Act." Perhaps an even more de-
scriptive statement was made by the late Justice Harlan in the Standard
Oii case.2 Dissenting in this famous Supreme Court decision which cre-
ated the so-called "rule of reason," Justice Harlan declared:
All who recall the condition of the country in 1890 will remember that there was
everywhere, among the people generally, a deep feeling of unrest. The Nation had
been rid of human slavery... but the conviction was universal that the country was in
real danger from another kind of slavery sought to be fastened on the American people,
namely, the slavery that would result from aggregations of capital in the hands of a
few individuals and corporations controlling, for their own profit and advantage exclu-
sively, the entire business of the country, including the production and sale of the nec-
essaries of life. Such a danger was thought to be then imminent, and all felt that it
must be met firmly and by such statutory regulations as would adequately protect the
people against oppression and wrong.3
Prior to, and for many years after the passage of the Sherman Act,
businessmen manifested a desire to be insulated from the risk of competi-
tion. The various tactics used to accomplish this included: formation of
trusts; predatory pricing practices to force competitors to come into line
or drop from the market; acquiring weakened competitors; etc.' Today
these blatant methods have been replaced by more subtle and ingenious
devices.5 In their expansion drives, designed to reduce the risk of competi-
tion, businessmen -have effectively gained control of other corporations
through the respectable merger route.
* Professor of Law, Tulsa University School of Law.
1. 21 Cong. Rec. 2598 (1890).
2. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
3. Id. at 83-84 (concurring and dissenting opinion).
4. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 US. 106 (1911).
5. Speaking before the Committee on Banking and Currency, United States Senate, on
S. 510, 90th Congress, 1st Session, Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commison, stated: "It is wise not to underrate the ingenuity of thu-, engaged
in the complex game of promoting or opposing block acquisitions .... " (Unpublished
statement).
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Additional respectability has in fact been given to mergers, especially
conglomerate mergers, by Donald F. Turner, who presently heads the
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department.' Turner, it is said, has
taken the aura of a crusade out of trust busting; however, he should not
receive the full credit or blame for the failure of section 7 of the Clayton
Act to stop or even slow down the merger movement. The number of cor-
porate mergers taking place in this country has increased steadily since
1944, with a sharp increase in 1954. In the area of manufacturing and
mining, for example, there were 295 mergers or acquisitions in 1953. This
number jumped to 387 in 1954 and has been on a rapid incline since, with
854 in 1964, 1,0084n 1965, and 995 in 1966.1 This increase becomes even
more startling when one examines the Federal Trade Commission's tabu-
lation of all mergers. Taking the last three years, 1964, 1965 and 1966,
the Commission recorded a total of 1,797, 1,893, and 1,746 respectively.'
Perhaps when one speaks in terms of the number of mergers occurring
in this country the conclusion becomes somewhat clouded; however, the
staggering consequences of the merger movement are clearly manifested
in the valuation of disappearing assets. Taking 912 selected mergers that
occurred during the period of 1948-1966, the valuation of acquired assets
exceeded thirty-one billion dollars.' During an earlier period, 1940-1947,
Congress noted that 2,500 formerly independent manufacturing and min-
ing companies disappeared as a result of mergers and acquisitions. The
asset value of the acquired companies amounted to 5.2 billion dollars,
which represented 5.5 per cent of the total assets of all manufacturing
corporations. 0
Generalizations such as the above will admittedly vary, depending on
their particular source," but they are sufficient to support the points to be
raised in this paper. A more complete and accurate tabulation of the num-
ber and valuation of mergers occurring in this country would only support
the already clear conclusion that section 7 of the Clayton Act has failed
6. Business Week, May 20, 1967, at 59.
7. See Appendix table 1, p. 566 infra.
S. See Appendix table 2, p. 567 infra.
9. See Appendix table 3, p. 568 infra.
10. H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1949).
11. Note the discrepancy in the number of reported mergers and acquisitions in manu-
facturing and mining shown by comparing Appendix i and Appendix 2. It will be noted
that the source material in compiling Appendix 2 included the Wall Street Yournal, Journal
of Commerce, and New York Times. One might still change these figures by adding other
source material in which mergers are reported.
In Forbes, it was reported that the brisk merger rate was causing 2,400 companies to
disappear into other companies every year. Forbes, Feb. 15, 1967, at 38, col. 1. There were
1,416 mergers during the first six months of 1967, according to the Associated Press. Tulsa
Daily World, Sept. 3, 1967, § 3, at 3, col. 3.
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to thwart the ever-increasing expansion and creation of gigantic corpora-
tions which hold extreme economic power over this society. It is enough to
demonstrate that the merger business in the financial world has become
big business. For example, it was recently reported that Lehman Bros., in-
vestment bankers, were paid a fee of $916,000 for services in connection
with the study and negotiations leading to the merger of American Home
Products with Ekco Products Company.12 While business brokers and
CPA firms have increased their role in the "merger business," the key role
in most major mergers is played by Wall Street investment bankers. These
bankers, who handle the underwriting of new acquisitions, participate in
one of the most vital phases of a successful merger."3 Then, of course,
there are the business executives who play a not insignificant role in pro-
ducing major mergers, many of which go unchallenged."4
The merger and acquisition fever has risen to such a level that many
businessmen feel that they can act with impunity as far as the federal anti-
trust laws are concerned. And perhaps this attitude is not unwarranted,
especially in light of the current administrative enforcement philosophy
which has been created by a combination of factors. This philosophy, by
giving businessmen a false sense of security, has led to several rags-to-
riches success stories. One of the most interesting and successful involves
the rapid growth of Gulf and Western Industries, Inc.
Charles Bluhdorn, born in Vienna, has entered into many apparently
crazy (but successful) business deals and has become known on Wall
Street as "the mad Austrian."' 5 In 1958, Bluhdorn purchased Michigan
12. Forbes, Feb. 15, 1967, at 38, cal. 3. In this same article, it was reported that CPA
firms are taking an active role (and generating a profitable business) in advising corpora-
tions on the acquisition of other firms. "Some big CPA firms generate their own 'companies
for sale' list, which is circulated internally. Many big CPA firms are starting to set up
trouble-shooting departments for merger and acquisition work." Id. at 39, cal. 1. The merger
business is so big that D.H. Blair & Co. conducts special seminars on the subject. See full
page advertisement, Forbes, Sept. 15, 1967, at 335. William Colvin, who started Corporate
Seminars Inc., observed that: "More and more you find company chairmen and presidents
spending half their time searching out acquisitions." Tulsa Daily World, Sept. 3, 1967, § 3,
at 3, col. 3. Even educational institutions, especially law schools, have entered the busi-
ness of training company officials and lawyers in how to accomplish a corporate merger.
13. Forbes, Feb. 15, 1967, at 41-48.
14. A number of these executives are examined in Forbes, Feb. 15, 1967, at 49-59. See
also Business Week, May 20, 1967, at 61, reporting several unchallenged mergers: Con-
tinental Oil Co. combined with Consolidation Coal Co., forming a company with aggregate
assets of 2.1 billion dollars; Atlantic Refining Co. and Richfield Oil Co., with combined
assets of 1.4 billion dollars; Douglas Aircraft Co. plus McDonnell Co. has assets of 1.2
billion dollars; and American Tobacco Co.'s acquisition of Sunshine Biscuits forms a
company with assets of 959 million dollars.
15. Welles, Multimillion Reach of Wall Street's "Mad Austrian", Life, March 10, 1967,
at 43.
19681
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Bumper, a manufacturing concern that was at the time losing $50,000
each year, which was then merged into a Houston auto parts firm. The
combined company, named Gulf and Western Industries, Inc., then ac-
quired over 150 distributors and signed up hundreds more as independents
through which Gulf and Western sells about $100 million in auto parts
every year. 6 Since its formation in 1958, Gulf and Western has purchased
68 other companies, including Paramount Pictures, and has within this
relatively short period of time become one of the top one hundred corpora-
tions in the United States." Chris Welles, writing about the philosophy of
Bluhdorn, says: "All he wants to do, all he ever talks about, is to get big-
ger faster than anyone else, reaching a billion in sales in two years, then
two billion."'
While most mergers or acquisitions are mutually advantageous to the
acquiring and acquired corporations, the tender offer is becoming a popu-
lar way to capture control of another corporation unilaterally. Success of
a tender offer requires that the affection and confidence of shareholders
for the present management be alienated. This alienation is accomplished
by bidding for a large block of stock at a price considerably higher than
the current market price. Gulf and Western has used the tender offer to
fulfill its goal of growing faster and bigger than anyone else. For example,
through a full-page ad appearing in the New York Times, it made a tender
offer to purchase 500,000 shares of common stock of Delta Steamship
Lines, Inc.' 9
Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, has referred to the tender offer as a form of industrial warfare which
he compares with the more familiar corporate proxy fights-both being
methods of capturing or preserving control of a corporation." To initiate
a tender offer, bidders normally raise money by drawing on the general
corporate lines of credit.2 The war-like atmosphere that prevails over
many tender offers has been vividly described by William S. Rukeyser.22
There is no standard pattern with successful tender offers. They may be
preceded by abortive merger negotiations, or by an attempt to acquire
16. Id. at 44, col. 3. Compare FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966), with
United States v. Arnold, Scbwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
17. Welles, Multimillion Reach of Wall Street's "Mad Austrian", Life, March 10, 1967,
at 43, col. 1.
18. Id. at 43, col. 4.
19. New York Times, Aug. 10, 1967, at 59. Gulf & Western lost its bid for the Delta
Steamship stock, having been outbid by Transcontinental. See Forbes, Oct. 1, 1967, at 63.
20. Hearings on S. 510, Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess., at 16 (1967).
21. Rukeyser, Getting Tough with Tenders, Fortune, Aug., 1967, at 108, 110.
22. Id. at 109-10.
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the necessary control by open-market purchases, both of which would ac-
complish the same thing at a much cheaper price. But if this is considered
strategically unsound from the start, the bidder will carefully conceal his
intent in an effort to acquire the desired stock before management can
marshal its defenses. In such cases, great care is taken to preserve secrecy,
for by tipping off management the bidder would invite open industrial war.
Determined management has many defensive and even some offensive
weapons which can be used to fend off an unwanted take-over bid.
In the first place, management is in a better position to reach stock-
holders-assuming that it has time. If the veil of secrecy is pierced, it may
launch a vigorous publicity campaign against the offer. Or, if it is capable
of raising the necessary capital, it can make a counter offer to buy its own
shares at a price higher than that offered by the outside bidder. These tac-
tics failing, management may resort to more extreme measures, such as
negotiating a merger with a third company. Not surprisingly, in light of
the present ineffective enforcement policy under section 7 of the Clayton
Act, writers have given little attention to the anti-merger legislation as
an effective weapon against tender offers.
Nothing used presently or in the past has effectively deterred the
growth of tender offers. Chairman Cohen has observed that the aggregate
of cash tender offers has grown from less than two hundred million dollars
in 1960 to almost a billion in 1965.1 Instead of considering the legality
under section 7 of the Clayton ActO4 of the growing number and amount
of tender offers, the general response is to regulate them. Although recog-
nizing the dangers of tender offers, Mr. Cohen, in his testimony before
Congress, did not take a firm stand against them. In his response to the
views of Professor Mundheim, who ardently supports corporate takeovers,
Mr. Cohen observed that tender offers are being made "simply because the
acquiring company wants to get bigger or more diversified."2 But having
said this, he concedes that there are tender offers that may be beneficial to
stockholders, and he does not favor a bill that would unduly hinder the
beneficial ones.2
23. Hearings on S. 510, supra note 20, at 17.
24. Clayton Act, § 7, 15 U..C. § 18 (1964): "No corporation . . . shall acquire . . .
the whole or any part of the stock . . . of another corporation . . . where . . .
certain conditions are present.
25. Hearings on S. 510, supra note 20, at 179. The statement of Professor Mundheim,
as quoted by Mr. Cohen, was as follows: "Corporate take-overs by block acquisitions are
a good thing, because they provide a method, perhaps the most effective presently available,
of dislodging entrenched but incompetent management, and may thus improve the efficiency
with which resources are allocated and businesses are managed." Id. See also Rukeyser,
supra note 21. At no place in his article did Ir. Rukeyser mention the application of the
antitrust laws to "tender offers."
26. Hearings on S. 510, supra note 20, at 21.
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Professor Mundheim, in opposition to the Senate bill to regulate tender
offers, testified at one point that the proposed bill was, "in my opinion, a
wholly unfair and even an un-American approach. '27 He supported the
tender offer as an effective method of eliminating corporate inefficiency.
Whether tender offers may in fact improve the efficiency of management
and whether they may be beneficial to stockholders is of some interest
academically; legally, however, such arguments have for many years been
rejected as valid defenses to an asserted violation of the antitrust laws.28
Even so, the congressional committee considering S. 510 gives some cre-
dence to the economically oriented testimony of Professor Mundheim. In
its report to accompany S. 510, the Committee observed:
It was strongly urged during the hearings that takeover bids should not be dis-
couraged because they serve a useful purpose in providing a check on entrenched but
inefficient management. It was also recognized that these bids are made for many
other reasons, and do not always reflect a desire to improve the management of the
company.29
Noting the conflicting testimony concerning the purposed regulation of
tender offers, the report observed: "The committee has taken extreme
care to avoid tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of manage-
ment or in favor of the person making the takeover bid."3 0 In short, this
bill3 is designed only to require full and fair disclosure and is not intended
in any way to prohibit this method of corporate take-over.
Should Congress pass S. 510, introduced by Senator Williams of New
Jersey, it would lend an unwarranted degree of respectability to tender
offers. Lower federal courts, already unsympathetic to rigid enforcement
of section 7 of the Clayton Act, will be provided another technical argu-
ment to support mergers and acquisitions.32 With a sophisticated, defense-
oriented antitrust bar, one can expect the passage of any tender offer reg-
ulation to be used as a defense for mergers. The argument will go
something like this, Since Congress, in passing the tender offer legislation
must have been aware of the existence of section 7 of the Clayton Act, the
logical conclusion is that Congress must have approved the use of this de-
27. Id. at 115.
28. United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,
288 U.S. 344 (1933); United States v. Corn Prod. Ref. Co., 234 F. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916),
appeal dismissed, 249 U.S. 621 (1919).
29. S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
30. Id.
31. S. 510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), passed by Senate, Aug. 30, 1967, 113 Cong. Rec.
12,559 (daily ed. Aug. 30, 1967).
32. See Lunkenheimer Co. v. Condec Corp., 268 F. Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), where
the court refused to enjoin the defendant's "tender offer" to acquire controlling stock Interest
in the plaintiff.
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vice to capture control of corporations.m This interpretative conclusion
is understandable in light of the historical judicial presumption that the
legislative body is fully aware of the existing state of the law.3" Actually,
the very consideration of a bill such as S. 510 manifests a congressional
misunderstanding of the legislative process. Where this misunderstanding
has resulted in inconsistent legislation, the Supreme Court has been called
upon to rule that congressional action or inaction based on an erroneous
understanding of existing law does not, in fact, amend the previously en-
acted statute.3 5
I. THE PROBLEM DEFINED
Though one might find statements to the effect that the anti-merger
statutes are being overly enforced,3" an objective analysis will lead to a
contrary conclusion. Looking at the anti-merger legislation in retrospect,
it is obvious that the law has failed to stop the merger trend. After the Su-
preme Court created the so-called "rule of reason,"3 it became necessary
to supplement the Sherman Act with new legislation. In response to this
recognized need, the Clayton Act was passed in 1914. Under this act-in-
corporated in section 7--certain specified business practices were prohib-
ited, and among these was the prohibition of certain mergers. 8 Instead of
stopping, the merger trend continued uninterrupted. Finally, after numer-
33. The initial reaction of lower federal courts toward the Bank Merger Act of 1966
was discussed in United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 US. 361 (1967).
34. I am referring to more than repeal or amendment by implication, which is based
on the idea that the legislature is presumed to intend to achieve a consistent body of law.
See 1 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction, §§ 1922, 2011, 2012, 2014 (3d ed. 1943). More
pertinent is the idea that the legislative body is presumed to have knowledge of existing
laws including judicial decisions. See Enyeart v. Board of Supervisors, - Cal. 2d -, 427
P.2d 509, 58 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1967); McIver v. State Highway Comm'n, 198 Kan. 678,
426 P.2d 118 (1967); State v. Ayers, 198 Kan. 467, 426 Pad 21 (1967).
35. The Supreme Court has been unwilling to use repeal or amendment by implication
where the federal antitrust laws are in issue. See California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962);
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 US. 384 (1951). But more important,
the Supreme Court has not allowed such an amendment to be inferred from administrative
or congressional inaction. United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 US. 586
(1957). Even where Congress has taken action partially on an erroneous understanding of
existing law, such was not allowed to change the existing law. United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
36. MA. Wright, Chairman of Humble Oil & Refining Co. has recently charged that
the antitrust enforcement policies threaten America's economic growth. He stated that:
"the Supreme Court has adopted a very narrow interpretation of our anti-trust statutes."
Cited in remarks of Commissioner Reilly delivered to Antitrust Section, District of Colum-
bia Bar Ass'n, Feb. 23, 1967.
37. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 US. 1 (1911).
38. 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
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ous statements concerning the failure of the law, Congress again officially
expressed concern with the further increases in the concentration of eco-
nomic wealth, and, in 1950, it passed a significant amendment to the exist-
ing anti-merger statute.3 9 Yet even with this amendment, which incorpo-
rates the declaration of congressional purpose, the number of corporate
acquisitions and mergers continues to climb.
That it has failed is obvious; less obvious is why it failed. This paper
will explore the attitudes of parties involved in merger cases in an effort
to find an answer to this most perplexing question. In my search for some
plausible conclusion, I do not propose to make a detailed and comprehen-
sive coverage of the substantive rules, as such an attempt would only tend
to perpetuate error.
The problem in the past has been created by an aberrant philosophical
conclusion as to the role of courts in the interpretation of statutes. Little
attention and less concern has been shown for the relationship of courts
and legislature involved in the statutory interpretative process. This is
particularly true in the area of antitrust laws, where legal analysts start
with the presupposition that the statutes are purposely phrased in general
language" in order to elevate courts to a creative role. Having made such
a presumption, which in the author's opinion demonstrates the general
misunderstanding of the legislative process, the analysts conclude that
courts are charged with a duty of shaping an antitrust policy that is in the
best interests of society. In the shaping of this policy, the statute is looked
upon as a broad general standard established by Congress, from which
courts will promulgate specific principles to be applied in each individual
case.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act offers one of the best examples of the ap-
plication of this philosophy. The language, certainly general in nature, de-
clares that no corporation shall acquire the stock or assets of another cor-
poration "where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition
....,41 Legal analysts, looking at this language, reason that only anti-
competitive mergers are proscribed. The analysts then conclude that it is
the courts that must decide which mergers are anticompetitive by exam-
ining each merger in light of the market conditions and other economic
standards.
If courts must decide merger cases on the basis of an examination of
39. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
40. See Cohen, Judicial "Legisputation" and the Dimensions of Legislative Meaning,
36 Ind. L.J. 414 (1961) ; Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power: 1, 47 Colum.
L. Rev. 359 (1947); Miller, Statutory Language and the Purposive Use of Ambiguity,
42 Va. L. Rev. 23 (1956).
41. Clayton Act, § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
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economic data, the reasonable assumption is that they pass upon conflict-
ing economic theories which make their function more legislative than ju-
dicial. Such an attitude gives Congress little credit for having the ability
to formulate an economic standard that will control all future merger ac-
tivity. There is no sound reason to conclude that the use of general lan-
guage in a statute was meant to be a delegation of legislative authority to
courts. When the legislative process is looked upon as a legal institution
it becomes just as reasonable to say that general language is used in order
to cover all unforeseen and new devices that might be invented by busi-
nessmen which, if not stopped, would seriously impair the desired con-
gressional policies. Despite the many articles and books written on the
subject of antitrust, and more particularly mergers, few if any writers,
in their search for the real meaning of section 7, have given Congress suffi-
cient credit for being capable of writing a statute to meet the changing
needs in society. Concentrating on their individual theories as to what
enforcement agencies and courts should do in the antitrust field, most
writers fail to consider, at least with sufficient objectivity, the subtle
problems of statutory construction.4 -
There is no one person or group that is responsible for the general fail-
ure of section 7 to achieve the congressional desire to stop the merger
trend. Nor is the defect in legal philosophy (the area to be discussed in
this paper) a product of a sinister plot to block this legislation. The fact
is that the failure is a product of an aberration of long existence. If any
condemnation is in order, perhaps it should be leveled at the institutions of
legal education, which have failed to respond to the change from common
law to statutory law.4 3 Legal education, through an over-emphasis of com-
42. The imperative nature of the study of statutory interpretation in connection with
any legislative research project has been made abundantly clear by the newly formed Law
Commission in England. Created by the Law Commissions Act of 1965 for the purpose of
promoting the reform of the law, this agency, in its first "programme," observed: "It is
evident that a programme of law reform, which must necessarily use the instrument of
legislation, depends for its successful realization on the interpretation given by the courts
to the enactment in which the programme is embodied. The rules of statutory interpretation,
although individually reasonably dear, are often difficult to apply, particularly where they
appear to conflict with one another and when their hierarchy of importance is not dearly
established. The difficulty which faces the courts may be enhanced by present limitations
on the means, other than reference to the actual text of the statute, for ascertaining the
intention of the legislature." Law Commission Act 1965, First Programme of the Law
Commission, at 15 (Her Majesty's Stationery Office 1965). Since then, the Law Commission
has prepared and is circulating the first set of working papers on the subject: The Inter-
pretation of Statutes.
43. Roscoe Pound saw this problem even prior to 1908 when he observed: "Not the
least notable characteristics of American law today are the excessive output of legislation
in all our jurisdictions and the indifference, if not contempt, with which that output is
regarded by courts and lawyers. Text-writers who scrupulously gather up from every remote
1968]
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mon law, has historically trained students in the art of maneuvering. With
this art, lawyers squeeze and shape legislation (as they do common law
principles) to fit the needs of their clients. In an antitrust bar that is
manifestly defense-oriented, lawyers, with the zeal generated by the ad-
versary system, show little interest in understanding a law that works
against the desires of their corporate clients. But adversaries employed
by the two principal antitrust enforcement agencies, and the judges sit-
ting on lower federal courts,"4 have proven equally inept in the enforce-
ment of a simple merger prohibition created by Congress. This is not too
surprising, because the government attorneys and the trial court judges
have, like the private attorney, been trained in the archaic but prevailing
philosophies found in most of the present day law schools.
In the discussion to follow, I will seek to define the problem in more de-
tail, as well as to connect this philosophical defect to the failings of section
7 of the Clayton Act. To accomplish this it will be necessary to review in
some detail the present enforcement policy of agencies such as the Fed-
eral Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Justice Depart-
ment. I will then bring in and discuss to a lesser degree the philosophy of
the members of the private antitrust bar. At a later date, I will seek to
show that the sophistication of the lower federal courts, at least in the area
of antitrust, is not on the same level with that of the United States Su-
preme Court. From this more or less philosophical study, I will move into
a discussion of the congressional design and purpose behind its anti-
merger legislation, which should clearly establish the problems that exist
in this area of the law. In the final portion of this paper, I will consider
the question: Where do we go from here? There are, in fact, practical so-
lutions that are available which will stop abruptly the continuing merger
incline. Furthermore, in putting these practical solutions into operation,
there is no need for additional legislation.
II. TURNER'S PHILOSOPHY ON CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
Since Professor Donald F. Turner was named head of the Antitrust
Division, one has an easier time in analyzing the enforcement policy of the
Justice Department. It is easier because prior to his appointment, Turner,
while a Professor of Law at Harvard, spent considerable time studying
the legal problems of conglomerate mergers. One product of his research 45
corner the most obsolete decisions and cite all of them, seldom cite any statutes except those
landmarks .... or if they do refer to legislation, do so through the judicial decisions
which apply it." Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383 (1908).
44. I single out the lower federal courts because there Is a distinct difference in the
sophistication level between these courts and the Supreme Court, whose lead the lower
courts have time after time failed or refused to follow.
45. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev.
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has, within the antitrust bar, been regarded as the authoritative article
on the subject.4" More significantly, the article has received important
judicial attention from Justice Harlan, the principal antitrust dissenter
on the present Court.47 But regardless of the amount of attention re-
ceived, the article is significant as a detailed expression of the person
who presently plays a major role in shaping the antitrust enforcement
policy of this country, and because it is manifest that the policy expressed
therein is being carried out in practice.
A. The Turner Position on Conglomerate Mergers Reviewed8
Turner wrote Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act
to: (1) emphasize the need for rules in the merger field; (2) describe the
type of rules needed; and (3) actually formulate the rules.
1. Need and Type of Rules-Ideally, observes Turner, the regulatory
policy on mergers would be to examine on a case-by-case basis their anti-
competitive consequences. If we are to have an effective anti-merger stat-
ute, however, this policy is impossible. It is impractical because, with the
limited enforcement machinery, a case-by-case approach would present
insurmountable problems. 9 Instead of the case-by-case approach, Turner
suggests that we direct "the law toward rationally-based general rules that
are framed in terms of ... significant factual issues. . . ."I Cases falling
within the class identified by the factual issues could then be readily de-
cided without any need for a detailed economic analysis. There is nothing
new or novel about calling for the formulation of general rules, which
have the effect of reducing the proof requirement. The Supreme Court
has long followed this idea in the antitrust field, particularly with its
creation and application of the so-called "per se" rule."1
Even in the merger field, the Supreme Court has formulated broad gen-
1313 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Turner]. This 82-page article was the first compre-
hensive study of conglomerate mergers.
46. During a two day (Dec. 2 & 3, 1966) Practicing Law Institute forum on "The
Anti-trust Challenge to Corporate Growth Through Conglomerate Acquisitions and Joint
Ventures," the Turner article received much attention and praise.
47. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 582 (1967) (concurring opinion).
48. In this section, I will be reviewing in some detail the Turner article on conglomerate
mergers.
49. Turner 1318. For an interesting judicial discussion of the "case-by-case" approach
in a regulatory field, see FPC v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 206-16 (1964).
50. Turner 1319.
51. The nature of the "per se" rule was well stated by Justice Black in Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958): "[Tlhere are certain agreements or practices
which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue
are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry
as to the precise harm they have caused or the business ercuse for their use."
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eral rules under which particular acquisitions will be judged. It has on
many occasions expressed, in its holdings, a fear of an accelerated concen-
tration of economic power, and it has refused to allow the companies in-
volved to come forward with proof of economies or increased efficiencies
which would allegedly result from the merger.52 This philosophy of the
Court is not shared by Turner, who says, "[T ] here are strong reasons for
not interpreting the law so broadly as to limit unduly the number of poten-
tial purchasers of capital assets .... "'I Not only is the Court's philosophy
not shared, but Turner openly criticizes the Court for its manifestly hard
line against mergers. 4
Besides opposing broad rules which might restrict the number of
mergers, Turner advocates a different standard for each type of merger,
saying, "[W] e must recognize that the legal standards for various classes
of mergers are interdependent." 5 He further maintains, "[R]ational
lawmaking requires that we endeavor to establish some idea of the relative
probabilities of anticompetitive effects as among the various types of
mergers, so that our hierarchy of rules will at least make internal sense."5 0
In his hierarchy of rules, the standards would be hardest on horizontal,
easier on vertical, and least severe on conglomerates. 7 However in the
opinion of the author, Turner's reasoning on the different standards is
inconsistent, not only with the congressional design, 8 but also with the
52. For a good example of this "concentration of power" general rule, see United States
v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 316 (1962). In the former case, the Court, after reviewing the size factor alone,
said that: "Our conclusion that these percentages raise an inference that the effect of the
contemplated merger . . . may be substantially to lessen competition . . . ." 374 U.S. at 365.
53. Turner 1320.
54. He criticizes the Court's reasoning on the "concentration of power" issue in the
Brown Shoe case and the Philadelphia Nat'l Bank case, supra note 52. Turner 1324-26.
He criticized the holding (not on the concentration issue) of the FTC in Reynolds Metals Co.,
56 F.T.C. 743 (1960), aff'd, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Turner 1343. He also criticized
the FTC and approved the Circuit Court reversal in the Consolidated Foods case, 329 F.2d
623 (7th Cir. 1964). Turner 1393. Subsequent to the Turner article, the Supreme Court,
in Consolidated Foods, reversed the circuit court and upheld the FTC. 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
55. Turner 1320.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1322.
58. From the Congressional Committee Reports, it is clear that Congress meant for all
forms of mergers to fall under a single standard. S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1950); H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). In the House Report, it was
noted that: "Mergers and acquisitions have traditionally been designed as horizontal,
vertical, and conglomerate." Id. at 11. This report also includes a comprehensive chart
showing the nature and consequences of conglomerate mergers. Chart III. Consistent with
the report, the statute, as passed, makes no distinction as to the various forms of merger.
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Supreme Court's interpretation of section 7.11 There is no good reason
for distinguishing among the different forms of corporate mergers, except
perhaps for economists engaged in an academic analysis. Granted that
each forms a different factual pattern which may have different com-
petitive consequences, there is no benefit gained from, and no legal justi-
fication for, distinguishing between competitive consequences. Such
distinctions merely lead to more uncertainty, which is the very thing that
we are seeking to reduce. If elimination of uncertainty is our goal, we
also gain nothing by formulating general rules that are inconsistent with
the statute. Clarity in understanding, and effective enforcement, can be
accomplished only by recognizing and accepting the statute as being a
single standard of merger prohibition. If different standards had been
desirable, Congress was quite capable of providing for each. Instead it
formulated the single antimerger standard that must be followed by
enforcement agencies and courts.
Turner, somewhat biased economically, has formulated his own set of
merger rules, which deviate from congressional standards. One statement
made by Turner in the conclusion of his article demonstrates the per-
sonal nature of the rules formulated. He states, "In traversing the field of
conglomerate mergers, I have suggested a limited number of general
rules covering what I would like to think are rather carefully defined
situations."°When the formulation of general rules is placed on a per-
sonal basis, the most carefully defined situations will still reflect any biases
that might be present. Since Turner is an economist as well as a lawyer,
it is inevitable that any general rule that he might formulate will be some-
what influenced, if not controlled, by the particular economic school with
which he is associated.
The philosophy of this economic school, which ascribes economic
advantages to conglomerate mergers, is reflected in the Turner article
and now, more significantly, in the enforcement policy of the Antitrust
Division of the Justice Department. But what if, instead of Turner, Dr.
John Blair, a noted economist, had been appointed head of the Antitrust
Division? This question interestingly focuses attention on the conse-
quences of letting any economist formulate general rules under which the
congressional standard in section 7 will be enforced. Since Blair sees no
economic advantage in conglomerate acquisitions, the present substance
59. The Supreme Court's position was made clear by Justice Douglas in FTC v. Procter
& Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) when he stated that: "All mergers are within the
reach of § 7, and all must be tested by the same standard, whether they are classified as
horizontal, vertical, conglomerate or other" Id. at 577 (footnote omitted).
60. Turner 1393-94 (emphasis added).
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of enforcement policy would be reversed. According to Blair, there are
only three classes of mergers-horizontal, vertical and conglomerate.
And he states that of these classes, the "conglomerate acquisitions have
the least claim to promoting efficiency in the economic sense."'" Turner,
looking at conglomerate mergers on a much broader scale,02 recognizes the
possibility of resulting economies and efficiency. Dr. Blair, considered
"one of the leading crusaders against conglomerate mergers,"", has,
according to Turner, greatly overstated his case. 4
It is unfortunate that dichotomic economic views should prevail
over the antimerger law since this seriously weakens the total legislative
process. Application of section 7 does not require a construction based on
any one of the varying economic schools of thought. In fact, to the dismay
of many economists, it is not necessary for one to be even trained in the
field of economics in order to understand the antimerger statute. Congress
has established its own economic standard, which is based on a compre-
hensive, time-consuming and expensive analysis of the many conflicting
economic views. If Congress has been wrong in the conclusion reached
(which is the view of many), the economists, desiring to establish differ-
ent principles, should go back to Congress and request the necessary
changes. It is not for lawyers to question the substance of lawfully
enacted standards. Refusal to accept such standards (particularly in the
antimerger field), under the guise that Congress has granted the legal
profession a license to formulate its own economic rules, will effectively
emasculate the statute, and has done so with section 7.
2. Conglomerates Defended-To understand the Turner position,
one must consider the factors that influence the substantive nature of his
conglomerate rules. For obvious reasons, Turner limits his formulation of
general rules to the conglomerates. The generally accepted construction
of section 7 is that it prohibits only anticompetitive mergers. 5 From
this starting point, one can readily see the anticompetitive effects of
horizontal and vertical mergers. Horizontal mergers, it is said, contribute
heavily to the growth of monopoly and oligopoly situations; thus there
61. Blair, The Conglomerate Merger in Economics and Law, 46 Geo. L.J. 672, 679
(1958). When this article was written, as part of a symposium, Blair was the chief econ-
omist for the Senate Sub-Committee on Anti-Trust and Monopoly. But though an econ-
omist, he gives an accurate discussion of the historical congressional fears of mergers and
the associated legal issues.
62. Looking at the issue on a broader scale, Turner observes that conglomerates in-
volving no significant economic relationship have been relatively infrequent. Turner at 1315.
But even with the so-called pure conglomerate, Turner sees many economic advantages that
must be considered in measuring the anticompetitive effects. Turner at 1329-37.
63. Id. at 1328-29.
64. Id. at 1329.
65. I will discuss this point in greater detail at a later point in the article.
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is justification for a significant check on them. 6 Likewise, vertical
mergers are likely to be anticompetitive, since they may lead to an
extension of market power from one level to another., Conglomerate
mergers, on the other hand, do not as readily produce clear anticompeti-
tive effects (presuming that the statute prohibits only anticompetitive
mergers). According to Turner, the conglomerates range from pure con-
glomerate, in which there are no discernible economic relationships be-
tween the acquiring and the acquired firm, through a variety of mixed
conglomerates, involving horizontal or vertical characteristics."
Basically, Turner defends conglomerate mergers by means of a policy
argument in favor of improved economies and efficiency. Looking, perhaps,
at the total antitrust policy picture, Turner states, "[T]here is the
enormous social interest in progress and efficiency, which has represented
one of the primary bases for the policy of promoting competition as it has
in fact evolved." 69 More specifically, the economies of a conglomerate
merger might include spreading of overhead;7" spreading risk over more
independent sources of income; use of more efficient management; 2
and the attraction of cheap capital.73 The validity of none of these advan-
tages of the conglomerate can be questioned. The Procter & Gamble case
illustrates how the acquiring company is allowed to spread overhead."
By its acquisition of Clorox, Proctor & Gamble was able to achieve a more
efficient deployment of some 127 million dollars spent on advertising. Be-
ing such a large network purchaser, Proctor & Gamble could give each
product network exposure at a fraction of the cost per product that a firm
with only one product to advertise would incur.76 The second advantage
listed above (that risk is spread over more independent sources of income)
has been a major motivating factor behind conglomerate mergers. For ex-
ample, the precarious tobacco industry may desire to join with the less
precarious liquor industry; 7 a defense-oriented company (dependent on
government contracts) may wish to join with a consumer product-oriented
company in order to spread the risk emanating from a peaceful solution
66. Turner 1317.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1315.
69. Id. at 1326.
70. Id. at 1329.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1330.
73. Id. at 1331.
74. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
75. Id. at 573.
76. One proposed merger that failed to ripen was between P. Lorillard, Inc. and Schenley
Industries, Inc.
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of world problems. As far as using the conglomerate to achieve a more
efficient management, this is a possibility but not a certainty.Y In sup-
port of the last advantage (attraction of cheap capital), Turner provides
some interesting statistics. He says that small firms acquired by giant
firms are placed in a better position to acquire capital at a more favorable
cost.
78
True, the mere presence of the larger merged entrant may affect be-
havior of smaller firms. This, to Turner, is an additional advantage offered
by conglomerate mergers. He observes that where acquisitions yield
significant economies and the acquiring firm takes full advantage of them,
the heavy pressure placed on the smaller competitors will improve, rather
than worsen, their competitive performance. In order to survive, these
smaller competitors will be forced to improve their product, reduce manu-
facturing costs, and ultimately reduce the price to the public. 79 Speaking
of the small businessman who might, as a result of the increased efficiency
brought to the market by the conglomerate merger, fall by the wayside,
Turner makes this most revealing statement: "To be sure, they may be
unable to survive the pressures .... Large, diversified firms may tend to
supplant small, single-product companies; and perhaps, though not neces-
sarily, the number of sellers may eventually decline."80 To this possibility,
Turner in effect says: So what? If the smaller firms are lost because of
greater efficiency then this is the force of competition. 8' To support both
this conclusion and his entire theory, Turner resorts to the worn out
phrase that the statute protects "'competition, not competitors.' "82 yhile
this in itself is not an incorrect statement, it is, however, incomplete.
Competition can be protected only by protecting competitors against
practices proscribed by the statute.83 Turner's position, however, is neces-
sary if one is to conclude that mergers should not be invalidated because
of the increased economies. He argues that Congress never intended that
77. See Hearings on S. 510, supra note 20, at 179, where the "tender offer" was defended
as a means of eliminating inefficient management. In "The Magazine of Wall Street and
Business Analysis," May 13, 1967, the strong management of P. Lorillard was viewed as a
way to improve the Schenley brands.
78. Turner 1338. Using 1957, Turner reports costs of bank loans to businesses: businesses
with assets of less than: $50,000-6.5%; $50,000 to $250,000-5.7,; $1 million to $5
million-5.1%; $5 million to $25 million-4.8%; and over $100 million-4.4%. Id.
79. Turner 1352.
80. Id. at 1353 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 1353.
82. Id. at 1324.
83. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961);
KIor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). Turner recognizes,
however, that in some areas of the antitrust laws, individual competitors have been pro-
tected. Turner 1325.
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section 7 be used as a weapon against increased efficiency, and he takes
issue with the Court 4 and the Federal Trade Commission 8 for making
such a suggestion. Turner notes that in the Foremost Dairies case, the
Commission said that: "[T] he necessary proof of violation of the statute
consists of types of evidence showing that the acquiring firm possesses
significant power in some markets or that its overall organization gives it
a decisive advantage in efficiency over its smaller rivals."8' To this state-
ment, Turner remarks: "This position is not only bad economics but
bad law."817 Others have made even stronger condemnatory statements
about what appears to them to be a judicial attack on efficiency.
One of the most blistering attacks on the Court, with special mention
of Justice Douglas, comes from Professor Bork of the Yale Law School.
Writing in a recent issue of Fortune, Professor Bork, in a review of the
Procter & Gamble case, says: "The Supreme Court has steadily and
drastically re-shaped the law to protect the inefficient producer at the
expense of consumers." ' One of the most astonishing things about the
Procter & Gamble case, according to Professor Bork, was the Court's
lack of concern about the efficiencies generated by the merger. This lack
of concern for efficiencies is particularly significant, he finds, in light of
the position the government brief took: "In general, advantages afforded
by a merger which reflect simply greater efficiency ought not to be a basis
for holding the merger illegal; efficiency is, after all, a prime goal of anti-
trust."8 9 Focusing a direct attack on Justice Douglas, who wrote the
Proctor & Gamble opinion, Professor Bork noted these words: "'Possible
economies... cannot be used as a defense to illegality.' "0 These words,
according to Professor Bork, were unfortunate; however, there was more
concern for the reasons given by Justice Douglas in support of his asser-
tion. His interpretation of the reasoning of Justice Douglas was that
economies weigh on the side of illegality because cost savings which
might be beneficial to consumers were a threat to the protection of small,
locally-owned businesses.9 Justice Douglas was attacked principally for
his (alleged) "tendency from time to time to assert without explanation
and to treat conclusions as self-evident."' 2
84. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bk., 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963); Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962); Turner 1324.
85. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944 (1962); Turner 1324.
86. 60 F.T.C. at 1084 (emphasis added).
87. Turner 1324.
88. Bork, The Supreme Court Versus Corporate Efficiency, Fortune, Aug. 1967, at 92,
col. 2.
89. Id. at 155, col. 1.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 93, col. 1.
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Besides showing some ambivalence in his reasoning, Professor Bork,
like Turner, shows a misunderstanding of the merger opinions of the
Supreme Court. Without going into a detailed discussion of Procter &
Gamble, as well as other merger cases that have reached the Supreme
Court,93 it is sufficient, at this point, to say that the Court is not attack-
ing efficiency. What is being attacked is a method of achieving the
efficiency which threatens the very existence of small locally-owned busi-
nesses. The line separating the "method of achieving" from the "effi-
ciency" itself is, to be sure, thin and subtle, but it is discernible and must
be seen and comprehended for one to understand the Supreme Court
decisions in this area.
Artificial methods of achieving efficiency are nothing new to the com-
mercial world. In fact, these methods were the very concern of the anti-
trust laws, starting in 1890 with the Sherman Act. The large trusts of the
1800's, it could be argued, were designed to achieve the greatest degree
of efficiency. By bringing all competitors under central control, it was
possible to utilize the production facilities in the most efficient manner.
The problem was that the power formed by this centralization was mis-
used. Large mergers occurring today present the identical problem. Though
they may be defended in their inception because of the increased econo-
mies and efficiency, the power created might very well be misused
tomorrow.
In early cases such as Trenton Potteries (involving price fixing) 4 and
Addyston Pipe (involving division of markets)," the Court struck down
efforts by parties to achieve greater efficiency because of the method used.
In Trenton Potteries, it made little difference that the prices fixed were
reasonable and thus beneficial to consumers. The Court, showing more
concern over the power represented by the price-fixing agreement, stated
that: "The power to fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or not,
involves power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and unreason-
able prices. The reasonable price fixed today may through economic and
business changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow."9 0 Cer-
tainly no one would say that the Court was attacking efficiency in these
cases. The Court was instead attacking the method of achieving efficiency,
as it has in so many other cases where the method was of the type
proscribed by Congress.
93. I am presently researching this area and hope in the near future to complete my
study of the judicial attitude in the antitrust field, with emphasis on merger and treble
damage cases.
94. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
95. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified, 175
U.S. 211 (1899).
96. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (emphasis added).
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In the Corn Products case,9 for example, the parties through a com-
bination had, because of depressed market conditions, acquired and dosed
down several plants which were not capable of effective production. Ignor-
ing the fact that the combination may have had a beneficial effect on
industry and the public, Judge Learned Hand struck down the combina-
tion. In doing so, he stated that: "If the decisions of the Supreme Court
are to be so understood, it is the mere possession of an economic power,
acquired by some form of combination, and capable, by its own variation
in production,* of changing and controlling price, that is illegal.""8
Justice Douglas, who has written most of the Supreme Court's merger
opinions since the Columbia Steel case," has been even more adamant in
rejecting the efficiency arguments as justification for illegal methods. In
the Socony-Vacuum case, 00 Justice Douglas stated that: "Ruinous com-
petition, financial disaster, evils of price cutting and the like appear
throughout our history as ostensible justifications for price-fixing." 01
While these cases have not involved merger problems, they do represent
creditable support for the assertion that the Court is attacking the method
of achieving efficiency and not the efficiency itself. Looking at a recent
merger case, one finds the argument in the Philadelphia National Bank
case that the merger will improve the bank's efficiency and will have pro-
competitive effects since the Philadelphia bank will be in a better position
to compete with the large New York banks.02 Rejecting this argument,
the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Brennan stated: "If anti-
competitive effects in one market could be justified by pro-competitive
consequences in another, the logical upshot would be that every firm in
an industry could, without violating § 7, embark on a series of mergers
that would make it in the end as large as the industry leader."' 3 Justice
Brennan then went further and, in effect, stated that even if the Court was
receptive to the pro-competitive and efficiency arguments it could do
nothing. "A value choice of such magnitude is beyond the ordinary limits
of judicial competence, and in any event has been made for us already,
by Congress when it enacted the amended § 72"1°4
Regardless of the opposing mandate from the highest Court, the legal
profession, the lower court judges, and antitrust scholars persist in
97. United States v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 234 F. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), appeal dis-
missed, 249 U.S. 621 (1919).
98. Id. at 1012.
99. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
100. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 US. 150 (1940).
101. Id. at 221.
102. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370-71 (1963).
103. Id. at 370.
104. Id. at 371.
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defending conglomerate mergers as a vehicle for the achievement of
greater economies and efficiency. Turner, classed high among the anti-
trust scholars, strongly defends this position even after expressly recog-
nizing that this efficiency might force out of business the smaller, less
efficient competitors. This, he continues, cannot be avoided because such
an effect is a natural consequence of efficiency. Furthermore, if it does not
happen through a merger, it will inevitably happen through internal ex-
pansion of a corporation into new markets. 05 What Turner seems to be
saying is that: Since we cannot block the efficiency then we should go
ahead and promote it. Whether efficiency is brought to a market through
a merger or internal expansion, the small, inefficient operator will either
be lost or he will be forced to improve his competitive performance. 100
Turner is too quick to accept what he considers to be the inevitable.
There is a thin line separating the methods of bringing greater efficiency
to a market. Though the line is thin, the resulting separation of mergers
and internal expansion is more noticeable. Consideration of this separation
will illustrate why Congress felt justified in limiting its proscription to
mergers. And if Turner had considered the inherent differences, I do not
believe that he would have been so quick in his conclusion that the
smaller firms will be affected in the same way in either case.
Small firms in a particular market are affected more materially by a
merger than by internal expansion by a large firm. In the first place,
internal expansion is a slower process, and the smaller firms already
established in a market will be given some time to improve their competi-
tive performance. With the merger, on the other hand, the expansion can
come much more quickly, thereby cutting into the time needed to im-
prove. Besides this time advantage, there is also a cost factor that must
be considered. Obviously a corporation cannot go into a new market and
construct facilities at the same cost that a small competitor faced twenty
to fifty years earlier. With higher construction costs, the large corporation
considering internal expansion into a new market immediately faces a
higher unit cost for the produced product. This then, in a sense, insulates
the smaller firms from the economic power of the giant corporations.
Turner himself admits that expansion through mergers is cheaper than
expansion through internal growth.10 7 The Columbia Steel Company
case10 8 presents some interesting figures which illustrate the significance
of the time and cost factors. When United States Steel became interested
in acquiring the assets of Consolidated Steel Corporation, the committee
105. Turner 1331-32.
106. Id. at 1352-53.
107. Id. at 1318.
108. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
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established to study these facilities found that it would cost United States
Steel 14 million dollars and three years of time to construct plants equiv-
alent to those owned by Consolidated. 10 9 Since the depreciated value of the
Consolidated facilities was approximately $9,800,000, its cost base would
have been $4,000,000 less than what it would take for U.S. Steel to
construct equivalent facilities. Faced with the increased cost factor plus
the risk associated with the three years needed to construct the plants, the
committee established by U.S. Steel might well have recommended no
entry into the Consolidated market through internal expansion. Instead
it might have considered internal expansion in some other market area,
thereby contributing to a decentralization of production facilities. This
probability,"0 however, will never be tested since U.S. Steel successfully
negotiated an acquistion price of $8,250,000 for the Consolidated assets."'
A final Turner justification for conglomerate mergers to be discussed
in this section involves the "capital asset" market which is created by a
liberal merger policy. Turner says that a strict merger policy would
drastically weaken the market for capital assets and seriously depreciate
the price that persons could get for their businesses when they wished to
liquidate." "Such a policy," remarks Turner, "would seriously interfere
with maximum exploitation of productive resources . .. clearly against
the interests of small businesses already in being."" As laudable as this
policy argument might be, its acceptance would mean the complete destruc-
tion of the anti-merger statute. Congress in formulating its anti-merger
standard was in effect weighing the interests of those who desired to stay
in business and those who desired to liquidate. It is imposible to protect
both interests by a general proscription, and with section 7 Congress chose
to protect those businessmen desiring to stay in business. Furthermore,
109. Id. at 505.
110. There was such a probability in this case since U.S. Steel had earlier acquired its
Geneva facilities from the Government. US. Steel needed new fabricating facilities to
insure a market for its increased production of rolled steel products created by Genea.
111. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 506 (1948).
112. Turner 1326.
113. Id. Speaking of the Columbia Steel case, supra note 108, it should be noted that
Consolidated, the acquired firm, approached US. Steel and encouraged the acquisition.
From what Turner states about the benefits to small businesses, it would be of interest to
see what size the business must be to be considered "small." The editors of Fortune, August,
1967, at 94, reported on a survey of '"hat 'Little Business' Thinks About Mergers." This
survey, however, included only executives of companies with annual sales ranging from
$40 million to $60 million. The conclusion of the survey should be obvious. In this conclusion,
the editors noted: "Clearly, the federal trustbusters and men of the bench who have been
shaping increasingly restrictive policies on corporate mergers, partly for the purpose of
protecting smaller companies, get surprisingly little support from this group of supposed
beneficiaries." Id. at 94, col. 3.
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it is possible, if not probable, that if the threat of corporate invasion was
eliminated, fewer businessmen would desire to liquidate.
3. Conglomerates-Attacked-Answers given by Turner to certain
obvious attacks on conglomerate mergers will firmly establish his support
for this form of corporate acquisition. It was first noted that a common
belief is that a large company selling in several product or geographical
markets is likely to indulge in predatory pricing."' While this is a pos-
sibility, Turner reports that research and analysis show that this is
unlikely." 5 His entire discussion on this point is weakened by the narrow
and technical definition give to "predatory pricing." He says that merely
because a firm sells below cost or operates at a loss for a substantial
period of time, predatory pricing is not necessarily indicated." 0 Such
practices, says Turner, may be supported by justifiable reasons such as:
meeting distress market conditions, breaking into a new market, effi-
ciency, etc." 7 While the possibility exists, Turner thinks that predatory
practices are so improbable that they deserve little weight "in formulating
antimerger rules based on prospective effects."" 8 Finally, he goes to the
extreme of saying that even should predatory practices occur subsequent
to the acquisition, this should not be grounds for invalidating the
merger." 9
Similar conclusions are reached by Turner in his discussion of the
problems of reciprocity. Though he makes it clear that there can be no
justification for the serious anticompetitive device of reciprocity which
might be a product of mergers, he is equally clear on the point that
mergers should not be automatically outlawed merely because the pos-
sibility of reciprocity exists. He states, "It would be preposterous to out-
law a merger simply on the ground that the merged firm would have a
greater ability to employ requirements contracts or tying agreements,
because such restrictions can generally be readily detected and reached
by law whenever they materialize."' Little concern is shown by Turner
for the power created by a merger which makes it possible for a corpora-
tion to engage in a more favorable pricing policy or even reciprocity. 12t
114. Turner 1339.
115. Id. at 1340.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1341.
118. Id. at 1346.
119. Id. at 1347. In light of what is said here, see United States v. E. I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
120. Turner 1389.
121. His lack of concern for the "power" is the very antithesis of the Court's position.
For recent cases showing the Court's growing concern for power, see FTC v. Brown Shoe
Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1964).
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For Turner, it is enough that these practices can be easily spotted and
brought under control by other existing provisions under the antitrust
laws. Beyond doubt, then, Turner is one of the stoutest advocates of
conglomerate mergers, and it is only natural in light of his present posi-
tion that the enforcement policy should reflect these views.
III. CiTicAL ANALYSIS or TURNER'S MERGER PHILOSOPHY
Perhaps, to an extent, it is unfair to make reference to "Turner's
merger philosophy," since what Turner has said in the article discussed
above is reflective of the views of many other leading scholars. But
Turner is unique in the sense that he has provided us with one of the
most exhaustive studies of conglomerates. Furthermore, he has formu-
lated a set of rules that in his opinion should control the determination
of the legality of conglomerate mergers. This by itself might not be too
significant; however, this set of rules (or guiding principles) has received
wide attention and acclaim from members of the legal profession and
business leaders. 2 And though this public attention is not conclusive, its
significance was increased by his appointment to the position of Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division.
In view of his present position, Turner's previously published views on
conglomerate mergers have become "quasi-public statements." They
became "quasi-public" in the sense that they have manifestly become
the official enforcement policy. One commentator has observed that in
the more than two years since Turner took office he has challenged few
conglomerate-type mergers.123 This, to me, represents a failure of the
antimerger statute. But the failure cannot be attributed solely to Turner.
From its inception, the failure of section 7 of the Clayton Act has been
closely related to the enforcement policy. By charting this relationship,
the wide gap separating the number of mergers and the number of mergers
challenged becomes obvious. Graphs I and II, prepared from statistics
reported by the Federal Trade Commission, illustrate the long-existing
timidity in enforcement policy. Consequently, in order to find a clue to
explain the obvious failure, one must comprehensively examine the anti-
trust enforcement philosophy.
In focusing attention on Turner, there is certainly no intent to be
vindictive. He, like others, is merely reacting to a long established judicial
supremacy philosophy.
1. Judicial Supremacy Philosophy-Though a historical and philo-
sophical aberration, judicial supremacy is, in practice, a reality. I have
122. Business Week, May 20, 1967, at 60; Time, Sept. 8, 1967, at 93; Wright, Antitrust
Today: A Curb on Competition 8 (Pamphlet distributed by U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
123. Time, Sept. 8, 1967, at 93.
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GRAPH I
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Kefauver Act: Sixteen Years of Enforcement 37-39 (Comm. Print Oct. 16, 1967) thereinafter
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seen no satisfactory discussion as to the origin of this policy; however,
most writers seem to trace it to the common law.124 Speaking of the
court's power over statutes, Professor Radin once observed that there
was no early common law doctrine that held statutes unassailable. 2 This
form of judicial supremacy, according to most legal historians, was rooted
in the idea that statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly
construed. 2 6 Likewise, they all seem to agree that Sir Edward Coke was
the creator of this concept. For example, Professor Radin says that Coke
illustrates better than any one else the ordinary common law lawyer's
opposition to statutes which interfered with the normal course of legal
development. 27
Coke, in whom the common law came to be personified,' 28 did in fact
express words in the Dr. Bonham case that could logically lead to the
historian's conclusion of judicial supremacy.'29 In this case, Coke, in
clear, unequivocal language, declared that courts were superior to Parlia-
ment. He stated, "And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the
common law will control Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them
to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is against common right
and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common
law will control it, and adjudge such Act to be void."'," There can be no
question that this language, considered in isolation, stands for the propo-
sition of judicial supremacy. And since its declaration in 1610, this state-
ment, though the weakest sort of dictum, has been cited on numerous
occasions by American courts.' 3 ' The only real problem with the legal
historians and the courts is that none really questioned the validity of the
Dr. Bonham statement.
James Kent in his Commentaries did, to an extent, raise doubts about
124. J. Honnold, The Life of the Law (1964); W. Hurst, The Growth of American
Law-The Law Makers (1950); M. Radin, Handbook of Anglo-American Legal History
(1936).
125. M. Radin, supra note 124, at 335.
126. Id. at 335-37; J. Honnold, supra note 124, at 64; W. Hurst, supra note 124, at 34;
Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383, 386 (1908).
127. M. Radin, supra note 124, at 336.
128. MacKay, Coke-Parliamentary Sovereignty or the Supremacy of the Law?, 22 Mich.
L. Rev. 215, 222 (1924).
129. 8 Rep. 107a, 113b, 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 646. The Dr. Bonham case has received an
enormous amount of attention. See MacKay, Coke-Parliamentary Sovereignty or the
Supremacy of the Law?, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 215 (1924); Plucknett, Bonham's Case and
Judicial Review, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 30 (1926); Thorne, Dr. Bonham's Case, 54 L.Q. Rev.
543 (1938).
130. 8 Rep. at l18a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652 (footnote omitted).
131. Statutes in derogation of the common right shall be strictly construed. Lock v.
Miller, 3 Stew. & P. 13 (Ala. 1832); Young v. McKenzie, 3 Ga. 31 (3 Kelly 1847); Sprague
v. Birdsall, 2 Cow. 419 (N.Y. 1823).
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the validity of the statement. Speaking of the power of the statute in
England, Kent stated, "The will of the legislature is the supreme law
of the land, and demands perfect obedience.1 32 But then he continued,
"while we admit this conclusion of the English law, we cannot but admire
the intrepidity and powerful sense of justice which led Lord Coke... to
declare, as he did in Dr. Bonham's case, that the common law does
control acts of Parliament, and adjudges them void, when against com-
mon right and reason."1 3 While Kent recognized the supremacy of the
statute in England, he did not defend the concept. He stated that: "The
judicial power in every government must be co-extensive with the power
of legislation." '134 In exercising their judicial power in the interpretative
process, courts, according to Kent, were required to consider two things
-the common law and the constitution. His view was that statutes are to
be construed with reference to the principles of the common law, since it
must be presumed that the legislature did not intend to create more of an
innovation in the common law than the case absolutely required.135 More
important than this, however, was Kent's discussion of the constitutional
role of the court. Citing Marbury v. Madison,13 6 Kent stated that: "It is
the province and the duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is; and if two laws conflict with each other, to decide on the operation of
each."' 37
Even with his recognition of the strong constitutional power of courts
to declare statutes null and void, Kent still did not carry the issue as far
as later writers. He stated that: "If there be no constitutional objection
to a statute, it is with us as absolute and uncontrollable as laws flowing
from the sovereign power, under any other form of government."' 8
Contemporary writers like Hurst and Honnold look more upon the con-
stitution as the source of power for courts to rule over legislative bodies,
both federal and state. 39 Although Kent did express some limitation to
his views concerning the power of courts over legislative bodies, I think
it fair to say that he, more than any other person in this country, was
instrumental in institutionalizing the judicial supremacy concept. The
irony is that the judicial supremacy concept is based on an erroneous
interpretation of historical events.
Upon a closer examination of the Dr. Bonham dictum that courts are
132. 1 Kent, Commentaries* 448 (5th ed. 1844).
133. Id. (footnote omitted).
134. Id. at *296.
135. Id. at *463.
136. 5 US. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
137. 1 Kent, Commentaries* 453 (5th ed. 1844).
138. Id. at 448.
139. J. flonnold, supra note 124, at 64; W. Hurst, supra note 124, at 27-33.
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supreme, it becomes clear that the statement was not characteristic of
Coke.4 Coke was a great believer in the supremacy of Parliament for
which, as a member of the Commons, he fought so hard. At the same time,
however, Coke believed in a strong and independent judicial system. The
conflict arising in the quest for judicial independence was always with the
king, never with Parliament.
There are several incidents in history that might be considered as
conflicts between common law courts and Parliament. 4' One of the most
interesting, involving Coke, arose when the 1628 Parliament was called.
With the people in control of the Commons, an effort was made to force
crown officers into a sense of responsibility toward Parliament. 42 One of
the first problems to be considered involved the power of the king to
arrest and hold free Englishmen without first charging them. This had
been the issue in the Five Knights case, and the judges who ruled in that
case were called in to defend their position, which was in favor of the
crown.143 Coke, taking hold of the issue, began to cite judicial precedent
to support his position that the knights must first be charged before they
could be held, but he suffered a startling setback when the Solicitor
General cited Coke himself in support of holding the prisoners without
a charge. 44 Two other members of the Commons, Phelips and Selden,
assigned the duty of investigating the Commons' records and precedents
in light of the Solicitor General's statement, concluded and reported that:
"Judicial opinions ... were but servants of the law; where anything was
done against the statutes, it ought not to hold."' 45 And with this conclu-
sion, Coke had to agree. When he went before the Upper House to defend
the resolution passed by the Commons, Coke cited both judicial and
statutory precedent and stated that: "If these acts of Parliament cannot
persuade you, my lords, nothing can.'1146 To sum up the power of Parlia-
ment, one writer says that:
[T]here is now no doubt as to the force and effect of a statute. An act of Parliament
can do anything. It can alter the Prayer Book, define the creed of the Church of Eng-
land, annul royal marriages, and even settle the succession to the Throne. Any citizen
140. For general reading on Coke, see 1 L. Campbell, Lives of the Chief Justices 239-347
(1849); C. Bowen, The Lion and the Throne (1957).
141. Because of the major theme of the article, I will refrain from going into a detailed
discussion of these incidents. It should, however, be noted that this should be the type of
research conducted in order to define more accurately the responsibilities of government
officials charged with the function of carrying out the policy of Congress.
142. C. Bowen, supra note 140, at 482.
143. Id. at 485.
144. Id. at 486.
145. Id. at 486-87.
146. Id. at 487.
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who deems a statute unjust or immoral may agitate in every constitutional manner for
its repeal. But so long as it remains unrepealed he must obey it.147
Going back to the Dr. Bonham case for a moment, I should say that
writers construing the dictum in that case to mean that Coke supported
judicial supremacy over Parliament do a disservice to the man. There
are too many consistent acts which reveal his strong support for sovereign
power for us now to use an inconsistent statement to destroy this belief.
In this country, there has been a battle for power waged between
courts and legislatures . 48 Professor Hurst has observed that the years
1750-1820 offered legislators a chance to become the principal lawmakers
in this country. Not only did the early constitutions give the legislatures
broad powers, but there were, during this period, no significant judicial
decisions regarding the scope of legislative authority.4 ' But then the
legislature lost, or perhaps failed to gain, the confidence of the general
public."5 In any event, courts captured the popular imagination about
1820 and took the initiative in making the law.""' When revived legisla-
tures began to challenge this judicial leadership, courts reinforced their
hold on their supremacy by a revolution in legal education. 2 When in
the 1870s, Dean Christopher Langdell installed the case method of legal
instruction at the Harvard Law School, the concept of judicial supremacy
was perpetuated. 53 During Langdell's time, when legislation was rela-
tively insignificant, the case method of instruction was no doubt appro-
priate. Since then statutes have been rapidly increasing to the point that
all phases of our life and business are controlled by statute instead of
the common law.
Despite the tremendous shift in the balance between common law and
statutes, legal education continues to teach by the now outdated case
method. This is true even in the so-called statutory courses where the
explanation of legislative meaning is based on cases. This defect in legal
education was first mentioned by Roscoe Pound in 1908.'11 And while
text book writers are now providing "cases and materials" instead of a
mere collection of "cases," the emphasis in instruction is still placed on
147. 1 W. Odgers, The Common Law of England 57-58 (1911).
148. W. Hurst, supra note 124, at 23.
149. Id. at 25.
150. J. Honnold, supra note 124, at 61.
151. W. Hurst, supra note 124, at 85.
152. Id. at 85-86.
153. Id. at 86, 258-68. At about the same time the Field-Carter-Pomeroy controversy
was being waged with the enactment of the Field Code in California in 1874. See Thomas,
Statutory Construction When Legislation is Viewed as a Legal Institution, 3 Harv. J. Legis.
191, 205-07 (1966).
154. Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383 (1903).
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case analysis. Overemphasis of case analysis, the basis of common law
development, is today the most significant interference with the legisla-
tive process. Legal education, thus the legal profession, has rejected the
legislative process as a legal institution. 5' We have likewise refused to
accept the fact that there now exists a science of legislation.',,
Students of the law have historically been taught that certain types of
statutes, and all statutes under certain conditions, should be strictly
construed. They have been told that the interpretation of statutes offers
a truly creative role for judges.157 Courts acting as lawmakers have found
authority for their creative role in the canons of statutory construction
and in the "due process clause" of the constitution.5 8 There is abundant
authority, even at common law, supporting the proposition that statutes
must be strictly construed. 1 9 There are indeed interesting consequences
that flow from how one defines the word "strictly." Most writers look
upon this common law founded statement as justification for a creative
judicial role. When judges say that a certain statute must be strictly
construed because it abrogates the common law or because it is a penal
statute, they are giving a reason, or attempting to find support, for what
might amount to a law-making decision.' At one time, I found myself
within this group of writers who construed the word "strictly" to mean
that judges were to play a law-making role.'0 ' Considerable research,
however, has revealed that this proposition is unsound. To say that "a
statute must be strictly construed" does not necessarily lead one to the
conclusion that courts must play a creative role.0 2 It is just as logical,
and more consistent with history, to say that the word "strictly" limits
the authority of courts. Once the word is seen as a word of limitation
instead of a creative word, the consequences flowing therefrom become
155. Thomas, Statutory Construction When Legislation is Viewed as a Legal Institution,
3 Harv. J. Legis. 191 (1966).
156. Pound, supra note 154, at 186.
157. W. Hurst, supra note 124, at 186.
158. I again find it necessary to restrict my discussion because of time and space. One
point about "due process" must, however, be raised. At one point in history courts freely
reviewed the substance of a statute to decide if it met the substantive standard of due
process. Today the substantive due process attack has all but been eliminated. See Nebbla v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). But even so, the attack has influenced the construction
process and must be considered as a factor in the present study.
159. T. Plucknett, A Concise History of The Common Law 158 (5th ed. 1956).
160. See Horack, The Disintegration of Statutory Construction, 24 Ind. L.. 335 (1949).
161. Thomas, supra note 155, at 207.
162. Professor Dickerson once said that: "A court that was interested only in ascertain-
ing the meaning of a statute would have little occasion to construe it either 'strictly' or
'liberally."' Dickerson, Symposium On judicial Law Making in Relation to Statutes--Intro-
duction, 36 Ind. L.. 411, 414 (1961).
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quite different. For example, when one says that "statutes must be strictly
construed," the meaning is that courts have no authority either to add
or subtract anything from the words of the legislative body. This
removes all judicial authority to hand down policy-making decisions,
which to some degree deviate from the enacted words."e
Not only have we ignored the possibilities that this distinction offers,
we have followed the lead of James Kent and John Chipman Gray by
devoting our full energy and facilities to support the proposition that
courts should be creative in the sense that they actually rewrite existing
statutory law.'" The effects of our lack of concern can only be appre-
ciated by an examination of the more contemporary consequences.
2. Modern Battle and Consequences-Judicial interpretation of stat-
utes always involves a confrontation of courts and legislative bodies.
The basic conflict lies in the concepts of the authority of each. On the one
side, courts have consistently and jealously guarded their exclusive
authority from legislative encroachment."0 5 But the converse has not
generally held true. Besides the more subtle incidents, an overreaction to
the institutionalized judicial supremacy concept has led to some amazing
examples of judicial usurpation of legislative authority. The most blatant
incident in recent times occurred when Judge Corcoran of the District
Court of the District of Columbia (at the urging of the American Civil
Liberties Union) issued a temporary order restraining the House Un-
American Activities Committee from conducting hearings into demon-
strations against the Viet Nam war. Never has there been such a direct
attack on the legislative process, and, noting the ensuing reactions on the
part of Congress, one suspects we will never witness such an attack again.
Representative Pool, Chairman of the Committee, was reported to have
said: "The judge has no constitutional right to issue such an order ....
163. If this distinction is valid then the very foundation of judicial supremacy is de-
stroyed. At the present time I am engaged in research to support this position; however,
much more time is needed before a more definite stand can be taken. I suggest this poible
distinction here in an effort to encourage others to devote time to the issue.
164. J. Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law (2d ed. 1927). Gray has been given
much credit for formulating a theory of jurisprudence in which statutes were considered
to be only a "source of Law," with the actual "Law" coming from judicial decisions. Id.
at 84. Actually a broad view of history reveals that Gray formulated no new theory.
Rather, he merely restated what he actually saw going on in the legal system. Instead of
accepting these views as a great contribution (to be followed) to jurisprudence, they should
have aroused concern for what was in reality taking place. With the wide acceptance of his
views, Gray furthered the institutionalization of the judicial supremacy concept.
165. See T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 114 (7th ed. 1903). Smith v. United Con-
struction Workers, 251 Ala. 250, 122 So. 2d 153 (1960) ; People ex rel. Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Board of Supervisors, 16 N.Y. 424 (1857); Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Pa. 489 (1849).
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I will go to jail... until hell freezes over to prove my point."100 Equally
incensed by this flagrant judicial attack, Representative Buchanan of
Alabama declared: "I think the time has come at last ... for Congress
to take a long, sober look at the powers of the Congress and their relation
to some of the things the judicial and executive branches of government
have been doing." 07 Accepting the court's action as a direct judicial
attack on the legislative process, it must be realized that this was merely
a natural consequence of the judicial supremacy concept.0 8 The differ-
ence between this blatant attack and the more subtle encroachments ac-
complished through the interpretative process is only a matter of degree.
There has been so much written and said (particularly in the arena of
legal education) on this subject, that the common belief is that courts
operate as a supervisory arm over the law-making institution.
There are other incidents of possible judicial encroachment which,
while less obvious, are equally direct. Following the reapportionment
cases, 169 the Supreme Court finally took jurisdiction of a case involving
an individual's right to take his legislative seat. 70 Though the Georgia
legislature was not ordered to seat Julian Bond,' 7' the same issue might
well be presented to the Court again in the Adam Clayton Powell case."
Early labor cases also offer a good example of the battle for authority
waged between courts and legislative bodies. 73 At first, the courts were in
command. By applying a double standard, the courts, freely granting
labor injunctions, effectively thwarted the rights of workers to organize
and to take concerted action necessary to gain any demanded economic
benefitsY.4 By the use of common law devices 70 and later the Sherman
166. N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1966, at 1, col. 1.
167. Birmingham News, Aug. 16, 1966, at 1, col. 7.
168. The decision was reversed about as fast as it was rendered. N.Y. Times, Aug. 17,
1966, at 1, col. 1.
169. Since Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), reapportionment has presented no real
issue to the courts.
170. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
171. The Court merely ruled that Bond's constitutional rights had been violated. But
upon this decision, the legislature, without waiting for further judicial action, seated Bond.
172. Powell v. McCormack, 266 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1967). [The Supreme Court later
denied certiorari. 387 U.S. 933 (1967).]
173. The same experience is found in the evolution from the old fellow-servant rule to
the workman's compensation laws. See generally, C. Auerbach, L. Garrison, W. Hurst & S.
Mermin, The Legal Process (1961).
174. For a discussion of this double standard, see L. Wolf, Lockout 4-5 (1965). Com-
pare Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900), with Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor,
Gow, & Co., 23 Q. B. Div. 598 (1889).
175. E.g., Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896).
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Act,178 workers were judicially suppressed, causing at times outbreaks
of violence.1 7 Congress, in an effort to protect the rights of workers to
organize, then passed the Clayton Act, which exempted the "labor of a
human being" from the provisions of the Sherman Act.17  But courts,
influenced by their generally unsympathetic feeling toward labor, refused
to give up the battle so easily. The Clayton Act, which had been hailed
as labor's "charter of freedom," was rendered impotent by the strict con-
struction device which has been effectively used by courts to perpetuate
the judicial supremacy concept.17  Finally Congress, making a counter-
attack to preserve its law-making authority, effectively removed the
federal courts from the scene of labor disputes. With the passage of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, courts were prohibited from issuing any labor
injunction "except in a strict conformity with the provisions of this
act."'8 0 Then, in another giant step, Congress established in the National
Labor Relations Board, a more sympathetic agency that would honor
rather than usurp its legislative authority.'
Of all the incidents where judicial supremacy has clashed with the
legislative process, none can compare (at least for effectiveness) with
incidents arising under antitrust laws. In the field of antitrust, the
success of courts in their law making role must be attributed to the fact
that no one has really questioned this judicial authority. Even those
writers who call for the elevation of legislation to a science seem to con-
cede that the antitrust laws are in a special category.8 2 It is special in
the sense that writers generally take the position that Congress has
purposely used general language to transfer to the courts a general license
to supply the meaning.' Professor Jaffe, speaking on the court's role in
the field of antitrust, has stated that:
176. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); United States v. Debs;
64 F. 724 (NJD. Ill. 1894).
177. Roscoe Pound observed that there were those who "express the opinion that 'belated
and anti-social' decisions have been a fruitful cause of strikes, industrial discord, and conse-
quent lawlessness." Pound, supra note 154, at 384. See also Reid, Violence in American Law:
A Review of Five Books, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1208 (1965).
178. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. Jf 12-27 (1964).
179. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
180. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. g 101-115 (1964) (emphasis added). It is inter-
esting to note how Congress was using the word "strict" in this statute. With the use of this
word, there was a clear attempt to restrict the authority of courts. This is the same way the
word should be accepted in the historical common law approach to statutes in general.
181. Wagner Act § 3, 29 US.C. §§ 151-66 (1964).
182. Pound, supra note 154, at 383: "[Ljawyers in the legislature often conceive it more
expedient to make of a statute the barest outline, leaving details of the most vital impor-
tance to be filled in by judicial law-making."
183. J. Cohen, Materials and Problems on Legislation 64-67 (2d ed. 1967); J. Hoanold,
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Even the most traditional lawyer will admit that under the Sherman Act a court has
no choice but to formulate its standards as to what is a restraint of trade or a monop-
oly and that the formulation must express the court's notions of policy. The Sherman
Act is an extreme case but all great statutes force the judge at some point or other, be
he ever so reluctant, to devise a "common-law" of the statute. We have it from good
authority that the legislative draftsman on occasion ... deliberately fails to make ex-
plicit provision for a foreseen case.184
This license has been freely exercised by most of the lower federal
courts which render antitrust decisions on the basis of some conceived
policy, though it might be totally inconsistent with the legislative purpose.
For example, a federal district court, in upholding the Philadelphia Na-
tional Bank merger, stated that the merger would be "good for Philadel-
phia."'8 5 The most notable incidents of judicial supremacy in the anti-
trust field have, however, occurred in the treble damage cases. Lower
federal courts, without any support from the Supreme Court, have
generated a natural reluctance toward private suits because of the sever-
ity of the compulsory treble damages. 80 Professor Areeda, on this point,
observed that we are not willing to frame broad or rigorous liability rules
because private plaintiffs will not invoke them with responsible re-
straint. 8 7 Lower federal courts have gone so far as to ignore the practical
effects of the personal efforts of an injured plaintiff who successfully liti-
gated his case all the way through the Supreme Court. After receiving
a favorable verdict from the Court in Simpson v. Union Oil Co.,'"8 the
plaintiff returned to the federal district court to prove his damages. To
his surprise, the lower court denied the damages on the ground of unfair-
ness to defendant who it said had acted in good faith in relying on pre-
viously existing judicial precedent.8 0
Turner, like the courts, has felt free to formulate a set of conglomerate
merger rules with which to supply meaning to the presumed skeleton
anti-merger statute. In his comprehensive conglomerate merger article,
supra note 124, at 61; Cohen, Judicial "Legisputation" and the Dimensions of Legislative
Meaning, 36 Ind. L.J. 414, 415-16 (1961); Miller, Statutory Language and the Purposive
Use of Ambiguity, 42 Va. L. Rev. 23, 30 (1956).
184. Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 359, 360-61
(1947) (footnotes omitted).
185. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963). The Supreme
Court rejected this policy decision and stated: "A value choice of such magnitude is beyond
the ordinary limits of judicial competence .... " Id.
186. Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in Private Anti-
trust Suits, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 363 (1954), citing Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 297
F. 791, 812 (2d Cir. 1924).
187. P. Areeda, Antitrust Analysis 36 (1967).
188. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
189. CCH 1967 Trade Cases 72,142 (N.D. Calif. 1967). For a discussion of the plaintiff's
chances before district court decision was rendered see P. Areeda, supra note 187, at 36.
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Turner in effect denied the exclusive authority of Congress on three occa-
sions. He first stated, "While Congress obviously wanted to limit
mergers significantly, it also wished to leave at least some room for those
that promised beneficial or neutral effects and no serious threat to com-
petition."'190 He then observed that it is undeniable that the legislative
history of the 1950 amendment "indicated extensive, if not primary, pre-
occupation with alleged evils of concentration and alleged virtues of small
entrepreneurship."' 9' Finally Turner stated that "even though Congress
may have thought otherwise, and even though it may not be appropriate
for a court to 'overrule' a major premise of Congress by appeal to...
[economics statistics], it is certainly in order for the courts to take into
account the facts as they are in rejecting a policy choice that is contrary
to the main thrust of antitrust law and that Congress never really
made."'1
92
There is little doubt that Turner recognized and understood the statu-
tory purpose behind the 1950 Clayton Act Amendment; however, it is
equally clear that he seeks to bury this policy under his own economic
philosophy. His formulation of economic rules under which the great
majority of conglomerate mergers can be approved is nothing more than
an overreaction to the aberrant judicial supremacy concept. After creating
a set of general guiding principles based on certain economic views,
Turner says that if "Congress had focused on the issue, it would have
wished such a result.' 93 It seems strange indeed that anyone would
suggest that Congress had not focused on the issue. There are probably
few, if any, topics considered by Congress that have received the attention
focused on corporate mergers. Furthermore, a closer examination of this
material will bring clarity to the statutory words.
Congress is quite capable of establishing its own economic standard
under which corporate mergers are to be judged. When this is done (as
it has been in section 7 of the Clayton Act), there is no room, in the
application of the statute, for lawyers, courts or enforcement officers to
formulate their own economic policy. Instead of expending energy in this
direction (which will naturally result in inconsistent conclusions and thus
confusion) our efforts must be directed toward gaining an understand-
ing of the single congressional standard. This, however, will be accom-
plished only by developing a "legislative science" which demands recog-
nition of the legislative process as a "legal institution." Only then will
clarity in making business decisions replace the present state of confusion.
190. Turner 1316-17.
191. Id. at 1326.
192. Id. at 1327-28 (footnote omitted).
193. Id. at 1326.
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While the final results of the enforced statute might not make business-
men who desire to merge happy, any necessary changes must come from
Congress.
Refusal to abandon the judicial supremacy concept has effectively
retarded the consistency and thus the effectiveness of the antitrust
laws,"9 4 and members of the legal profession who face antitrust problems
daily have contributed heavily to this retardation. In fact, the judicial
supremacy concept reaches its pinnacle through positions taken by cer-
tain leading members of the Bar. For example, Jerrold Van Cise, a
nationally known antitrust lawyer, considered it necessary (in his dis-
cussion of the per se rule) to determine whether congressional objectives
should be used to support judicial decisions. 9 ' When taken out of context,
a reasonable conclusion would be that one should go to the statute only
when the judicial decisions are not clear. Placed in its proper context,
Van Cise's conclusion is that the per se rule is not absolute, and that to
determine the limitations one should go to the congressional objectives.
But even here (where a case is clear), the judicial decision is elevated
above the statute-leaving the impression that there is a wide range of
judicial discretion. Remaining consistent with most other writers, Van
Cise admits and supports the wide range of judicial discretion. He states,
"In the antitrust field the courts have been accorded, by common consent,
an authority they have in no other branch of enacted law."10  But Van
Cise does not go nearly as far as some other lawyers who specialize in
antitrust laws. Ira Millstein, who was formerly with the Antitrust Divi-
sion, took a rather interesting position at a recent Practicing Law Insti-
tute workshop on conglomerate mergers. 97 He voiced objections to
congressional hearings on this subject because such hearings were nothing
more than a list of economic views rather than an examination of proven
judicial decisions. He continued by saying that Congress should have
looked to the courts to see what legislation should be passed in the
merger field. In view of its obvious fallacy, nothing need be said about
this position except that it is one more example of overemphasis of the
judicial supremacy concept.
3. Why The Insistence That Courts Make Law?-For the general
purposes of this article, I will not seek to provide a comprehensive and
conclusive discussion of this question. Rather, I will seek merely to
194. This is not limited to the antitrust laws; the same holds true for most social legis-
lation statutes. Through their interpretative powers, courts can effectively impede or thwart
social legislation. See Pound, supra note 154, at 385.
195. J. Van Cise, Understanding the Antitrust Laws 116 (1966).
196. Id. at 117.
197. Practicing Law Institute, The Antitrust Challenge to Corporate Growth Through
Conglomerate Acquisitions and Joint Venture, Dec. 2-3, 1966.
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identify the stumbling blocks to effective legislation. My discussion will
be divided into two parts: first, the general misunderstanding of the
legislative process which prevails in this country; second, the natural fear
of change.
a) Misunderstanding: It has been suggested that since judges were
common law trained, they felt somewhat awkward in deciding cases based
on statutes. They would look at statutes but then analogize from cases.'"
Since legal education was common law oriented, it was only natural that
lawyers would feel more comfortable and reassured with an analysis of
cases. And what lawyers do, so do the judges. "It is not the judge's duty
to understand, but it is the lawyer's duty to make himself understood. The
judge remains seated awaiting a communication; the lawyer is on his feet;
he should be the aggressor and approach the judge in both the physical
and intellectual sense."' 99 This is especially true under our adversary sys-
tem where the opposing lawyers are charged with the duty of developing
the case.
By reasoning that the legislative body must predict detailed applica-
tions of any proposed legislation while courts draw their principles from
detailed applications after the event, one might reasonably conclude that
courts must make law. In other words, statutes passed yesterday must be
molded by courts to meet modem technological changes. This is a com-
monly heard statement; however, I suggest that it manifests a clear
misunderstanding of the legislative process. The misunderstanding is
based on the outworn and discarded concept that courts, in applying
statutes, must ascertain the legislative intent." ° There is no reason to
assume a limitation on the authority of Congress to pass a law which
will cover both foreseen and unforeseen situations. Under the Sherman
Act, Congress could have just as well said that every contract and every
other device that might be invented in the future by lawyers or business-
men, in restraint of trade, is hereby declared to be illegal. Merely because
every conceivable device was not listed does not mean that any law-
making authority was delegated to courts in classifying the type of
device which would be illegal. Congress was itself taking care of the un-
foreseen situation. Likewise, Congress could have said that every contract
involving price fixing, division of markets, group boycotts, and any other
form of restraint that might be invented in the future, is hereby declared
to be illegal. Again, merely because Congress did not conceive of all forms
198. J. Honnold, supra note 124, at 60.
199. These philosophical words come from P. Calamandrei, Eulogy of Judges 22 (2d ed.
1956 tr. by Adams and Phillips).
200. Justice Frankfurter admonished us against using this word "intent." Frankfurter,
Some Reflections On the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527 (1947).
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of restraint, one cannot conclude that any law-making authority was
delegated to the courts. The use of general language in a statute is not a
delegating device; it is a legislative device used to insure that the prohibi-
tion provided will cover the unknown as well as the known evils.
The general misunderstanding of the legislative process is rather evi-
denced by the belief that the courts' creative role lends greater certainty
to the law. It is argued that by refining the general congressional standard
into more precise principles (as is done at the common law) greater
certainty is achieved.21' No one would argue about the desire for greater
certainty; the question, however, is: how much certainty is possible?
Since few words possess the precision of mathematical symbols, and since
most statutes deal with many unforeseen problems, "no more than a
reasonable degree of certainty can be demanded.1 20 2 Because of the un-
avoidable lack of precision in a statute, "one who deliberately goes
perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that
he may cross the line."20 3 The risk involved is certainly not mitigated by
encouraging courts to create more precise principles. Courts cannot be
granted such creative power without, at the same time, being allowed to
consider policy arguments which, in the antitrust field, will be based on
a variety of economic theories. Furthermore, there will be many incon-
sistent decisions coming from the several districts, thereby creating
greater uncertainty rather than achieving the desired clarity. Though
certainty can never be absolute, the greatest degree will be achieved by
expending all energies toward gaining an understanding of the single con-
gressional standard.
There has been much written on the subject; however, I do not believe
that the research in the antitrust field has proven any more effective than
in other areas of legislation. As to these areas, the late Justice Frank-
furter once observed, "I confess unashamedly that I do not get much
nourishment from books on statutory construction, and I say this after
freshly reexamining them all, scores of them. '2°4 The general weakness
of writers in this area is that they are either seeking to explain the law
201. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of
Standards, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 863 (1962); Sullivan, Federal Power Commission Jurisdiction
Over Commingled Sales of Natural Gas: a Problem in Judicial and Administrative Legisla-
tion, 30 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 638, 642 (1962). In the antitrust area this position is shared
by most writers. This is the position advocated by Turner in his article. See also FTC v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan);
Bork, supra note 88.
202. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952); see Frank-
furter, supra note 200, at 543.
203. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 393 (1965).
204. Frankfurter, supra note 200, at 530.
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on the basis of judicially created principles or they are seeking to play
the part of a politician by rewriting the law. In either case the main
object of the legal research is lost. It is impossible to understand the
substantive matter of a statute without, at the same time, giving sufficient
consideration to the relationship of courts and the legislature as it is
involved in the interpretative process. °5
b) Fear of change: Fused with the general misunderstanding of the
legislative process is a fear of change. While one might say that fear is
based on misunderstanding, it goes much deeper than this. Fear of change
might actually be based on a desire to preserve the existing power struc-
ture.
Lawyers have historically shown a fear of change, particularly if the
change is to occur within the legal profession. No better evidence of this
can be shown than the early Field-Carter-Pomeroy codification contro-
versy.20 6 James Carter, the great New York opponent to a change from
common law to codification, declared: "We all know that when the
courts of common law in the infancy of legislation came to be called upon
to interpret statutes, they soon displayed their wisdom by hitting upon
the now familiar rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are
to be strictly construed.' 12°o Professor Pomeroy argued the issue even
more strongly since he was fighting to save the common law after the
Field code was adopted in California. He argued that the code was in-
complete, imperfect and partial since the familiar common law terminol-
ogy had been replaced by unfamiliar expressions which had no definitely
settled legal meaning2  He then successfully proposed that
except in the comparatively few instances where the language is so clear and un-
equivocal as to leave no doubt of an intention to depart from, alter or abrogate the
common-law rule concerning the subject-matter, the courts should avowedly adopt
and follow without deviation the uniform principle of interpreting all the definitions,
statements of doctrines and rules contained in the code in complete conformity with
the common-law definitions, doctrines and rules, and as to all the subordinate effects
resulting from this interpretation.2 09
Closely akin to this fear of change, and even more important, is the
desire to preserve the existing power structure.10 Many incidents in the
law show the existence of this desire. For example, in Munn v. Illinois,211
205. See note 42 supra.
206. Thomas, supra note 155, at 205-07. See also J. Honnold, supra note 124, at 123.
207. J. Carter, Law: Its Origin, Growth and Function 303 (1907).
208. Harrison, The First Half-Century of The California Civil Code, 10 Calif. L. Rev.
185, 189 (1922).
209. Quoted in Harrison, supra note 208, at 189-90.
210. See H. Laski, The State In Theory and Practice (1935).
211. 94 US. 113 (1876).
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where the Supreme Court affirmed the states' power to regulate railroads,
Mr. Justice Field, in a vigorous dissent, stated that: "The principle upon
which the opinion of the majority proceeds is, in my judgment, subversive
of the rights of private property, heretofore believed to be protected by
constitutional guarantees against legislative interference."2 12 It has been
stated that courts captured the popular imagination about 1820; 218 how-
ever, there is just as much evidence to support the notion that courts,
rather than being popular with the people, were actually controlled by the
railroad interests and their own political philosophy.2 14 This conclusion
cannot be ignored in light of the vast amount of evidence concerning the
unsympathetic feeling of courts toward individuals in fellow-servant cases
and in the many cases involving the workers' efforts to organize in order
that they might be more effective in making demands on employers. And
there is no reason to believe that the same feeling does not exist in the
field of antitrust. In fact, this feeling becomes quite obvious in the
many harsh attacks leveled at the Supreme Court because of adverse
decisions in the relatively few cases that ever reach the Court. It becomes
particularly unfortunate when this criticism is leveled at the Court by
men who are supposed to be trained in the law. 215 Many of these critics
are good examples of the "politician disguised as a lawyer."
IV. SHOULD COURTS MAKE LAW IN THE FIELD OF ANTITRUST?
Based on the previous discussion, no one can question the fact that
courts have definitely assumed law-making power in the antitrust field.
In fact, instead of questioning this power, most people and courts devote
their energies to a defense of it. The judicial position on this question
was greatly clarified in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp.216 Recovery of treble damages was there denied on the ground that
the defendant should not be penalized for action occurring before the
212. Id. at 136.
213. W. Hurst, supra note 124, at 85.
214. Thomas, An Answer to Regulation Critics-Control of Administrative Agencies, 1
Tulsa L.J. 109, 112 (1964); Reid, Henry Brannon and Marmaduke Dent: The Shapers of
West Virginia Law, Part I, 65 W. Va. L. Rev. 19 (1962). It has been said of Chief Justice
Marshall that he personally (he being a Federalist, it is understandable) favored a strong
national economy and a strong central government, which he achieved through decision after
decision "until they became imbedded in our law." Jones, Chief Justice John Marshall xv
(1956). James Kent was another judge who obtained greatness, but what he was not capable
of achieving in his unsuccessful career as a politician, he sought to achieve during his more
successful tenure as a judge. See W. Hurst, supra note 124, at 44.
215. For an example of unfair criticism, see Bork, The Supreme Court Versus Corporate
Efficiency, Fortune, Aug. 1967, at 92. (Bork is a Professor at Yale Law School.)
216. 377 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1967).
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"change occurred in the law."2 17 It was concluded that the change
(created by judicial decision) could not be retroactively applied. 18 This
retroactivity question offers the clearest example of judicial lawmaking,
and presents the most obvious judicial encroachment into the legislative
process.219 In such cases, courts interpret and apply statutes under a
double standard. Persons relying on prior judicial decision are given im-
munity from liability. Consequently judicial decisions are elevated above
statutes, and the concept of judicial supremacy is effectively perpetuated.
If a defendant has neatly fitted his action under a judicial decision (which
is not difficult under the adversary system which incorporates the art of
manipulation), it might be very profitable for one to violate the antitrust
laws. Since a judicial change will only be prospectively applied, the defen-
dant is able to retain the profit of his illegal act. The consequences of this
are particularly great in the antitrust field where restraining agreements
and illegal mergers reap substantial benefits for the wrongdoer. Further-
more, injured persons, bound by prior judicial principles, have been given
no voice in the creative process.
1. Certainty: That certainty is acquired through the role of judicial
law-making is at best questionable. It has been reasoned that this
certainty results from a judicial refinement of statutory standards into
more precise principles. Such an optimistic view manifests a clear mis-
understanding of our entire legal system. In the first place, the accuracy
of this position is based on an ideal that all decisions are skillfully
reasoned and written. But, as Kent pointed out, "It is probable that the
records of many of the courts in this country are replete with hasty and
crude decisions."'  Secondly, such a position is based on a fatalistic
view that the legislative body is incapable of conveying a meaning which
will be a clear enough standard. When the legislative process is looked
upon as a legal institution and is understood, the statute represents a
single standard. On the other hand, judicial decisions represent multiple
standards varying in conclusion and reasoning dependent on the ability
and philosophy of the judges. Question: Where is clarity gained? At the
present time, this question will be left open, but an answer will be
sought in the remaining portion of this article.
2. Who is best able to handle social problems? Whether one seeks to
answer this question constitutionally or purely academically, the con-
clusion is the same. "It is the province of the Statesman, not of the
217. Id. at 789.
218. Id. at 787-90.
219. See Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973
(1952). See also Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 US. 358 (1932).
220. 1 Kent, Commentaries *477 (5th ed. 1844).
19681
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
lawyer, to discuss, and of the Legislature to determine what is best for
the public good, and to provide for it by proper enactments."1221 Only a
statesman can objectively assess the needs of the nation. Lawyers, on the
other hand, chained to the adversary system, are dedicated to converting
others to preconceived and unscientific conclusions. Acceptable weapons
in the lawyer's arsenal include the use of schemes, devices, tactics and
the art of rhetoric.222 Furthermore, lawyers are without the necessary
resources or facilities for making adequate sociological, political and
economic studies. Within the legislative body, however, massive ma-
chinery and funds are available to measure the voice of the governed.
Thus, value judgments reached and enacted by legislative bodies must
not be disposed of lightly as offhand products. They "represent long and
patient study by experts, careful consideration by conferences or con-
gresses or associations, press discussion in which public opinion is focused
upon all important details, and hearings before legislative commit-
tees.,,
22
This bit of political philosophy was clearly structured into our con-
stitutional system of government to insure that society would be regulated
by "law" and not by the value judgments of men, whether they be men of
good or bad will, whether they be judges, lawyers or enforcement officers.
The United States Constitution represents more than the isolated ideals
over which the American Revolution was fought. It was written from the
early experiences of the internal political struggle that had previously
taken place in England over the respective power of the king, Parliament
and courts. It was during the reign of James II that that controversy was
climaxed with the claim that the king by his prerogative could dispense
individual cases from the operation of a statute. Upon this clear issue of
authority, the conflict was fought in what has been described as "the great
and glorious revolution" of 1688.24 From this revolution came the Bill
of Rights which provided that the pretended power of suspending laws,
or the execution of laws by regal authority, without the consent of
Parliament, was illegal.22 5 But even before this date Parliament was
gaining in power. Maitland, describing the early English Parliaments,
observed that the House of Lords gave the king advice and counsel, and
from the House of Commons the king sought consent.220 This consent
proved to be a useful tool to the king, especially when he sought to
221. W. B. Odgers, The Common Law of England, vol. I, at 59 (1911).
222. J. Frank, Courts on Trial 80-102 (1949).
223. Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383, 384 (1908).
224. T. Plucknett, supra note 159, at 59.
225. Id.
226. F. W. Maitland, The Constitutional History of England 388 (1908).
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impose a tax on the people. When such a tax was imposed on the people
by consent of the House of Commons, greater general acceptance was
assured, and there was greater ease in collections..227 According to all
jurisprudential writers, consent (or obedience) of the people is vital to
the stability of any legal system. The legal order can stand only so long
as there is sufficient general acceptance by the people or, in the absence
of this acceptance, sufficient physical force to insure obedience. In a
representative form of government greater reliance is placed on this gen-
eral acceptance with a minimum amount of physical force; however, this
reliance is assured only if the representatives respond to the wishes of
the people.
One finds this historical background reflected in the constitution. To
insure the consent of the people, all legislative power is vested in the
Congress.2 2 And to insure a fair enforcement of the laws, the judicial
power is vested in the courts.229 According to Chief Justice Marshall, in
Marbury v. Madison,10 it was the "duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is." When one looks at Marshall's words in light of the
Constitution, there is a significant difference between what they mean
and what those adhering to the judicial supremacy concept construe
them to mean. According to the words of the Constitution, courts (in
certain prescribed jurisdictional areas) decide controversies.3 1 Viewed in
light of Marshall's words, "courts say what the law is" to the extent
necessary to resolve the controversy.
This is the only consistent interpretation that can be given to the
constitutional words. Moreover, since courts are not representative of the
people, in a political sense, it is only natural that judicial power be limited.
When the courts interpret the formulation of general statutory princi-
ples232 as casting courts in a law-making role, people most affected by this
judicially-created law find themselves bound without having been given
any standing to be heard on the merits. This political conflict is avoided
only by adjudicating cases on the basis of the statute as it is written.
Turner offers the best example of why (at least in the area of antitrust)
this political division must be preserved. In formulating his general
principles under which conglomerate mergers will be judged, Turner
227. This historical practice perhaps explains why in the Constitution, revenue measures
must originate in the House. US. Cost. art. I, § 7.
228. U.S. Const. art. L § 1.
229. U.S. ConsL art. IMI, § 1.
230. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
231. U.S. Cost. art. III, § 2.
232. This is what Turner is calling for in his conglomerate merger article, a view that
is shared by the dissenting member of the Court, Mr. Justice Harlan. See FTC v. Proctor
& Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 581 (1967) (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan).
1968]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
shows little concern for the small businessmen.238 These small companies,
says Turner, are not lost because of the merger; they are lost because they
fail or are unwilling to improve their competitive position. If mergers
were prohibited, companies would merely expand internally, and the
small companies which remained uncompetitive would, in any event, be
lost."34 In formulating his merger rules, Turner is making, at the most,
a value judgment which is based on a personal economic philosophy that
adheres to the position that no law should retard corporate efficiency,
even at the cost of eliminating small businessmen from our economy.
It is doubtful that Turner, in formulating his rules, held any public
hearing in which the voice of the small businessman was heard. Congress,
on the other hand, in formulating its standard as found in section 7 of the
Clayton Act, did hold hearings and did provide an opportunity for the
small businessman to speak for himself or through his elected representa-
tive. Based on this complex legislative machinery, Congress likewise
reached a value judgment that might very well be the antithesis of the
position taken by Turner. Perhaps it was decided that the small com-
panies, with all their inefficiency, should be preserved. Such was, in fact,
suggested by the Supreme Court in the Brown Shoe Company case. 30
The court stated that: "[W]e cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire
to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally
owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher cost and
prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and
markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of decen-
tralization. We must give effect to that decision.2
230
With this value judgment Turner takes issue and charges that the
Court in making the statement was ambivalent.237 The difference in the
two value judgments is that Congress is the constitutional institution
created to make such judgments. Whatever value judgment is finally
reached through the legislative process, it carries with it the weight of
law, and all public officials are charged with the duty of executing this
law on the basis of the official value judgment. Public officials, including
enforcement officers and courts, have no constitutional power to dispense
233. It has been reported that: "Turner makes few friends in Congress with the out-
spoken candor he developed in Academe. Turner upsets members of the congressional small
business committees when he tells them that the anti-trust laws aren't meant to assist small
companies overcome their competitive problems." Business Week, May 20, 1967, at 61, col. 2.
234. Turner 1353.
235. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
236. Id. at 344 (emphasis added).
237. Turner 1323-24.
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with a constitutional statute for any reason.238 It is the author's intent, in
writing this paper, to clarify this legislative value judgment.
3. False Sense of Security: With the merger rules formulated by lower
federal courts and institutionalized by Turner, lawyers and businessmen
are presently enjoying a sense of security. One periodical has reported
that business lawyers are saying that "the antitrust rules have never been
clearer than they are today.""es For this greater degree of certainty,
credit is given to Turner, who, it is said, has been spelling out his in-
terpretation of the law.240 This security results from Turner's refusal to
prosecute the great majority of conglomerate mergers. 241 And, to be sure,
businessmen are taking advantage of this security, with major corporate
mergers during this year moving at a record clip of 150 each month. 4 -
The Wall Street Journal reports that the present merger surge has been
spurred partly by fear that the government may soon blow the whistle. -43
That there is a fear of a possible government crackdown on mergers
should be evidence that the security gained by judicial or Turner rules is
a "false security." Even assuming constitutional authority for the non-
legislative formulation of rules, the fact remains that the rules are subject
to change at any time and without notice. This alone should cause every
merged company to operate in constant fear, and it might even be wise
for them to set up a contingency reserve fund which might be needed to
defend the merger or to finance the possible divestiture or dissolution.
But there are other factors that should cause even more concern. It is
obvious that Turner's merger philosophy is not consistent with that of the
Supreme Court. As Professor Bork recently observed: "Defendants are
simply not winning cases they should win in the Supreme Court. No de-
fendant has won a merger case there since Congress amended Section 7 of
the Clayton Act 17 years ago. 2 44
It should be noted that, though there are dissenters on the Court,
there have been no serious splits in antitrust opinions. It has even been
said that the Court seems to be urging Turner to be more aggressive in
238. Such attempts are no different than the early regal efforts to dispense with
statutes enacted by Parliament. See note 224, supra, and accompanying text.
239. Business Week, May 20, 1967, 59, at 60, col. 1.
240. Id.
241. Time, Sept. 8, 1967, at 93, col. 1.
242. Id. at 87, col. 1.
243. The Wall Street J., Sept. 19, 1967, at 1, col. 6. Attorney General Clark has already
announced a tougher stand on conglomerates. See Conglomerates, Bewarel, Forbes, Nov. 1,
1967, at 27.
244. Bork, The Supreme Court Versus Corporate Efficiency, Fortune, Aug. 1967, 92, at
158.
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the merger field . 45 Every merger that has occurred since Congress created
its merger standard is subject to prosecution even though the companies
carefully follow the rules formulated by Turner. If Turner should reverse
his philosophy, or if the next enforcement officer does not agree with the
Turner philosophy, these companies could well find themselves defending
a merger that occurred 30 years previously. One should not forget that
this is exactly what happened in the DuPont case.24
The sense of security gained from the Turner rules is further weakened
by the presence of the Federal Trade Commission, which also holds
authority to enforce section 7 of the Clayton Act. Whether this agency is
more adept in carrying out the congressional merger policy must at this
point remain in question; however, at a later point in this article the FTC
authority will be discussed in greater detail. Right now it is sufficient to
observe that this dual authority does exist and represents a threat to
whatever security a company might presently be gaining from the Turner
rules.
Another threat that merging companies must consider is the private
treble damage suit. Even though lower federal courts have been un-
sympathetic to private antitrust plaintiffs, they will be unable to follow
the Hanover 47 philosophy, under which damages are denied on the
ground that the defendant acted in good faith in following what he
thought was the law as evidenced by Supreme Court decisions. The
Supreme Court has shown little interest in formulating more precise
standards under which mergers will be controlled. Instead it has followed
a general approach with an express desire to effectuate the policies of
Congress. Since the official enforcement agencies have shown ini-
tiative in attacking corporate mergers, private plaintiffs, under the
present Supreme Court attitude, might find it much easier to prosecute
merger cases. But even with the private suits, there are hurdles to cross,
and because of the different level of sophistication within the judicial
system, plaintiffs might find it necessary to prosecute a case all the way to
the Supreme Court.
V. CONGRESSIONAL STANDARDS vs. TURNER'S RULES
1. General: Besides the philosophical weaknesses in the Turner rules,
the so-called guiding principles are contrary to congressional standards.
To support this conclusion one must make a comprehensive study of the
legislative material. And to make this study meaningful, it is necessary
245. Business Week, May 20, 1967, 59, at 61, col. 2.
246. United States v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
247. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 377 F.2d 776, 787-90 (3d Cir.
1967).
[Vol. 36
CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
to take a look at the total antitrust congressional policy. From this
broad view, we can then proceed to focus on more precise questions. My
intent is not to formulate any new or novel economic theories that might
be consistent with the general antitrust philosophy. Instead, it is to
define and understand the economic theory adopted by Congress in
section 7 of the Clayton Act.
2. Background: There is a long history behind the present anti-
merger statute, dating back to the inception of the antitrust laws. Starting
in 1890 when the Sherman Act was passed, one finds, spilled over the
pages of the Congressional Record, economic evidence that manifested a
serious fear of the domination by what has been generously referred to
as free enterprise. To repeat the words of the late Justice Harlan:
All who recall the condition of the country in 1890 will remember that there was ev-
erywhere, among the people generally, a deep feeling of unrest .... [T]he conviction
was universal that the country was in real danger from another kind of slavery ...
that would result from aggregations of capital in the hands of a few individuals and
corporations controlling, for their own profit and advantage exclusively, the entire
business of the country, including the production and sale of the necessaries of life.2 48
During this earlier period of time, merger, just as much as restraining
agreements, represented a serious threat to free competition. Actually,
the great merger movement began at the very end of the 19th century
and extended through the year 1907, and it was during this period that
the country witnessed the birth of such huge consolidations as the United
Steel Corporation.24 9 The steel trust, under the leadership of Judge Gary,
reaped immense profits from its actual capital of 650 million dollars.
With this concentrated economic power, Judge Gary operated under the
philosophy that workers should be suppressed into industrial slavery, and
that enormous profits should be distributed to the relatively small number
of shareholders.250 Describing the conditions of workers under the steel
trust, Brandeis stated:
It is a life so inhuman as to make our former Negro slavery infinitely preferable, for
the master owned the slave, and tried to keep his property in working order for his
own interest.The Steel Trust, on the other hand, looks on its slaves as something to be
worked out and thrown aside. The result is physical and moral degeneracy-work,
work, work, without recreation or any possibility of relief save that which dissipation
brings. The men coming out of these steel mills move on payday straight to the bar-
room. Think what such men transmit as a physical and moral heritage to their children
and think of our American citizenship for men who live under such conditions.ml
248. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., Inc. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 83 (1911).
249. H R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1949). Northern Sec. Co. v. United
States, 193 US. 197 (1904).
250. L. Brandeis, The Curse of Bigness 38 (1935).
251. Id.
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The steel trust, which exemplified the power of economic concentration,
exerted great effort to prevent combination among its employees when
they sought to procure decent working and living conditions. "It stamped
out, through its immense powers of endurance, one strike after another.
It developed a secret service, a system of espionage among its workmen,
singling out individuals who favor unionism; and anyone fomenting dis-
satisfaction with existing conditions, as it was called, was quietly dis-
charged."2 52 The social unrest of our people in this struggle with the con-
centrated economic powers represented a serious threat to our entire
legal system and has been compared with the unrest leading to the
American Revolution and the Civil War. 58
With this economic history, representative of the total picture, as a
background, Congress passed the Sherman Act.2 4 After all constitutional
attacks had failed,255 lawyers began resorting to the Carter-Pomeroy
codification philosophy that statutes should be construed in light of their
common law background. Although this philosophy was first rejected,"'
the Supreme Court, with later strategic changes in its personnel, created
the "rule of reason.
' 2 57
This judicially created "rule of reason" was a great victory for the
antagonists of the Sherman Act in the sense that it created a serious
question as to the respective authority of the Court and Congress. Stand-
ing alone (without future elucidation) it stood for the proposition that
the Court had the power to decide what "contracts in restraint of trade"
ought to be held illegal.258 This meant that the courts could examine
252. Id. at 39.
253. Id.
254. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
255. Commerce clause: United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293
(1945); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Delegation of
legislative authority: Standard Oil Co. of N.J., Inc. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
Liberty of contract: United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898). Vagueness:
Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913).
256. United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n., 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v.
Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
257. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904), set the stage for the Judi-
cial shift which finally culminated in 1911 with Standard Oil Co. of N.J., Inc. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). From the time that Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n. was decided In
1897 until Standard Oil in 1911, only two of the Justices were the same-Justices White and
Harlan. Mr. justice White, who dissented in Trans-Mo., wrote the majority opinion in
Standard Oil. Mr. Justice Harlan, who was included in the majority in Trans-Mo., wrote the
concurring (dissenting as to common law) opinion in Standard Oil.
258. The effects of the "rule of reason" have been greatly reduced by the Judicially
created concept of "per se" illegality. When these are taken together, the same conclusion
could have been reached by a non-creative sophisticated and scientific approach to statutory
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mergers under this "rule of reason" to decide if there was an unreasonable
restraint.259 Under this philosophical and political aberration, lawyers
could approach an antitrust case on the theory of offering economic
evidence in justification for a particular merger. Courts were then left
with the duty of deciding the issue on the basis of opposing economic
views. Whether a merger would survive an attack depended upon the
prevailing economic view and the present judicial attitude. A shift in
judicial personnel or time meant a shift in the law.2c
Creation of the "rule of reason" merely contributed to the then obvious
fact that the Sherman Act had failed in accomplishing its designed pur-
pose. Various forms of restraint, including mergers, continued at a full
gallop, causing great public concern and indignation. Turning the problem
into a major political issue, the finger of blame, recorded in the Congres-
sional Record, pointed first at the attorney general and then at the Court,
with special mention given to the "rule of reason" case.-,.1 After reviewing
the Standard Oil262 decision, the Court was criticized by Congress for its
reluctance to issue strong decrees against monopolies. It was observed that
while the Court used harsh language against the trust and had even issued
a decree ordering the dissolution of Standard Oil, the effect was to place
greater economic power in fewer hands. -e One is left with little doubt
that by 1914 Congress was determined to pass a bill that was powerful
enough to eradicate the country of the dreaded trust and monopolies.
From the long and heated debates came two significant laws, both
designed to supplement the Sherman Act. These two laws were of course
the Federal Trade Commission Act, approved on October 14, 1914, and
the Clayton Act, approved one day later. Congress, in the Clayton
Act,2 listed certain proscribed activity, the legality of which had been
left questionable by the judicially created "rule of reason." To Congress,
the "rule of reason" left the antitrust laws indefinite, requiring courts to
apply definitions to all new forms of combination which businessmen
could and would invent.265 With this act, Congress desired to remove any
interpretation. See Thomas, Statutory Construction When Legislation Is Viewed As A
Legal Institution, 3 Harv. J. Legis. 191, 201-02 (1966).
259. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948); United States v. Wlmslow,
227 U.S. 202 (1913). But with change of times and change of attitudes, see United States v.
First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 376 US. 665 (1964).
260. Id.
261. For early debates expressing the charges and counter charges for failure of Sherman
Act, see 51 Cong. Rec. 1866, 8840, 8973 (1914) (House debates); 51 Cong. Rec. 11031,
11237 (1914) (House debates).
262. Standard Oil Co. of NJ. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
263. 51 Cong. Rec. 8973, 8976 (1914) (remarks of Mr. Murdock).
264. 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
265. 51 Cong. Rec. 8973, 8976 (1914) (remarks of Mr. Murdock).
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possibility of judicial emasculation by removing the effect of the "rule of
reason" from certain proscribed practices, including: price fixing,211
exclusive dealing arrangements, 26 7 acquisition of capital stock,2 8 etc.
With the Federal Trade Commission Act,20 9 Congress sought to move
further away from the judicially created "rule of reason." It was argued
that the laws proposed should be written in such a fashion that they could
stop a monopoly before it grows so powerful that even when the courts
condemn it, they shrink from destroying it. Thus, the creation of a strong
interstate trade commission (later to be named the Federal Trade Com-
mission) was proposed. This Commission 210 was empowered and directed
to prevent persons from using unfair methods of competition in com-
merce.
27 1
By its decision to use the general words, "unfair methods of competi-
tion," Congress again showed its desire to avoid loopholes created by the
inventiveness of businessmen and the consequences of the creative atti-
tude of courts. An interesting and revealing congressional debate took
place over the use of this general phrase. Many senators desired that a
definite meaning be placed on the term "unfair method"; however, this
was not to limit the power of the Commission. The fear was that such an
obscure term might be used to argue that the act was unconstitutional.
Other members, including Senator Cummins, insisted that the term had a
definite meaning, but when called upon to give an actual definition to
the words, Senator Cummins refused. 2 The desire to have unfair methods
of competition enumerated in the bill was further to direct the Commission
and to avoid the mild interpretation being placed thereon. This observa-
tion manifested a congressional misunderstanding of the many mechanical
rules of statutory construction under which specific words act more as
words of limitation. With the inventiveness of businessmen and lawyers,
operating under the adversary system, new restraining devices could be
created which, under a strict judicial interpretation, would satisfy the
statutory specifications. In fact, other senators expressed the belief that
such an enumeration might act as a limitation on the authority of the
Commission's discretion to decide what was or was not an unfair method
266. Clayton Act, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
267. Clayton Act, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
268. Clayton Act, § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1964).
269. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-46, 47-58 (1964).
270. "That a commission is hereby created and established, to be known as the Federal
Trade Commission . . . which shall be composed of five commissioners." 15 U.S.C. § 41
(1964).
271. Federal Trade Comm'n Act, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
272. 51 Cong. Rec. 11081, 11105 (1914) (remarks of Senator Cummins).
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of competition. 73 As to this discretion, Senator Cummins would have
given the Commission absolute power to rule what was an unfair method
of competition without any review or appeal. 274 Use of general words in a
statute is like Congress saying: Everything that we now know and
everything that might be invented in the future is, if it falls within this
general category, illegal.
I think it fair to say that Congress, in passing the Clayton and the
Federal Trade Commission Acts, was attacking the judicial system in
what might be considered a battle for supremacy. When viewed in
retrospect, the congressional concern over possible restrictive judicial
interpretation was not unfounded. In its period of infancy, it is clear, the
Federal Trade Commission was not looked upon with favor by the courts
as vividly demonstrated in FTC v. Gratz.27 The Commission had, in that
case, held it to be an "unfair method of competition" for the respondent
to refuse to sell cotton ties unless the customer purchased a corresponding
amount of jutebagging. As a tying arrangement, which is today considered
illegal per se because it is anticompetitive by its very nature, -"0 there
would be no question about it being illegal; however, the Court in re-
versing the Commission's ruling, stated that it is for the courts, not the
Commission, ultimately to determine, as a matter of law, what is included
under the phrase "unfair method of competition." The Supreme Court
has now rejected this view, and it is now recognized, in line with the
dissent of justice Brandeis in the Gratz 7 case, that the Commission has
broad powers to declare trade practices unfair. The present significance
of the Gratz case is in the Court's historical expression in support of the
judicial supremacy concept, the very thing that Congress, in passing the
Federal Trade Commission Act, was seeking to avoid. In another judicial
attack against the authority of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the
Court took the statutory words, "unfair methods of competition," literally
and held that injury to competition was a jurisdictional prerequisite to
proceedings under the act.2 78 Congress responded to this judicial assault in
1938 by passing the Wheeler-Lea Amendment to the Federal Trade
273. For a complete discussion of the meaning of the term "unfair method of competi-
tion," see 51 Cong. Rec. 11105-09, 11113 (1914) (debates of Senators Cummins, Robinson,
Words and Reed).
274. 51 Cong. Rec. 11081, 11105 (1914) (remarks of Senator Cummins).
275. 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
276. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
277. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966), citing prior rejections: FTC v.
R. F. Koppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 310 (1934); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 US.
683, 693 (1948); Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 369 (1965).
278. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
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Commission Act which added a prohibition against "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices." 279
3. Mergers through the Year 1914: That an anti-merger section was
included in the original Clayton Act indicates definite congressional con-
cern, even in 1914, about the merger problem. In fact, as stated before,
one of the economic factors behind the passage of the Clayton Act was
the great merger movement which began at the very end of the 19th
century and extended through 1907.2"0 And Congress, as early as 1890,
when the Sherman Act was passed, expressed the desire to protect small
businessmen against the large aggregation of economic power which was
brought on through various devices-one being mergers. Senator George,
expressing concern over the economic conditions of the time (1890),
observed that the "present system of production and of exchange is
having that tendency which is sure at some not very distant date to
crush out all small men, all small capitalists, all small enterprises. This
is being done now. We find everywhere over our land the wrecks of small
independent enterprises thrown in our pathway."' Most writers cling to
the view, with strong judicial support,8 2 that Congress never, in the
antitrust statutes, attacked bigness. 8
With the Sherman Act, there is some logic with which to justify this
conclusion. Section 2 of that act does not make "monopoly" illegal; it
makes illegal the act of "monopolization," which denotes some form of
action (either to gain, retain or use monopoly power) .24 This same logic,
however, does not stand in any legislative study of the Clayton Act. In
the congressional debates there are repeated references made to "bigness."
As mentioned earlier, one of the charges was that the reluctance of the
courts to issue strong decrees had the effect of placing greater economic
power in fewer hands, thus making the big get bigger.285 Certain members
of Congress would have actually placed big companies under govern-
mental control. Speaking on this subject, Mr. Morgan stated that: "If
necessary for the public welfare we should authorize the commission to
regulate the prices at which large industrial corporations shall dispose
279. The Act now reads: "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
280. H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1949).
281. 21 Cong. Rec. 2598 (1890) (remarks of Senator George).
282. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
283. Turner throughout his article takes this position. See also Handler & Robinson, A
Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 629,
667 (1961) ("concentration [or bigness] does not in itself spell illegality"); J. Van Cise,
Understanding The Antitrust Laws 26 (1966).
284. J. Van Cise, supra note 283, at 26.
285. 51 Cong. Rec. 8973, 8976 (1914) (remarks of Mr. Murdock).
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of their products."2 6 He continued by saying that: "Many of our in-
dustrial corporations have become impressed with public use. They are
public agencies. They are in every legitimate sense of the word quasi-
public corporations, and we should by law declare them to be such."I 1
Although this strong view was held by only a very small minority of
Congress, there can be no question that it influenced the tone of the final
Federal Trade Commission and Clayton Acts. Clearly, there was a con-
gressional policy forming against bigness. While policy did not go so far
as to create a law to break up any existing company, it did go so far as to
hold that any increase in bigness could not be accomplished by the con-
duct proscribed by the statute-price fixing, exclusive dealing and, of
course, mergers.
The only problem with the proscribed merger conduct was that Con-
gress did a poor drafting job, and courts were correct in not applying the
statute beyond a reasonable interpretation of the words, regardless of the
clarity in purpose and policy. In the original section 7 of the Clayton Act,
it was provided: "That no corporation... shall acquire, directly or in-
directly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of
another corporation ... where the effect of such acquisition may be to
substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is
so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain
such commerce in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly
of any line of commerce."2 118 Why Congress elected to use this very limited
wording can only be a matter of speculation today. Being very generous
to this legislative body it has been suggested that this was the generally
accepted way of accomplishing a merger.289 Though Congress had con-
sidered this very problem in wording the Federal Trade Commission Act,
in this instance it failed to consider the ingenuity of the lawyer who
immediately seeks to devise methods of pushing mergers through possible
loopholes. Under the circumstances, courts could do nothing but apply
this proscription to stock acquisitions, even though, in other parts of the
act, the Court did stretch its interpretative powers to expand the statutory
words to cover the questionable vertical acquisitions.2 90 The CoUrt also
found it possible to bend the legislative command that could, if literally
construed, reach acquisitions of even the smallest companies. To get
around this poor drafting job, the Court applied the Sherman Act "rule
of reason" test. Of course, this shift destroyed one of the major reasons
286. 51 Cong. Rec. 1866, 1870 (1914) (remarks of Mr. Morgan).
287. 51 Cong. Rec. 1866, 1871 (1914) (remarks of Mir. Morgan).
288. 38 Stat. 731, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1964).
289. H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., ist Sess. 4 (1949) ; Handler & Robinson, supra note
283, at 652.
290. United States v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
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for passing the Clayton Act-that is, to remove the merger practice from
this judicially created rule.
While statutory words must be examined in light of the legislative
purpose, one should not conclude that courts are free to supply missing
words.29' Regardless of the clarity with which Congress declares the
purpose of the antitrust merger proscription, judicial power is limited
by the words.2 92 Courts that are willing to supply or amend statutory
words in order that the legislative policy not be defeated are, to the
highest degree, engaged in judicial law making. It matters not what the
legislative "intent" is; courts can only declare the meaning of statutory
words. 2 3 The clarity lacking in the words themselves is supplied through
an examination of such words in light of the legislative purpose.214 If the
legislative process is ever to be elevated to an institutional level, Congress
must accept full responsibility for drafting laws and should never look to
the courts to correct its own drafting errors. Likewise, courts must not
accept a responsibility that constitutionally and necessarily belongs to
Congress. The Supreme Court (even though lower federal courts have
not yet reached this level) has shown a willingness to recognize the
supremacy of congressional authority in the antitrust field, particularly
where mergers are involved. With this present judicial attitude, the con-
gressional merger activity becomes even more significant.
4. TNEC-A Study of Bigness: With the failure of the original sec-
tion 7, the merger movement continued unabated. While during 1914
(the year the Clayton Act was passed) there were only 39 reported
mergers in manufacturing and mining, 1,058 mergers took place in 1928
and 1,245 were reported in 1929.29 Capital assets held by independent
companies were swiftly disappearing into larger holdings. The increase
in the concentration of economic power, already reaching a serious level,
again caused concern in Congress. To publicize this concern, Congress
291. The clearest example of this is where the Court ruled that the original section 7 cov-
ered both vertical and horizontal mergers. While the legislative purpose dearly supports the
conclusion, the words of the statute were inadequate to cover vertical mergers. United
States v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
292. For a debate on this issue, see, Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593 (1958); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to
Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630 (1958).
293. Frankfurter, Some Reflections On the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527
(1947).
294. See note 292 supra. The "purpose theory" is not a rule of statutory construction;
it is a rule of language. Since statutes are words, it is obvious that the circumstances under
which the words are uttered would be significant in determining meaning. See Thomas,
Statutory Construction When Legislation is Viewed As A Legal Institution, 3 Harv. J. Legis.
191 (1966).
295. See Appendix table 1.
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launched one of the most massive research projects that has ever been
witnessed.
On April 29, 1938, President Roosevelt called attention to the need
for a thorough study of the concentration of economic power and its
injurious effects on the American system of free enterprise.00 Echoing
this call, Congress, by joint resolution, approved June 16, 1938, created
the Temporary National Economic Committee..20 7 Granted the same in-
vestigating power held by the Securities and Exchange Commission,
-8
the TNEC was charged with the duty of making a complete study of, and
defining the problems concerning monopoly and the concentration of
economic power in the production and distribution of goods.2 90 Specifical-
ly, the committee was charged with determining the causes of such con-
centration and control and their effect upon competition. 00 From this
study, the committee was to make recommendations to Congress toward
the "improvement of antitrust policy and procedure and the establish-
ment' of national standards for corporations engaged in commerce." ''
This last statement, drawn from the congressional resolution, clearly
defines the principal function of the TNEC. Congress was calling for a
study from which could be developed a national standard. Recognition
of the need for such a national standard was a recognition of the need for
uniformity-without which the law would be unworkable. If the anti-
merger statute is to be effective, the several federal district courts cannot
freely formulate general merger principles. Furthermore, the effectiveness
of the law (however subsequently formulated by Congress) requires
serious enforcement. Such was the observation of the committee as it
cited the efforts of an earlier congressional study.0" To achieve such
296. Temporary National Economic Committee, Investigation of Concentration of
Economic Power, S. Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 691 (1941) [hereinafter referred to
as TNEC Report].
297. 52 Stat. 705 (1938).
298. 52 Stat. 706 (1938).
299. 52 Stat. 705 (1938).
300. Id. The word "competition," as used here concerns the general system of free
enterprise and not to the specific effects of a specific restraining device. The significance of
this observation will be seen later.
301. 52 Stat. 705 (1938) (emphasis added).
302. TNEC Report 770-773. In 1898, The Industrial Commission was formed to con-
duct a similar economic study. One recommendation of this Commission was: "That com-
binations and conspiracies, in the form of trust or otherwise in restraint of trade or pro-
duction, which by the consensus of judicial opinion are unlawful, should be so declared by
legislation uniform in all jurisdictions, and as to all persons, and such statutes should be
thoroughly enforced. Id. at 772 (emphasis added). The need for uniformity in the inter-
pretation of national statutes was also discussed by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Hearst
Publications Inc., 322 US. 111 (1944).
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uniformity, the committee recognized the necessity of exploring all view-
points on the subject, particularly those of economists.
In order to obtain the widest range of views, several federal agencies""
were assigned the task of conducting special studies, for which $858,000
of budgeted funds were allocated.3 0 4 In order to obtain a well-rounded
analysis and treatment of the broad subject of the concentration of
economic power and its effects, it was considered necessary, not only to
obtain direct testimony but to have economists, expert in particular fields,
study the problems raised in the hearings and make separate reports upon
them. From these special studies, 43 separate monographs were published
by leading economists.30 Lawyers have been heard to criticize such con-
gressional studies as being "just a bunch of economic views." Instead of
looking at the conflicting economic views, it is said, Congress should
examine proven judicial decisions that have been generated by our ad-
versary system.306 Such a suggestion would, if accepted, cause utter
confusion, for under the adversary system the interest of the general
public is not in issue. Economic standards that are formulated to control
business activity can be objectively and comprehensively studied and
decided upon only within the framework of the legislative process. Our
failure to accept this conclusion has resulted in the creation of serious
credibility gaps among legislative bodies, the people and the courts.
With many writers in the field and the several district courts making anti-
trust policy decisions on the basis of a jurisprudential aberration, there
can be no uniformity in the application of the law, and no person affected
thereby can be sure of his rights or remedies. Clarity in the law can come
only from a general acceptance of the single standard created by the
official lawmaking body.
Turner, in creating his rules for conglomerate mergers, completely
ignores the economic standard formulated by Congress in the TNEC
studies, even though the standards were in 1950 distilled into a new anti-
merger statute. By ignoring this policy, he is forced to give a literal in-
terpretation to the key words of the statute. Though he does cite the
general policy of the antitrust laws, Turner takes the words "substan-
tially to lessen competition" as being a congressional caveat authorizing
303. These agencies included: the Department of Commerce, the Federal Trade Com-
mission, the Department of Justice, the Department of Labor, the Securities Exchange Com-
mission, the Department of the Treasury and the Department of Agriculture.
304. TNEC Report 694-95.
305. TNEC Report 694.
306. Remarks of Ira M. Millstein, attorney, delivered at Practising Law Institute Forum
on the Antitrust Challenge to Corporate Growth Through Conglomerate Acquisitions and
Joint Ventures, Dec. 2-3, 1966, New York. See also Bork, The Supreme Court Versus
Corporate Efficiency, Fortune, Aug., 1967, 92, at 156.
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him to supply rules consistent with his own economic views.30 7 Since this
position goes against a most basic and elementary axiom of statutory con-
struction-that words of a statute must be examined in light of con-
gressional policy-it must be rejected. In fact, the Turner rules for
conglomerate mergers are the very antithesis of the congressional policy
concerning the anticompetitive effects of the concentration of economic
power.
a) What the TNEC study reveals: So that readers of this rather long
dissertation will not think that the revelations of the TNEC million
dollar study are of only historical significance, I should point out that the
present words of section 7 of the Clayton Act express a national merger
policy that evolved from this study. The words of that statute, if they
are to be understood, must be read in light of this background since they
are, in fact, a reaction to our economic history.308
Results of the TNEC investigation are staggering, and most revealing
of the congressional merger policy. This economic investigation coincided
with our national efforts to mobilize industry for war. Thus, due to the
enormous war contracts let by the government, there was an accurate
method of measuring the extent of economic concentration.
During the period of June 1, 1940 to March 1, 1941, government de-
fense contracts were awarded in an amount in excess of 12 billion dollars
cca sum which is more than half of all the value added by manufacture
in all the industrial plants of America for all industrial commodities dur-
ing the year, 1939.11309 At the time, this 12 billion dollars exceeded the
total assessed valuation of all the real and personal property within the
boundaries of 21 states. When one examines the allocation of this sum
among the states, the concentration of economic power and wealth is
dramatically revealed. For example, less than 13 per cent of the 12
billion dollars was received by a total of 35 states. By the end of
February, 1941, 2 states, Montana and North Dakota, had received
no primary defense contract of more than $10,000.110 On the other hand,
4 states-California, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York-had
received nearly 40 per cent of the total defense spending. Six states, in-
cluding the four previously mentioned, received nearly 54 per cent. In
fact, more than 82 per cent of the total went to only 15 states.31'
Similar results were found in the distribution of industrial facilities
307. Turner 1316, 1326-28.
308. Note the similarity in reasoning in Congressional reports that supports the present
wording of section 7 of the Clayton Act. H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. (1949);
S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Seas. (1950).
309. TNEC Report 3.
310. Id. at 3, 53.
311. Id. at 4, 54.
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which were financed by the federal government. Sixty-nine per cent of
these facilities were constructed in only ten states while less than 12 per
cent went to thirty-three states. 12 The Committee, in citing these statis-
tics, was not being critical of the War and Navy Departments since the
primary objective of the defense organization was to produce essential war
materials. It was only logical that these government expenditures go to
the states in which the American industrial plant had already been con-
centrated. The statistics do, however, illustrate the intensity of the eco-
nomic concentration during this period of time. An even more startling
observation, drawn from the analysis of the contracts, shows that 45 per
cent of the total 12 billion dollars went to six closely interrelated corpo-
rate groups. Taking this analysis one step further, one finds that 80 per
cent of the total defense spending for this period went to 62 companies.
During this time of crisis, the government was not free to make an equi-
table distribution of these funds; it was forced to follow the pattern and
contribute to an increase in economic concentration.
With this general geographical concentration of economic power, it is
not surprising to find a similar pattern in asset and income holdings. The
Committee reported that in the year 1932, 78 per cent of all business
wealth in this country was owned by corporations.813 Breaking down this
wealth into assets and income, the results become staggering. Citing sta-
tistics published by the United States Treasury Department for 1937, it
was revealed "that 228,721 corporations, each with total assets of less
than $50,000, reported less than 1/ 2 per cent of total assets of all
reporting corporations although they constituted 55 per cent of the
total number. At the other end of the scale, the 394 largest corporations,
although they constituted less than 1/10 of 1 per cent of the total number
of reporting corporations, owned almost 45 per cent of all corporate
assets." '314 The income analysis is no different. From the same statistics
reported above, one finds that 65 per cent of the corporations received
considerably less than 2 per cent of the total reported income while the
1/10 of 1 per cent of the corporations received 40 per cent. Though al-
ready at an alarming level, it was observed that the concentration of
wealth within the corporate structure was progressing.31 5
No one can question the fact that this economic concentration is pro-
gressing. It has been reported that the 200 largest U.S. corporations
increased their control over total assets from 30 per cent in 1947 to 55
per cent in 1967. And it is predicted that, if the trend continues, these
312. Id. at 4, 55-56.
313. Id. at 679.
314. Id.
315. Id.
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200 corporations will control 67 per cent of the assets by 1975.31G Ex-
pressed in dollars, this increase becomes even more evident. Total assets
of the top 100 corporations, as reported in Forbes, amounted to 15 billion
dollars in 1917; 28 billion dollars in 1929; 36 billion dollars in 1945 and
200 billion dollars in 1967.'1
b) Consquences of bigness or concentration: Having established the
existence of a high degree of economic concentration, which indicates a
failure in the antitrust laws, particularly the original antimerger statute,
we must now consider the consequences of bigness or, if you prefer, con-
centration. In the introductory paragraph of its final report, the TNEC
states that: "It is quite conceivable that the democracies might attain a
military victory [World War II] over the aggressors only to find them-
selves under the domination of economic authority far more concentrated
and influential than that which existed prior to the war." ' These words
demonstrate the seriousness of the present level and expected growth in
the concentration of economic power. Facing destruction from an unsuc-
cessful war effort, the concepts of democracy and free enterprise were
equally endangered by this economic concentration. Reaffirming their
belief in democracy, at a time when that political system was facing its
fiercest attack, the committee stated:
The form of political and social organization which we call democracy is at bay
throughout the world. Powerful forces have arisen on every continent which reject the
principles upon which our system of free government and free enterprise has been es-
tablished. Americans are committed to an enthusiastic defense of the ideals of democ-
racy, but if that defense is to be successfully waged and its institutions made secure
for the future, it is clear that our people must re-examine the elementary factors of
our faith in democracy.319
The most basic tenet of democracy, the Committee wrote, is that "all
power originates in all of the people and not in any part of them .... ,3 2o
Drawing still further from the historical principles of democracy, the Com-
mittee stated: "Governments are instituted among men to serve men; men
were not created to serve government."3 ' It is not the function of govern-
ment to direct and command the activities and lives of men. Rather the
limited function of government is to produce and preserve that order
which will insure the rights of all men to enjoy their free will. Just as the
316. Ling the Merger King, Newsweek, Oct. 9, 1967, 71, at 76, col. 3. See also, Hearings
pursuant to S. Res. 191 before the Subcomm. on Anti-trust and Monopoly of the Senate
Comm. on the judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5, at 1891 (1966).
317. Forbes, Sept. 15, 1967, at 76.
318. TNEC Report 3.
319. Id. at S.
320. Id.
321. Id.
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government is called into existence by men for the benefit of the entire
community, it is equally true that the economic organizations, called into
existence by men to meet their material needs, are likewise justified only
to the degree in which they serve the entire community. "If the political
structure is designed to preserve the freedom of the individual, the eco-
nomic structure must not be permitted to destroy it."81 To prevent the
economic structure from destroying the political structure, a steady con-
centration of political power in Washington has been necessary.
Though people have not wanted to surrender local self-government, and
though Congress was reluctant to accept additional political power,"'
the concentration of political power in a centralized government became
inevitable because economic life had broken down all geographical boun-
daries. 24 Political power must increase in proportion to the increase in
economic concentration-and in the same proportion, the free will of men
will decrease. On the other hand, a decrease in economic concentration
will be accompanied by a decrease in political centralization,' though the
least amount of government regulation that business can ever expect is
the "enforcement of free competition"' 2 5 which makes other forms of
regulation unnecessary. It was observed in the TNEC report that the
concentration of government appeared because local communities and
states, no longer economically self-sufficient, became economically de-
pendent upon the acts and decisions of persons and organizations beyond
their jurisdiction. "Local communities and local sovereignties .. .found
themselves dependent upon centralized political organization .... M20
As industrial facilities become more centralized through concentration,
the economic dependency of local government will continue to increase.
Many states and local communities, bidding for the entry of new industrial
facilities, have given up a degree of sovereignty. Besides subsidizing these
private economic organizations in the form of tax concessions, construc-
tion of plants, grants of land, etc., these states have been economically
bound to retain archaic workmen's compensation laws and have been
restrained from passing necessary legislation called for by the danger
level of water and air pollution. In each case, the central government,
which has no boundaries, has been forced to impose the necessary restric-
tions on business, thereby adding to the centralized political influence. 27
322. Id.
323. Thomas, An Answer to Regulation Critics-Control of Administrative Agencies, 1
Tulsa L. J. 109, 117 (1964).
324. TNEC Report S.
325. Id. at 16.
326. Id. at 6.
327. See generally, TNEC report 5-6.
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c) Big companies v. little companies: The principal and elementary
premise upon which most legal scholars in this area rely is that the anti-
trust laws do not make bigness illegal. And it is in light of this premise
(in support of which there has been no deliberation) that the present
version of section 7 of the Clayton Act has been interpreted. Turner,
throughout his analysis of problems of conglomerate mergers, clearly
adheres to this position. He concedes that the appearance of a large firm
in a market of small competitors will put these small competitors under
pressure. However, Turner goes on to explain that this pressure goes
toward improving rather than decreasing their competitive perfor-
mance.328 He even goes so far as to admit that some of these small com-
petitors may be unable to survive the pressures and that the number of
sellers may eventually decline. But this eventuality is explained by saying
that if the smaller firms are lost because of greater efficiency, this is the
force of competition. 29 The foundation of Professor Turner's value judg-
ment as expressed here, along with his total theory and enforcement phi-
losophy, crumbles under the policy expressed in the TNEC report, as well
as all other subsequent congressional reports on the subject.a
"Men will dare to compete against men but not against giants.' 31
These words, spoken by President Roosevelt, greatly influenced the sub-
stance of the economic standard of competition which was eventually to be
formulated by this special congressional committee. The TNEC report,
having been carried forward to the section 7 amendment, must be con-
sidered as the official voice formulating the official economic standard and
policy under which the congressional words must be examined. Here lies
the weakness of the antimerger statute. Congress, though clearly adopt-
ing the policy, did not, as it so wisely did in the labor statutes, include a
formal expression of policy within the body of the written law. Conse-
quently, lawyers, lower federal courts and writers, starting with a literal
construction of words, have felt free to work with varying economic
theories.
The TNEC could not have been clearer in declaring itself in favor of
small independent businessmen as well as a stop to further increases in the
concentration of economic power. Free enterprise, to the Committee,
meant that there was an economic freedom which allowed individuals to
engage in any business or trade. "Every State in the Federal Union,"
328. Turner 1353.
329. Id.
330. In order to avoid any possible objection to this observation, I should say that I
recognize that there is a difference between an expression of policy and the law as it is
written. I must still show, if possible, that the policy as expressed in the TNEC Report, was
actually distilled in the words of the statute.
331. TNEC Report 13 (words of President Roosevelt).
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observed the Committee, "has tried by law to protect economic freedom
by exempting from execution or attachment the tools and implements of
trade .... ,,382 In its strongest policy statement, the Committee declared:
"America must find the way to bring about a permanent decentralization
if the ideals of a democratic social and economic structure for all our
people are to be achieved." ' 3
Further declaring its faith in small businessmen, the Committee called
for the government to encourage actively the development of new private
enterprises, and to initiate positive programs designed to foster and pro-
tect them.3 4 "If the opportunity for the employment of idle men and
idle money is to be found in a free, private enterprise system then, obvi-
ously, we must find the way to stimulate that enterprise by encouraging
the investment of private savings in new private enterprise."3 ' While
there are laws designed to stimulate the activity of small businessmen, the
total economic environment presently works against their interest. In the
first place, the cost of loans is higher for the small business. In fact,
Turner uses the fact that large firms can obtain capital on a more favor-
able basis as justification for allowing certain mergers.,,, Secondly, it is
obvious that the availability of capital is greater for the giant firms. It
is even more obvious that this availability increases when the funds are
to be used in a corporate take-over scheme as opposed to the support for
a new private enterprise. Just recently, for example, during the tight
money market, James Ling, one of the self-styled merger kings, was able
to borrow 80 million dollars to finance a corporate takeover of Wilson &
Co. Then, with more financial manipulation, he generated another 250
million dollars to finance future takeovers of companies, which may or
may not cooperate. 3 7 If the money is available, it is immaterial whether
the company destined to be captured cooperates.
Turner does not object to any technique that will encourage new enter-
prises or which will preserve or add to the opportunities of small
business entrepreneurship. He supports the aids provided by Congress
in the form of loans and loan guarantees and favorable income tax treat-
ment for small business, and he says that these can do more to promote
opportunities for small business "than the ephemeral protection afforded
by sweeping antimerger prohibitions-a 'protection' that will often harm
rather than help the small businessman." 3 8 Arguing strongly for con-
332. Id. at 6.
333. Id. at 4.
334. Id. at 9.
335. Id. at 9-10 (emphasis added).
336. Turner 1338.
337. Ling the Merger King, Newsweek, Oct. 9, 1967, at 71.
338. Turner 1327.
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glomerates, Turner says that large firms should not be penalized for ac-
quiring small firms merely because of the cost savings. He continues by
saying that there is an enormous social interest in the progress and
efficiency that such conglomerates generate. Any strict or sweeping en-
forcement of the antimerger statute would do violence to this social
interest, in his opinion.
By relying on this personally conceived value judgment, Turner re-
veals the fallacy in his entire conglomerate theory. In formulating his
conglomerate rules, he cannot be said to have lacked understanding of
the congressional policy on the issue. As he so accurately observed: "It
is undeniable that the legislative history of the 1950 amendment to section
7 indicated extensive, if not primary, preoccupation with the alleged evils
of concentration and the alleged virtues of small entrepreneurship."r3
But while not denying the existence of an official congressional policy
against concentration, Turner in effect says that Congress was wrong.
He says that had this lawmaking body given adequate consideration to
the social interest of conglomerates (as conceived under his personal
economic views) it is doubtful that there would have even been any strong
policy against concentration. With this unsupported explanation Turner
seeks to justify the application of his own economic standards to the anti-
merger statute. Actually the congressional committee, in its study of the
problems of economic concentration, did consider conflicting economic
views. Spending in excess of one million dollars on this study, the TNEC
specifically called for economists, expert in particular fields, to study the
problems raised in the hearings and to make separate reports upon
them.3
4 0
No matter what one's qualifications be, particularly if he is a public
officer, he cannot ignore the policy adopted by the official law-making
body. If, as Turner does in this instance, an enforcement officer disagrees
with this official pronouncement, he should present his views to Congress
and seek a change through the machinery of the legislative process. In-
stead Turner merely ignores the congressional policy with which he dis-
agrees, and tells the antitrust enthusiast on Capitol Hill that he isn't
alarmed at the increase in the percentage of industrial assets controlled
by the top firms." 1
With this open and bold rejection of the "will of Congress," Turner
is overreacting to the more subtle concept of judicial supremacy. It might
be argued that if this is true then Congress should retaliate by changing
the law. Of course there is nothing original about this argument. This is
339. Id. at 1326.
340. TNEC Report 694.
341. Business Week, May 20, 1967, at 61, col. 2.
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the theory followed by many courts which hold that if the legislative body
fails to respond to a particular judicial construction of a statute, it then
acquiesces in it. Such convoluted reasoning, which has contributed to the
failure of many statutes, fails to consider the complexity of the law-
making machinery. With all the conflicting views and political pressures,
the obstacles to merely initiating change are staggering.
d) Bigness: There is no doubt that the TNEC, after long and serious
deliberation of all opposing views, came up with an official economic
standard in favor of blocking any further extension of economic concen-
tration. It did not say that the future increase of concentration should
be controlled by government regulation. Instead it said, in unequivocal
terms, that legal action must "stop the processes of concentration .... 812
Nor was the Committee satisfied with preserving the status quo; it insisted
that the trend be reversed. 4 But before there can be a reversal in the
trend, action to stop the trend must be accomplished. Once the trend was
stopped, the reversal would be a natural consequence of an increased
confidence of small investors. This confidence would be further enhanced
by the recommended government action to encourage actively the de-
velopment of private enterprise.844
The Committee did concede that bigness already present was here to
stay, but along with this it recognized the need for the presence of suffi-
cient government controls "to eliminate all danger of arbitrary power." 3M 4
Being realistic in its approach, the Committee observed that its recom-
mendations were not "designed to turn the economic clock back.) 840 In
outlining the function of the Committee to study economic concentration,
President Roosevelt had earlier declared: "No one suggests that we re-
turn to the hand loom or hand forge. 347 The President observed that
modern efficiency might require one or more huge mass production plants
to turn out a given manufactured product. However, he continued by
saying, "[M] odern efficient mass production is not furthered by a central
control which destroys competition between industrial plants each capable
of efficient mass production while operating as separate units."148 At first
glance, one might draw the conclusion from these words that the President
was concerned only with competition in the production and sale of a
particular product between two merging plants. I suggest, however, that
this would be a narrow construction of the word competition. Read con-
342. TNEC Report 9.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 7.
346. Id. at 10.
347. Id. at 13.
348. Id.
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sistently with the general theme of his message and the subsequent find-
ings and conclusions of the TNEC, this word "competition" must be con-
sidered as an economic concept standing for the broader term "free enter-
prise." Under this broader interpretation of the word, it is obvious
that all forms of mergers were considered-horizontal, vertical and
conglomerate. The President and the Committee rejected any attempt
to justify any further concentration of economic power on the argument
that mergers would encourage efficiency. This, of course, is the central
theme under which Turner formulates his conglomerate rules. However,
as President Roosevelt declared: "Industrial efficiency does not have to
mean industrial empire building.23 49
e) What is wrong witk bigness: A continuing inquiry into economic
concentration has established that this concentration is intimately related
to higher consumer prices.5 0 Inflation and rising prices, the correction
of which brings on suggested tax hikes, have today become a major con-
cern to this nation. Market power breeds more economic power through
promotional and advertising techniques, as was noted by the Supreme
Court in the recent Procter & Gamble case.3 51 That company, in 1957,
spent more than 80 million dollars on advertising and an additional 47
million dollars on sales promotion. 2  During this same year, the Clorox
Company, which was acquired by P & G, spent almost $3,700,000 on
advertising and $1,700,000 for other promotional activities. 33 In this
latter situation, it was observed that the advertising was used to imprint
the value of the name "Clorox" in the mind of consumers, even though
all liquid bleach is chemically identical." 4 Such mass promotional cam-
paigns (which, it could be argued, are anticompetitive in themselves) are
so costly that they necessitate a high concentration of economic power.
This high cost, however, is obviously passed on to consumers in the form
of higher prices 35
Not only is rising cost associated with economic concentration, but it
has been suggested that "bigness" and "corporate morality" are closely re-
349. Id.
350. Hearings pursuant to S. Res. 191 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess, pt. 5, at 1863 (1966).
351. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
352. Id. at 573.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. It is not my purpose here to take any position on the anticompetitive effects of
advertising. I can see the educational virtues of advertising. But I can also see the anticom-
petitive effect of creating demands on the basis of "brand names" rather than the more
traditional competitive merits such as price, quality, services, etc. But, not being an econo-
mist, I am not qualified to reach even this conclusion.
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lated. It might be argued that any danger of the centralization of eco-
nomic power in a handful of huge corporations is diluted by a wide public
distribution of securities. President Roosevelt, in his message to Congress
prior to the TNEC study, rejected this idea and declared that, in 1929,
the concentration of stock ownership was equal to the concentration of
corporate assets. 56 "Corporate morality" takes on many different forms,
depending upon the source being considered. The TNEC report, for
example, in formulating a congressional policy, declared that economic
organizations can be justified only to the degree in which they serve the
entire community.357 Other sources might measure this "morality" by the
financial return received by the shareholders.53 Today, even the historical
position of complete allegiance to shareholders is being questioned. It
has been suggested that those firms which merge tend to be more oriented
to management's interest than to the shareholders'."'0
Whatever the conclusion reached on the question of "corporate moral-
ity," it is obvious that the standard envisioned in the TNEC report has
not yet come about. Efficiency of the corporation is not presently mea-
sured in terms of the good it can do for the general public. Instead of
decentralization, which would allow all economic geographic segments
of the country to develop, there has been a rapid increase in consolida-
tions. Such deviation from the congressional standards has been geared
to increase profits and generate additional capital which can be used to
capture control of other companies. The consequences of this efficiency
were considered by Congress as being too great to allow the continua-
tion of concentration to go unchecked. To repeat the words of President
Roosevelt: "Industrial efficiency does not have to mean industrial empire
building."360
From these general remarks concerning the consequences of bigness,
I will now consider some of the more serious points raised in the TNEC
studies. My purpose in discussing these points is to clarify further the
official congressional policy upon which section 7 of the Clayton Act was
amended. At times, I will seek to compare the current economic problems
to these standards to demonstrate the obvious failure of the merger
proscription. In doing this, however, I may at times drift too far and
insert my own economic biases. If this should occur, I beg the reader to
disregard it, for my principal purpose remains that of isolating the con-
356. TNEC Report 11.
357. Id. at 5.
358. Rupert Thompson of Textron, Inc. remarked about shareholders: "No stockholder
of any company that we have acquired has ever done worse than double his money." News-
week, Oct. 9, 1967, at 72, col. 1.
359. Hearings pursuant to S. Res. 191, supra note 350, at 1915-20.
360. TNEC Report 13.
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gressional policy. Far from my mind is any notion to persuade any person
to accept a given economic view. Such persuasion, in my opinion, rightly
belongs to the political or social scientist and I confess to be neither.
Furthermore, there are already too many unofficial economic theories be-
ing advocated to courts in the application of the antimerger statute. And
these unofficial views have been the major cause of the present ineffective
enforcement policy. There is no room for judicial consideration of vary-
ing economic theories; the choice has already been made by Congress.
Lawyers, as opposed to political and social scientists, have the limited and,
I might add, the less taxing duty of understanding the single standard
adopted by the law-making body. Should we, as lawyers, consider the
law to be unworkable or unfair to the interest of our clients, we must,
if the political system is to be preserved, restrict ourselves to the same
legislative machinery that is available to all the people. Lawyers who
seek changes through the judicial tribunal, and judges who respond by
way of either a restrictive or an expansive statutory interpretation, inter-
fere with the constitutional and orderly method of accomplishing a change
in the law. It is with this limited purpose that I continue the discussion
of the consequences of bigness.
f) Distribution of wealth: It was no empty slogan when the TNEC ex-
pressed its general standard that economic organizations can be justified
only as they serve the entire community.30' With this expression, the Com-
mittee was avowing its faith in the concept of "free enterprise,"" which,
according to the Committee, can be preserved only by decentralization
of economic interests. Nor was the avowed faith in this concept based on
any mere philosophical bias. It was believed that the force of "free enter-
prise," through decentralization, could more equitably distribute the
wealth of the nation. Congressman Celler recently observed that utiliza-
tion of corporate funds for mergers and consolidations diverted corporate
resources from the building of new plants and the development of new
technical resources.8 3 Decentralization, if accomplished, would cause
facilities of production to be dispersed into the undeveloped market areas,
thereby reducing the problems of unemployment and failing businesses.
States have become economically dependent on persons and organizations
that, through mergers and consolidations, have removed economic ac-
tivity from within the borders of their respective communities.P
Although there may be greater efficiency in consolidated facilities, it
comes at the expense of those economically depressed areas that today
361. Id. at S.
362. Id. at 7.
363. Cong. Rec. A1493 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1964) (remarks of Mr. Celler).
364. TNEC Report 5-6.
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have captured the attention of all Americans." 5 If the cost of gaining
efficiency is an increase in economic concentration, the expense is too
high. The unending trend toward super concentration has already all but
destroyed "free enterprise." Consequently, a large mass of people, de-
prived of any economic opportunity, have inflicted the conscience of this
nation with a cancerous sore. To be more exact, 35,000,000 people, or one
sixth of the nation's population, have "not shared in the abundance which
has been granted to most of us, and on... [them] the gates of oppor-
tunity have been closed." 6 ' Responding to President Johnson's message
of March 16, 1964, Congress launched a major attack on the total prob-
lems of poverty.367 With special emphasis on the economically depressed
areas (urban slums, the Ozarks and Appalachia), Congress has author-
ized expenditures of billions of dollars to relieve the starving conditions
(economic and mental) of millions of American citizens.
It is unfortunate that the centralized government was compelled to
enter this war on poverty. For so long, the system of "free enterprise,"
with all its economic force, was assigned the task of distributing the na-
tion's wealth. Because reliance was placed on this economic force, the
government, even with all its bureaucracy, found itself inadequate to
the challenge of making any meaningful economic distribution.8 8 Empha-
sis, under the poverty program, has been placed on education, job training,
etc., with little, if any, attention being directed toward a move to enhance
an effective antitrust enforcement policy. This is not to suggest that
economic decentralization is a panacea for all the ills of poverty. It
merely points to the fact that the TNEC adopted this system of economic
organization as its standard for insuring the greatest number of jobs and
the greatest number of opportunities for small private enterprise.
It is reasonable to think that the forces of competition, if unrestricted,
would naturally develop the economic segments of the country. If there
are people then there are markets, and the forces of "free enterprise"
365. United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). The Court ruled that
procompetitive effects in one market will not justify anticompetitive effects in another
market area. Id. at 370.
366. Message from The President of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 243, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1 (1964).
367. Economic Opportunity Act, 78 Stat. 508 (1964) (codified in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
368. It was noted in the House Report that for parts of the program there was no
prototype or model upon which to build or improve, making the administration of this new
concept difficult. H.R. Rep. No. 428, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1965). See also, S. Rep. No.
599, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). This Senate Report reveals that the Economic Opportunity
Act of 1964 carried an authorization for an appropriation for only one year. This was a
control technique developed by the Congress in order to require a close check and reevalua-
tion of this new program. Id. at 1.
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will cause the entry of that business necessary to satisfy the demands of
the market. If the people are untrained, the economic forces, in order
to satisfy their demand for labor, will train them. All people have the
right to that level of dignity which is associated with the ability to earn
a living. Deprivation of this dignity due to the forces of either political
or economic centralization threatens the very existence of the legal sys-
tem. Yet millions have been deprived of this dignity because the economic
organizations were allowed to grow so powerful that even Congress, with
its lawmaking powers, has been unable to stop the tide." "
The timidity of antitrust enforcement and adjudicating policy is the
principal cause of the general failure of the antitrust laws to achieve
decentralization. First and foremost, of course, is the emasculating inter-
pretation applied to the antimerger statute both by the Justice Depart-
ment and the Federal Trade Commission. Long before Turner was named
to head the Antitrust Division, there had been ineffective enforcement.
The only difference between Turner and the previous enforcement officers
is that he spells out and explains his reluctance to act3 70 Almost as im-
portant is the long standing attitude of the Federal Trade Commission
on delivered pricing. While the Supreme Court has upheld the Federal
Trade Commission's determination that delivered pricing amounts to
price discrimination, the Commission announced a policy that it would
attack only those pricing systems devised by concerted effort.' Accep-
tance of this delivered pricing system causes companies located near a
market to lose their competitive advantage of location. Large firms with
centralized facilities can compete effectively in faraway markets by ab-
sorbing the freight costs. Without this ability, the larger firms would be
forced to decentralize by building new plants in juxtaposition with local
markets and thereby develop economically deprived areas. Until this oc-
curs, individual states and local communities will continue to be dependent
upon centralized economic organizations which are presently resisting
any efforts toward gaining local economic self-sufficiency.
The TNEC, in its recommendations for bringing about decentralization,
took a strong stand against delivered pricing systems. It said that "such
systems have resulted in uneconomic and often wasteful location of plant
369. Congressm an Murdock spoke in favor of creating a strong commission (the FTC)
which could prevent a monopoly before it grew so powerful that even if the courts con-
demned it, they would shrink from destroying it. 51 Cong. Rec. 8973, 8975 (1914) (remarks
of Mr. Murdock).
370. The enforcement role of the FTC will be discussed in greater detail at a later point.
371. See FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC,
324 U.S. 726 (1945); FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 US. 746 (1945). For a discussion
of the development of FTC policy, see S. Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Laws 262-63 (2d
ed. 1959).
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equipment. ,,-." Addressing itself to the objections raised to the recom-
mendation that Congress enact legislation declaring delivered pricing
illegal, the Committee stated:
The committee is not impressed with the argument that a legislative outlawing of
basing point systems will cause disturbances in the rearrangement of business through
a restoration of competitive conditions in industries now employing basing point sys-
tems. Such disturbances may be costly to those who have been practicing monopoly.
But the long-run gain to the public interest by a restoration of competition in many
important industries is clearly more advantageous.8 73
No such legislative action was taken. However, after the Supreme Court
rulings in 1945 and 1948,874 there was no further need for it. But after
these decisions, Congress, somewhat inconsistently with its decentraliza-
tion policy, passed legislation which legalized freight absorption 75
Whether this was due to the economic pressure placed on the lawmaking
body or on a general misunderstanding of the competitive system as
described in previous and subsequent antimerger legislative history is
not clear. In any event, President Truman vetoed the measure, indicating
that the bill, intended to clarify the law, would instead obscure it and
create new confusion.78
g) Preservation of the concept of free enterprise: As already men-
tioned, the term "free enterprise" is being used conceptually to stand for
the standard or ideal of "individual opportunity"-an ideal rooted in the
very foundation of our political system. Congressman Celler noted, in his
stand for passage of an effective antimerger statute, that the greatness
of this country was first built on the foundation of small, independent,
decentralized business.377 Even Thomas Jefferson, who favored states
rights and local control, looked upon the great concentration of industrial
power as a threat to the constitutional right of individual liberty.878 This
relationship between economic power and political power was the issue
before Congress in 1890, in 1914, on numerous occasions between 1940
and 1949, and finally in 1950. In passing the 1950 antimerger amend-
ment, this lawmaking body took its stand in favor of the preservation of
372. TNEC Report at 33.
373. Id.
374. Cases cited note 371 supra.
375. S. Oppenheim, supra note 371, at 263. S. 1008, after long debate, was passed by
the House on March 14, 1950, and the Senate on June 4, 1950. With the passage of the
amendment to § 7 of the Clayton Act occurring in the same year (Dec. 29, 1950), It might
well be argued that the expressions in favor of delivered pricing dilute any argument In
favor of a strict policy in favor of decentralization. Since I have no present time to follow
through on this point, this must be considered a limitation to my views.
376. S. Oppenheim, supra note 371, at 264.
377. 95 Cong. Rec. 11486 (1949) (remarks of Mr. Celler).
378. Id. at 11485.
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"free enterprise," a term synonymous with decentralization. Some theor-
ists (including politicians), however, mistakenly interpret this freedom
to mean that men with such capabilities should be allowed to either ac-
quire or sell corporate stock or assets unrestrained.3 " People with such
views, in the name of free enterprise, claim an uncontrolled right to
merge. As noted in the TNEC report: "Private enterprise is ceasing to be
free enterprise and is becoming a cluster of private collectivisms; masking
itself as a system of free enterprise after the American model, it is in fact
becoming a concealed cartel system after the European model."3s°o
With all the clarity in the policy of the law, it is indeed a sad commen-
tary that those holding the minority view in favor of unrestrained acqui-
sitions have consistently been winning the final battle. What they were
unable to accomplish through the legislative process, they are doing quite
successfully by means of the enforcement agencies and the lower federal
courts. And this failure to enforce the antitrust laws, particularly the
antimerger statute, vigorously, is at the expense of the next generation.
As the TNEC report warned:
So great a proportion of all national savings and all national wealth have fallen under
the control of a few organized enterprises that the opportunity of those individuals
who will constitute the next generation will be completely foreclosed unless, by com-
mon consent of leadership in business and government, we undertake to reverse the
trends responsible for the present crisessl
Since these words of warning were delivered in 1941, the merger trend
has continued unabated despite the passage of the 1950 antimerger
amendment. Perhaps this ever increasing trend has already been allowed
to go too far.
At other points in this paper, I have already illustrated the extent of
mergers; however, let me cite a few more statistical observations. As of
1949, there were over 3 million business units in this country. Of these,
445 corporations, Y8 of one percent of all corporations, owned 51 per cent
of the nation's business assets.3 12 This, according to Congressman
Celler, was allowed to happen because of loopholes in the 1914 antimerger
statute. Under these loopholes, 2,500 formerly independent companies
disappeared as a result of mergers. While this number may not be too
impressive, the assets of the 2,500 disappearing corporations were valued
at $5.2 billion, 5.5 per cent of the total corporate assets.' 3 We have al-
379. 95 Cong. Rec. 11488 (remarks of Air. Goodwin); 95 Cong. Rec. 11492 (remarks of
Mr. Jennings); Turner 1326.
380. TNEC Report 12.
381. Id. at 9.
382. 95 Cong. Rec. 11485 (1949) (remarks of Mr. Celler).
383. Id.
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ready seen that the number of major business mergers during the year
1967 moved at the record rate of 150 a month. 8 4
More recently, it has been observed that during the period of 1955
through 1965, only 14 of the 500 largest firms have not engaged in
mergers. 85 Partially as a result of mergers, the top 100 corporations
increased their asset ownership from $36 billion in 1945 to $200 billion
in 1967.80 In a review of the top 100 corporations, it was reported in
Forbes: "Not only companies, but whole industries rise and fall in our
economy."8 7 For example, from 1945 to 1967, only 71 of the top 100
corporations survived outside attacks.88 8 And of the 29 newcomers, several
jumped to a point near the top.8
The merger trend merely reflects the general big business belief that
the historical idea of "free enterprise" is an outdated market concept.
Frank Peterson, president of Brown Company, taking this position, ex-
plains that the "middling sized company is doomed."3 ' He says that
we are now in an era of industrial socialism where middle sized companies
are being picked on by the little fellow and crushed by the giant."9' When
businessmen freely express approval of the merger trend, they show an
open disregard for congressional standards. Voicing his approval of this
trend, Frank Peterson declares that while the whole country might not
be made up of conglomerate giants, we will see over 80 per cent of the
gross national product produced by 15 per cent of the companies.9 2 This
prediction is fast coming true, with the merger upstarts, such as James
Ling of Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., Harold Geneen of International Tele-
phone and Telegraph, Charles G. Bluhdorn of Gulf and Western Indus-
tries, Charles Thornton of Litton Industries, and Rupert Thompson of
Textron, Inc. acting as pacesetters.
Established companies that once were conservative in seeking out
mergers have gained a sense of security from the "hands off" enforcement
policy for conglomerates. Feeling secure, they have followed the pace-
setters by forcefully entering into the merger arena in a bid to obtain
profit stabilization and to form shelters from market fluctuations. Be-
384. Time, Sept. 8, 1967, at 87, col. 1.
385. Hearings pursuant to S. Res. 191, supra note 350, at 1924 n.24.
386. Forbes, Sept. 15, 1967, at 76.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 64.
389. Id. at 76. Companies listed were not part of the top 100 in 1945, yet they gained the
following positions: General Telephone & Electronics 11; International Telephone & Tele-
graph 22; Tenneco 17; Reynolds Metals 46. Id. at 58-60.
390. Id. at 336.
391. Id. at 336-37.
392. Id. at 337.
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sides these economic reasons for mergers, it has been suggested that the
moving trend is being influenced by additional psychological forces. In
a desire to keep up with the corporate Joneses, it is reasoned: " 'Every-
body's doing it-why not us?' "I" The Wall Street Journal has facetiously
(but with some accuracy) predicted that the merger trend would end only
after the merger of General Motors Corporation into American Inter-
national Consolidated Everything, Inc. "The GM purchase completes
AICE's acquisition program-it has now bought every company in the
U.S."39 4
The destructive power of economic concentration cannot be measured
by the effects of a single merger. Any one particular merger may have
no apparent anticompetitive consequences. On the other hand, a series
of these seemingly procompetitive mergers would most definitely con-
tribute to a further general concentration of economic power, and thus
would be contrary to the congressional standard. Consequently, one must,
in each case, consider the anticompetitive effects on a broad conceptual
basis.
7z) Foreign influence and control: Speaking of the size of American
corporations and the power generated thereby, the TNEC report indicated
that what states cannot constitutionally do, corporations with their
economic power have been able to do.3" On the international scene, large
corporations have entered cartel arrangements with foreign govern-
ments.3 9 Besides the competitive advantages gained by these big corpo-
rations (capable of involvement in cartel arrangements) over smaller
American competitors, another effect is that foreign influence is gaining
a foothold in American industry. It is interesting to note, for example,
that James Ling sought and obtained $50,000,000 from banks in Europe
to finance his take-over of Wilson & Co.3 7
i) Bank control: Lending institutions-foreign or domestic; bank,
trust or other institution 39 -that furnish the necessary capital for
corporate take-overs are being placed in a strategic position to exercise
control and influence over American industry and thus the American
economy. With what appears to be reckless financial manipulation to
accomplish corporate take-overs, even proponents of the merger trend
393. Wall Street J., Sept. 19, 1967, at 1, col. 6.
394. Id. "This is pretty much what Wall Street wags predict would happen if the present
merger rush roared on unchecked." Id.
395. TNEC Report 7. See U.S. Const., art. I, § 10.
396. TNEC Report 8.
397. Ling the Merger King, Newsweek, Oct. 9, 1967, at 72, col. 2.
398. Id. For the Wilson & Co. takeover, Ling needed $80 million, of which he obtained
$50 million from European banks and $30 million from American non-banking institutions
such as insurance companies and the Harvard and Stanford University trust funds.
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have raised the storm flag. John Beckett, president of Transamerica
Corporation, a great supporter of the merger trend, warns that: "'There's
a great danger ... of people coming in, trying to do what we're doing,
and getting themselves completely overextended. They're using too
much of debt securities and dividend securities, paying too high a price
to acquire something and pyramiding.' 3"9 Some of these merging com-
panies, warns Mr. Beckett, could eventually get into difficulties equivalent
to what happened to the old utility holding companies in the depression. 00
Overextension of credit is easy to understand when one realizes that
corporate take-overs are not inexpensive. This is especially true when
there are two raiding parties seeking to capture the same corporation.401
Closely related to the problems created by an overextension of credit
is the financial manipulation that gives big corporations strong economic
power over local communities. Local communities, with power to issue
municipal tax-free bonds, have engaged in the practice of pirating plants
from other communities. The fact that this practice creates an economi-
cally depressed area in the pirated community is enough to condemn it.
But yet more significant is the corporate power created over the political
subdivision as a consequence of an overextension of public debt. The tax
exempt status of municipal bonds is being transferred to private eco-
nomic organizations. 02
Besides being an abuse of a tax benefit, the practice has serious eco-
nomic consequences, as the following examples will illustrate. In order
to transfer the public tax benefit to a private group, a municipality will
issue bonds which are sold to the corporation willing to move into the
area. The money received is then used to build the plant facilities, which
in turn will be rented to the corporation for thirty years at a rate to cover
cost, and then renewed for an additional thirty years at $1 per year. A
specific example cited by Congressman Reuss showed that the city council
of Bowling Green, Kentucky authorized the issuance of $6,500,000 tax-
free bonds to finance the construction of a plant for Cutler-Hammer
Group. This company, then operating a plant in Milwaukee employing
399. Forbes, Sept. 15, 1967, at 312.
400. Id. It seems curious that a person favoring the merger trend would even liken It to
the old utility holding company problems, since, following a FTC investigation of the
problems, Congress passed the Federal Power Act, Natural Gas Act, Securities Act, Securities
and Exchange Act, and Public Utility Holding Co. Act. See Davis, The Influence of the
Federal Trade Commission's Investigations on Federal Regulation of Interstate Electric and
Gas Utilities, 14 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 21 (1945).
401. Consider the fight between Gulf & Western and Transcontinental Bus System over
New Orleans' Delta Steamship. With its better offer to the Delta shareholders, Transconti-
nental won the battle. Forbes, Oct. 1, 1967, at 63.
402. For a full discussion of this problem, see 110 Cong. Rec. 5918-19 (1964) (remarks
of Mr. Reuss).
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800 workers, announced that it would leave Milwaukee and move to
Bowling Green, the reason being the more favorable tax benefits that
were available in the Kentucky community. The consequences of this
pirating practice was that the 800 workers in the Milwaukee plant lost
their jobs. 3
An even more startling incident involved the small community of Lewis-
port, Kentucky, which had a total population of 780 persons. In order
to bring in the Harvey Aluminum Company (the fifth largest aluminum
producer in the United States), this small community announced the
issuance of $50 million in revenue bonds, the proceeds of which would
be used to finance the construction of a rolling mill for the company. It
is obvious that such a small community could not market revenue bonds
in this amount. The company's soundness of business was the indis-
pensable ingredient for making the bonds attractive to investors. And as
Congressman Reuss observed: "One of the company's bankers, the Bank
of America, took up an $8 million share."4 ° Not only were the tax ex-
emption benefits transferred over to the large Harvey Aluminum Com-
pany, but the company was able effectively to distribute securities to the
general public free from the scrutiny of the Securities Exchange Com-
mission. As for the anticompetitive consequences, I will merely raise the
question: What power did this bond issuance give Harvey Aluminum
Company over the small community of Lewisport?
5. TNEC Recommendations and Subsequent Congressional Proposals:
There is, to my knowledge, no evidence in the TNEC report that would
indicate a desire to change the previously existing congressional policy.
On the contrary, the TNEC expression of policy, crystallized in the
recommendations, merely reinforced the 1890 (Sherman Act) and the
1914 (Clayton Act and Federal Trade Commission Act) congressional
standards in opposition to concentration of economic power. During these
earlier periods, Congress was just as clearly seeking to preserve a belief
in small private enterprise as the TNEC was in the early 1940's.
a) Enforcement policy: The TNEC first recommended "the vigorous
and vigilant enforcement of the antitrust laws."40 5 There was certainly
nothing different in this suggestion from what Congress did in 1914. When
the Clayton Act was passed, Congress was not seeking to add new sub-
stance to the then existing Sherman Antitrust Act. To Congress, every-
thing specifically proscribed in the Clayton Act was thought to have been
incorporated in the earlier Sherman Act. With the two principal 1914
statutes, Congress was merely seeking a more vigorous and vigilant en-
403. Id. at 5918.
404. Id. at 5919.
405. TNEC Report 9.
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forcement policy which had become necessary due to the judicially created
"rule of reason." Mergers falling under this "rule of reason" were in such
an uncertain state that Congress made this one of the specifically pro-
scribed acts, thereby removing mergers from the effects of this rule. With
the general recommendations of the TNEC, an effort was again exerted
to insure a more effective enforcement policy. The effectiveness of this
policy would be established (at least with the proposed section 7 amend-
ments) only when the trend toward the concentration of economic power
was stopped.
b) Merger recommendations: While the TNEC studies and recom-
mendations covered the entire antitrust field, this article will be limited
to those things dealing with mergers. The report concerning the merger
recommendations first notes that: "The committee has given serious con-
sideration to the problem of corporate mergers and consolidations, this
process being recognized as one which has for years hastened the growth
of the concentration of economic power and has contributed in major
part toward the elimination of competition."406 Thus we can conclude that
the general purpose behind the recommendations was to stop the growth
of concentration through mergers. To accomplish this purpose, three
principal proposals were offered.
First, the TNEC recommended a change in the statutory language so
that section 7 of the Clayton Act would apply both to capital stock and
assets. 07 As will be seen later, this was the recommendation that was sub-
sequently incorporated into the 1950 amendment. But, as the committee
urged, this single change would not be sufficient to stop the merger
trend.40 8 With this observation, the committee appears to have been
concerned about the judicial attitude that had become apparent in anti-
trust cases. It urged that, instead of attempting to stop the merger trend
through "case by case litigation," the lawmakers should devise a proce-
dure that would halt the merger in its inception. 09
Thus the TNEC's second recommendation was that Congress give the
Federal Trade Commission sufficient authority "to forbid the acquisition
of the assets and property of competing corporations of over a certain
size unless it be made to appear that the purpose and apparent effect
of such consolidation would be desirable.1 410 In drafting a congressional
standard for the Federal Trade Commission to follow in its merger re-
406. Id. at 38.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
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view, the TNEC suggested that no merger be permitted unless its pro-
ponents demonstrate:
(a) That the acquisition is in the public interest and will be promotive of greater
efficiency and economy of production, distribution, and management;
(b) That it will not substantially lessen competition, restrain trade, or tend to create
a monopoly (either in a single section of the country or in the country as a
whole) in the trade, industry, or line of commerce in which such corporations are
engaged;
(c) That the corporations involved in such acquisition do not control more than such
proportion of the trade, industry, or line of commerce in which they are engaged
as Congress may determine;
(d) That the size of the acquiring company after the acquisition will not be incom-
patible with the existence and maintenance of vigorous and effective competition
in the trade, industry, or line of commerce in which it is engaged;
(e) That the acquisition will not so reduce the number of competing companies in the
trade, industry, or line of commerce as materially to lessen the effectiveness and
vigor of competition in such trade, industry, or line of commerce;
(f) That the acquiring company has not, to induce the acquisition, indulged in any
unlawful methods of competition or has not otherwise violated the provisions of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended.41 '
In addition to this pre-merger clearance procedure, the TNEC recom-
mended "an outright prohibition on the acquisition of stock in or holding
company control of competing companies .... M.12 With all three of the
above recommendations, the TNEC was seeking to infuse a degree of
certainty into the congressional standard to avoid any serious interpreta-
tion problem.
c) Subsequent congressional proposals: Beginning in 1943, new efforts
(sparked by the TNEC 1941 final report) were made in Congress to
amend the antimerger statute,"la the main thrust coming from Senator
O'Mahoney, who had been chairman of the TNEC. In that year, Senator
O'Mahoney introduced a bill in which he inserted the TNEC recom-
mendation for pre-merger approval. 14 Administered by the Federal Trade
Commission, the bill required prior approval of mergers where corporate
property was valued at a dollar amount to be determined by Congress.1
Having failed in getting this bill before Congress, O'Mahoney reintro-
411. Id. at 39.
412. Id.
413. There had been many earlier attempts to amend § 7 of the Clayton Act. See
Handler & Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act,
61 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 652-54 (1961).
414. S. 577, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943), as cited in Handler & Robinson, supra note
413, at 655.
415. Handler & Robinson, supra note 413, at 655.
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duced the bill in 1945.416 After congressional hearings, the dollar amount
specified in the bill was replaced by a percentage of market rule. But this
prior notification bill failed again, and was reintroduced in the next
session.417
In 1947, proponents of the antimerger statutory amendment shifted
their attention to a bill designed merely to plug the loopholes in section
7.418 One objection to this change was that the amended language "would
override the prior interpretation of section 7 and 'prevent any such rule
of reason at all as to competition.' "' This objection, being consistent
with subsequent objections to be raised, clearly made manifest the real
issue (which went unnoticed by Congress) involved in this political
entanglement. This "rule of reason" was one of the principal reasons
why Congress, in 1914, passed the Clayton and Federal Trade Commis-
sion Acts. At that time this rule was considered as an open disregard for
congressional standards.
d) General words v. specific words: Proponents of the consistent con-
gressional policy against economic concentration do a disservice to that
policy by insisting on a specifically worded antimerger statute. If a
statute is passed prohibiting mergers of companies with $10,000,000 in
assets, then there is an inference that all mergers under this figure are
permissible. If Congress were to pass a bill that required pre-merger
clearance, this same inference would arise. When the TNEC first made
the suggestion in favor of pre-merger clearance, it demonstrated an
inconsistency with its more basic economic standard. A standard calling
for pre-merger clearance is incompatible with the standard in favor of
stopping the growth of economic concentration.
As discussed earlier, this issue was considered by Congress in 1914
when it was debating the use of general words in the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act. In deciding upon the general words, "unfair methods of
competition," it avoided many loopholes which would result from a judi-
cial strict construction. Use of general language is preferable because
Congress itself is applying the statutory proscription to future practices
devised by lawyers and businessmen.
Whether this philosophy had any influence on the rejection of efforts
to use more precise prohibition standards is no longer material. The fact
416. S. 615, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); H.R. 2357, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), as
cited in Handler & Robinson, supra note 413, at 655.
417. H.R. 4810, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1945), as cited in Handler & Robinson, supra note
413, at 656.
418. Handler & Robinson, supra note 413, at 656-59. There were, however, subsequent
pre-merger bills introduced-S. 72, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) ; S. 104, 80th Cong., 1st Sem.
(1947); H.R. 1240, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
419. Handler & Robinson, supra note 413, at 657.
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is that the proposal finally adopted in 1950 was phrased in general
language, thus giving it a much wider application. And in construing
this general language, one attempting to restrict its meaning receives little
help from the previously introduced, highly articulate and restrictive bills.
There is no question that Senator O'Mahoney, Senator Kefauver and
other proponents of the measures were seeking to standardize the estab-
lished policy which favored decentralization. Their insistence on the
more precise standards merely reflected the generally prevailing misunder-
standing of the power of Congress and its relationship to judicial power.
It is remarkable, however, that even with the congressional rejection of
pre-merger clearance, the enforcement agencies have informally in-
corporated this practice on a voluntary basis. Furthermore, there is an
insistence that courts develop more precise standards in order to regulate
merger cases, which, in my opinion, is equally contrary to this congres-
sional rejection.
6. The policy behind the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Amendment: In this
section of the article, I will discuss the congressional policy that was in-
corporated in the present words of the antimerger statuteY4 ° This dis-
cussion will, at times, sound somewhat redundant; however, this should
not be considered an error in writing style. At the expense of being re-
dundant, I will show that the congressional policy behind the 1950
Amendment is no different than the policy expressed by Congress and
its committees in previous years. Recognition of this means recognition
of the fact that the present statutory words, in order to achieve clarity,
can be examined in light of this long standing policy. When so read, the
statutory words themselves become an expression of this congressional
policy.
The Committee Reports, favorably endorsing the bi "2' that would
eventually pass, reflect the long history of congressional efforts to stop
the continuing trend toward concentration of economic power. : A brief
examination of the conclusion reached in the House Report clearly indi-
cates the extent to which Congress was reaffirming the historical anti-
trust principles.' It was there observed that Congress, in adopting the
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, "gave expression to a virtually
unanimous demand that our competitive economic system be protected
against those forces of monopoly which would destroy it." e' Similarly,
420. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
421. H.R. 2734, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) (introduced by Congressman Celler).
422. H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) [hereinafter referred to as House
Report]. S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) [hereinafter referred to as Senate
Report].
423. House Report 12-13.
424. Id.
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the TNEC, in its 1941 report, declared that it "avows its faith in free
enterprise."425 It was next observed that the proposal to amend section
7 "is in no sense antagonistic to so-called big business.1420 In the earlier
TNEC report, the permanent existence of big business was also recog-
nized. However, unlike the present congressional report, where big busi-
ness is recognized for its contribution to the national welfare, the TNEC
report merely conceded that no one could turn the economic clock back.4 27
As a final note in the House conclusion, it was noted that the concentration
of great economic power in a few corporations will necessarily lead to
the formation of large national labor unions, which will of necessity lead
to the growth of centralized political power.428 With this proposed anti-
merger amendment, Congress was only seeking to effectuate a policy that
had been formulated by it in 1914.429
a) Opposition to bigness: Obviously, Congress did not expressly at-
tack the existence of bigness, which is something that proponents of the
present conglomerate merger trend eagerly point out. But recognition
of this is little or no defense for the continuation of mergers. The clear
expression of purpose in the Senate report indicates that the proposed
antimerger bill "is to limit future increases in the level of economic
concentration resulting from corporate mergers and acquisitions.""4 ' Thus
it is the method of gaining bigness that is being attacked. In the ensuing
debates on the proposed bill, Congressman Boggs observed that the 78
largest corporations emerged from the war with 10 billion dollars in
working capital, an amount sufficient to buy the assets of 90 per cent of
all the existing corporations. 481 The dramatic increase in the concentration
of economic power led Congressman Patman to say, "Mergers must be
stopped now, or else the big corporations will become so big that there
will be nothing left to do except for the government to take them over. '432
Congress was well aware of the various types of corporate acquisitions,
yet, in formulating a single economic standard, it made no distinction
between horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers. As specifically
stated in the House report: "The bill applies to all types of mergers and
425. TNEC Report 7.
426. House Report 13.
427. Compare House Report 13 with TNEC Report 10. President Roosevelt did, In his
message to Congress, concede that one or more huge mass-production plants might be
needed. TNEC Report 13.
428. Compare House Report 13 with TNEC Report 10.
429. "Congress thought that it had put a halt to mergers way back in 1914 when It
passed the Clayton Act." 95 Cong. Rec. 11497 (1949) (remarks of Mr. Boggs).
430. Senate Report 3.
431. 95 Cong. Rec. 11496 (1949) (remarks of Mr. Boggs).
432. 95 Cong. Rec. 11498 (1949) (remarks of Mr. Patman).
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acquisitions, vertical and conglomerate as well as horizontal, which have
the specified effects of substantially lessening competition... or tending
to create a monopoly."'4"s Turner, along with other lawyers, writers and
lower federal courts, seeks to isolate conglomerate mergers and place them
under a special set of rules. This, I suggest, amounts to an open repudia-
tion of the congressional standard against any increase in economic
concentration through mergers. Even in 1914, Congress established only
a single standard that was to be applied to all forms of stock acquisi-
tions.434 Congressman Boggs, in the congressional debates, argued (con-
sistently with the committee report and the statute) that the conglomerate
merger "is one of the most detrimental movements to a free enterprise
economy.' 4 35 He stated: "By this process they build up huge business
enterprises which enable them to play one type of business against another
in order to drive out competition. ' 4 6 Until the Procter & Gamble 3 7 case,
even the Supreme Court was applying different standards to the various
kinds of mergers; however, with that case, the Court finally came around
to accepting the single congressional standard concept.4 13 Even before this
Supreme Court decision, the issue was too clear for any serious doubt;
yet Turner had previously advocated the opposite view. He declared that
it would seem reasonable to apply different standards to horizontal, verti-
cal and conglomerate mergers, with the least severe standard for con-
glomerates.439
The defect in this reasoning stems from the fact that there has been a
tendency to tie the problems of concentration to specific industries. This
then limits the application of the congressional standard against economic
concentration to only horizontal and vertical mergers.440 Thereby, one
433. House Report 11. Charts appended to the House Report clearly show that Congress
considered and understood the conglomerate-type merger.
434. 38 Stat. 731 (1914). The wording of this statute ("may be to substantially lessen
competition [between the acquiring and the acquired corporation]") was for a long time
construed to mean that the prohibition was only against horizontal mergers. See House
Report 11. But see United States v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
435. 95 Cong. Rec. 11496 (1949) (remarks of MAir. Boggs).
436. Id. In the area of price discrimination, the danger of the anticompetitive practice of
geographic or area pricing has been recognized. Under such practice, a company will support
the low prices in one area (the location of a competitive battle) by higher prices in another
area where the competition is not as harsh. See Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 US.
115 (1954); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961).
437. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
438. Id. at 577. "All mergers are within the reach of § 7, and all must be tested by the
same standard, whether they are classified as horizontal, vertical, conglomerate or other."
439. Turner 1320-22.
440. The Supreme Court has spoken of the concentration of economic power only in
horizontal and vertical merger cases. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294
(1962), the Court spoke of the concentration within the shoe industry. In United States v.
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is allowed to apply a totally different theory to conglomerates. Though
Congress spoke of economic concentration in specific industries,4 1 pri-
mary concern was fastened to the evils associated with general conditions
of economic concentration. When viewed in light of the total historical
legislative background, this is the only permissible conclusion. Because
Congress looked upon economic concentration as a threat to the total
competitive and political system, the various types of mergers cannot
be distinguished. Each must stand or fall on the basis of the single eco-
nomic standard formulated by Congress.442
b) Desire to preserve small business: The strong congressional oppo-
sition to those mergers that unduly contributed to an increase in economic
concentration was based on the desire to preserve intact a system of free
enterprise made up of small independent businesses. As noted in the Senate
report: "The enactment of the bill will limit further growth of monopoly
and thereby aid in preserving small business as an important competitive
factor in the American economy."443 Similarly, concern was manifested in
the House report over the fact that "recent merger activity has been of
outstanding importance in several of the traditionally 'small business'
industries." '44 It was further noted that "the outstanding characteristic
of the merger movement has been that of large corporations buying out
small companies rather than smaller companies combining together in
order to compete more effectively with their larger rivals. 445 Speaking in
favor of the bill that would manifest congressional faith in the traditional
concept of "free enterprise," Congressman Celler observed that it was the
small, independent, decentralized businesses that made this country
strong.446 When referring to "free enterprise," in a conceptual sense, it
is impossible to dissociate it from the political concept of democracy
or the constitutional form of government as we know it.
Established under our Constitution, democracy is justified only to the
degree that the system protects the individual rights and liberty of its
people. The vehicle through which the people exercise these constitution-
ally preserved rights is "free enterprise," an integral part of the accepted
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), the Court spoke of concentration of banking
facilities. But in the classified conglomerate cases-FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380
U.S. 592 (1965), and Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (not a
true conglomerate) -little if anything has been said of economic concentration.
441. House Report 2.
442. This distinction between specific and general concentration will become more sig-
nificant when we examine the statutory words.
443. Senate Report 3.
444. House Report 3.
445. Id.
446. 95 Cong. Rec. 11486 (1949) (remarks of Mr. Celler).
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political system. And there is no separating the two. Destruction of the
economic system means destruction of the political system. Destruction
of the political system means destruction of the economic system. If eco-
nomic concentration threatens the survival of "free enterprise," it like-
wise threatens the political system. Thus, if the trend toward economic
concentration is allowed to continue, Capitalism will be replaced by Stat-
ism.
That economic concentration does threaten the preservation of a
capitalistic or "free enterprise" system can no longer be objectively de-
bated;447 there is too much supporting data. One cannot help but note
the great concern of the TNEC on this point. "This committee recites
the facts [the extent of economic concentration] only for the purpose of
demonstrating that concentration does exist and that America must find
a way to bring about a permanent decentralization if the ideals of a demo-
cratic social and economic structure for all our people are to be
achieved.""18 Since the TNEC study, every subsequent Congress has
experienced this same concern, and has manifested this concern by the
many attempts to pass a law that would effectively stop the merger trend.
As Congressman Boggs observed: "Congress thought that it had put a
halt to mergers way back in 1914 when it passed the Clayton Act." 4
Congressman Celler, desiring to make the point even more strongly,
declared: "I want to point out the dangers of this trend toward more
and better combines."" Then, citing from a report that had been filed
with former Secretary of War Royall, Congressman Celler stated: "Ger-
many under the Nazi set-up built a great series of industrial monopolies
in steel, rubber, coal and other materials. The monopolies soon got con-
trol of Germany, brought Hitler to power and forced virtually the whole
world into war."4 '
Congressman Celier then observed that the lack of any antitrust laws
in England resulted in constant merger, constant concentration, and more
447. Antagonists and proponents of the antimerger statute use the same line of argu-
ment-preservation of "free enterprise" and democracy. To the antagonists, the threat comes
from the concentrated political power. They object to any form of government control
being imposed on the people (including the big corporations). Congressman Jennings of
Tennessee argued that the right to buy property and to earn a living is too precious for
Congress to take away. Continuing, Congressman Jennings argued that the proposed anti-
merger amendment places too much power in the hands of the federal bureaucracy (the
FTC) which is leading us down the same socialistic path as England. 95 Cong. Rec. 11488-91
(1949) (remarks of Mr. Jennings). This type argument refuses to recognize that centralized
political power results from a centralized economic power.
448. TNEC Report 4.
449. 95 Cong. Rec. 11497 (1949) (remarks of Mr. Boggs).
450. 95 Cong. Rec. 11486 (1949) (remarks of Mr. Celler).
451. Id.
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and more power in the hands of the few. "The end result in England was
socialism. I want no socialism here," remarked Congressman Celler. "I
want no manner or kind of collectivism or totalitarianism. These mergers
are usually the forerunners of collectivism and socialism and therein lies
the danger." '452 Echoing these same sentiments, Congressman Patman of
Texas declared: "Mergers must be stopped now, or else the big corpora-
tions will become so big that there will be nothing left to do except for
the Government to take them over-socialism in the United States, as in
Great Britain, where they never have had our antimonopoly laws. This
is the very thing we all are trying to avoid.1 455
Since I have freely cited from debates on the proposed bill to amend
the antimerger statute, their relevancy must be considered. It is true that
the Supreme Court has ruled that legislative debates are not entitled to
the same weight as carefully considered committee reports. 4 The general
inadmissibility of debates as an aid to statutory construction is based on
the theory that such are "expressive of the views and motives of individual
members [, and] are not a safe guide. '415 Refusal to accept legislative
debates at all,45 or reluctance to place much weight on them, 4 7 is under-
standable where the admission is sought for the purpose of placing a
precise meaning on a specific word. In other words, there is good reason
to limit the use of legislative debates under a theory of statutory construc-
tion that calls for an identification of "legislative intent." There is no
reason, however, to restrict their use when legislative debates are used
to verify the legislative policy and purpose, as opposed to assigning mean-
ing to words.455 The limited function of legislative purpose, once it is
defined, is to clarify statutory words.
c) Limitations on Congressional Policy: Up to now I have, perhaps,
left the impression that Congress, in amending section 7 of the Clayton
Act, was passing an absolute prohibition of all mergers. This is not true,
although there was fear expressed in the debates that the words as pro-
posed could be construed as an absolute prohibition.4 " Had Congress
452. Id.
453. 95 Cong. Rec. 11498 (1949) (remarks of Mr. Patman).
454. United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567 (1957); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443
(1921).
455. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 474 (1921).
456. Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1845).
457. 2 3. Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 5011, at 499-502 (3d ed. 1943).
458. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Thomas, Statutory Construction
When Legislation is Viewed as a Legal Institution, 3 Harv. J. Legis. 191, 204 (1966).
459. See, 95 Cong. Rec. 11487-88 (1949) (remarks of Mr. Goodwin); 96 Cong. Rec.
16436 (1949) (remarks of Senator Donnell). See also the minority views of Mr. Donnell.
Senate Report at 11-23.
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desired an absolute prohibition, "it would have been a simple matter to
outlaw all acquisitions. 4 60 Having made this statement, Professor Handler
declared: "In short, Congress did not prohibit concentration as such. 401
Going still further, he said that since increased concentration is not itself
illegal, there is no escape from the necessity of showing the requisite im-
pact on competition.41 With these words, Professor Handler placed him-
self in the company of those preoccupied with the statutory word
"competition." He suggested that the competitive impact of the specific
merger must be measured in each case. This then led him into the aber-
ration that Congress provided no standards under which the statutory
words are to be construed. This just isn't so.
Congress, in the amended version of section 7, declared that acquisi-
tions that "may be substantially to lessen competition" are prohibited."3
Obviously, these words cannot be construed to be an absolute prohibition
against all mergers. Furthermore, the House report expressly declared:
"One reason for this action was to make it clear that this bill is not
intended to prohibit all acquisitions among competitors."' " This state-
ment, however, can be misleading when taken out of context. It was meant
to clarify the correction of one defect in the original section 7 wording,
which if literally construed would have prohibited all horizontal mergers,
no matter what the size of the company. Even so, there is sufficient evi-
dence in the committee reports, and of course in the statutory words, to
show that the prohibition was never meant to be absolute.
From this point most writers proceed to the next step by saying that
Congress delegated authority to the courts to make a determination on
a case by case basis. They reason that courts, by applying economic evi-
dence, are to decide if a merger is good or bad. I suggest that this errone-
ous conclusion is reached as a result of an incomplete analysis of the
congressional purpose. A further analysis calls for answers to certain
pertinent questions.
(1) Why didn't Congress prohibit all mergers? Congress recognized the
evil of mergers for the threat they represented to the constitutional politi-
cal and economic organizations. But, while recognizing the threat, it did
agree that there would be economic mergers that might be beneficial to
the economic system. Though it is obvious that Congress did not prohibit
all mergers, it is equally obvious that there was no general congressional
approval for "mergers in the public interest."
460. Handler & Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger
Act, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 667 (1961).
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1963).
464. House Report 11.
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(2) What mergers would Congress allow? If the conceptual policy of
Congress was to preserve "free enterprise," one must consider the fact
that such a system demands protection of the freedom of individuals to
enter a business. For purely economic and practical reasons, such freedom
can exist only in a highly decentralized economy where all geographical
markets are developed. Referring back to the historical legislative temper
on this subject, one cannot help but sense the apparent congressional
desire to promote the interests and opportunities of "small businessmen."
(3) What is a small company? Congress has consistently rejected any
attempt to establish a quantitative test to measure the size of a company.
We are not, however, left without any standard. Interestingly, Senator
O'Mahoney, in his final statement to the TNEC, made several useful
observations that help to distinguish between the "big" and "small" com-
panies.46 5 He first observed that local and state boundaries began to
disappear as corporations began to engage in interstate business. 40 From
this same observation, carried forward to the final TNEC report to Con-
gress, it was concluded that the very foundation of state and local govern-
ment was undermined because of the breakdown of geographical mar-
kets.46 7 Principally, this economic breakdown was allowed to occur when
corporations gained the right (or power) to engage in interstate busi-
ness.46 As the trend toward a centralized economy continued, states
lost the power to control effectively corporations engaged in interstate
business.46 9 Eventually this concentration of economic power held by
interstate corporations even exceeded the size of most states.470
Observing that corporate power was exceeding that of states, Senator
O'Mahoney suggested that: "We must be able to differentiate between
that business which is naturally and properly national in scope and that
business which is naturally and properly local in scope.1" 7' National
companies, operating in several geographical markets, can crush, almost
at will, small local competitors. 72
This fact makes it even more probable that many, if not most, states
will eventually become subservient to the so-called national company.
465. TNEC Report 671-87.
466. Id. at 674.
467. Id. at 5.
468. See International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910); Paul V. Virginia, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 517 (1839). Sec
also Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
469. Ohio v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137, 30 N.E. 279 (1892). This was a prelude
to the now famous Standard Oil Co. of N.J., Inc. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
470. TNEC Report 675-77.
471. Id. at 681.
472. Id. at 682-83..
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Instead of contributing to the economic development of certain states,
these national companies withdraw wealth from the local areas. With
the use of its centralized power, aided by the delivered pricing system, a
national company can make sales in a particular state without the need
of building local production facilities. This practice, multiplied manifold,
has left in its pathway many economically depressed areas. Local com-
panies, on the other hand, produce and sell in the same area. Thus, profits
made are then plowed back into further economic development, thereby
contributing to the economic self-sufficiency of the state.
Another relevant distinction made by Senator O'Mahoney was one
between corporations and individuals.4 73 He noted that, by 1932, the
shift in business from individuals to corporations resulted in corporations
holding 78 per cent of all business wealth in this country.74 The term
"perpetuity" fairly distinguishes corporations from individuals. Corpora-
tions are allowed to accumulate wealth without the fear of dispersal that
can occur with the death of an individual.
Congress was not as clear in its distinction between "big" and "little"
companies. However, it did, through examples given, supply us with the
same insight expressly revealed by Senator O'Mahoney. First, the anti-
merger statute applies only to corporations,4 75 not partnerships or individ-
uals. With both individual proprietorships and partnerships, no antimer-
ger law was necessary; death, in both of these situations, is a natural
guard against any dangerous degree of economic concentration. Besides,
the descent and distribution laws, the estate and gift taxes to some extent
control the accumulation of wealth. Any resulting vacuum caused in the
local business community will be filled through the forces of free enter-
prise.
Congress, when it voted, had also been assured that the new antimerger
statute would not apply to companies in a failing or bankrupt condition.
Both the House and Senate reports reviewed the Supreme Court's opinion
in International Shoe Co. v. FTC471 and adopted the judicial reasoning
as part of the congressional policy.417 Interestingly, one finds in both
reports the following judicial language:
[Where there was] a corporation with resources so depleted and the prospect of reha-
473. Id. at 678-79.
474. Id. at 678. One exception to this trend was with the agriculture business which was,
to the extent of 93%, done by individuals. This is understandable in light of state statutes
that limit the right of corporations to acquire land outside boundaries of incorporated cities.
See, e.g., Okla. Const. art. 22, § 2; Okla. Stat. tit. 18, § 1.20 (1961).
475. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1963): "wo corporation . . . shall acquire . . .
etc.
476. 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
477. Senate Report 7; House Report 6.
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bilitation so remote that it faced the grave probability of a business failure with re-
sulting loss to its stockholders and injury to the communities where its plants were
operated, we hold that the purchase of its capital stock by a competitor (there being
no other prospective purchaser), not with a purpose to lessen competition, but to facili-
tate the accumulated business of the purchaser and with the effect of mitigating seri-
ously injurious consequences otherwise probable, is not in contemplation of law preju-
dicial to the public and does not substantially lessen competition or restrain commerce
within the intent of the Clayton Act.478
Adoption of this policy statement does not give companies the right to
sell to anybody of their choice. If there are several prospective purchasers,
the sale should be to the one whose purchase least interferes with the
competitive system. After reviewing the failing company doctrine, Con-
gress reemphasized its stand on this position. In the Senate report, it
was stated: "It is expected that, in the administration of the act, full
consideration will be given to all matters bearing upon the maintenance of
competition, including the circumstances giving rise to the acquisition."4 '
Another limitation expressed by Congress in its approval of the anti-
merger bill concerned the right of two small companies to merge in order
to afford better competition to large companies. To understand this limita-
tion, one must go back to the original wording of section 7. In its original
form, section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibited corporate stock acquisition
where the effect "may be to substantially lessen competition between the
corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation making the
acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or community
or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce." 8 0 A literal inter-
pretation of these words would have the effect of prohibiting the merger
of even the smallest companies. Since all competition is eliminated be-
tween the acquiring and acquired corporations, the statutory term,
"substantial lessening," is clearly established. Then by taking the words
"such commerce" as referring to that which existed between the acquiring
and acquired corporation, and adding to it the word "community," one
can reasonably arrive at the conclusion that small local competitors are
prohibited from merging. Such an unrealistic conclusion was possible
except for the limiting interpretation by the courts.48 '
It was observed in the House report that the proposed antimerger bill
would modify the "present law so as to remove any possibility of an
interpretation that would prohibit inconsequential acquisitions of stock
or assets. 48 2 Congress was not attempting to block corporate mergers
478. Id.; International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302-3 (1930) (emphasis added).
479. Senate Report 7.
480. 38 Stat. 731-32 (1914) (emphasis added).
481. House Report 7.
482. Id. (emphasis added).
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where the "corporations were so small and their other competitors so
numerous that the acquisition would have made no perceptible change
in the intensity of competition in any line of commerce in which such
corporations were engaged."s It would appear that the limitation placed
on the merger prohibition was meant to apply only to horizontal and per-
haps vertical mergers. After reviewing the various forms of mergers and
the change in statutory language just discussed, it was observed in the
House report: "One reason for this action was to make it clear that this
bill is not intended to prohibit all acquisitions among competitors."4 1
I see nothing inconsistent with the limitation of the broader congres-
sional policy against increased economic concentration. By allowing small
companies to join together, the competitive system is better preserved.
An absolute prohibition against all mergers could only benefit those
companies that had already gained a high degree of economic concentra-
tion. Small local companies (the heart of a system of free enterprise)
could not long survive the entry of the large corporations into their
market. Survival depends on the right to merge facilities.
It is thus understandable that certain horizontal (and perhaps some
vertical) mergers must be allowed; however, the same is not true with
conglomerates. While there are many economic arguments in favor of
conglomerate mergers, none can be said to have been adopted by Congress
in the passage of the new antimerger statute. The most obvious economic
benefit of the conglomerates is the created buffer against bad weather
within a single industry.8 5 As favorably viewed by Professor Turner,
"acquisition of diversified lines of business, by stabilizing profits, may
minimize the risk of business failure and bankruptcy."480 No one can
question the validity of this economic observation. Diversification does
spread, and thereby minimize, the risks taken by companies; however,
it must be remembered that this risk is a natural ingredient of, and can-
not be separated from, the concept of free competition. Risk can also be
reduced and profits stabilized by an industry-wide agreement to buy up
the surplus caused by an overproduction within a depressed market.
Such was, in fact, the practice involved in United States v. Socony-Vac-
uum Oil Company.48 7 Facts in that case revealed that large oil companies
had entered into an agreement whereby they would acquire, in an effort
to stabilize market conditions, a certain amount of surplus gasoline that
483. Id. at 8. (emphasis added).
484. Id. at 11.
485. This is the benefit cited by the so-called merger kings themselves. Time, Sept. 8,
1967, at 88, col. 1.
486. Turner 1317.
487. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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was being dumped on the market. Holding that this practice amounted
to price fixing (and was thereby illegal per se), Mr. Justice Douglas, for
the Court, declared:
The elimination of so-called competitive evils is no legal justification for such buying
programs. The elimination of such conditions was sought primarily for its effect on the
price structures. Fairer competitive prices, it is claimed, resulted when distressed gaso-
line was removed from the market. But such defense is typical of the protestations
usually made in price-fixing cases. Ruinous competition, financial disaster, evils of price
cutting and the like appear throughout our history as ostensible justifications for price-
fixing. If the so-called competitive abuses were to be appraised here, the reasonable-
ness of prices would necessarily become an issue in every price-fixing case. In that
event, the Sherman Act would soon be emasculated; its philosophy would be sup-
planted by one which is wholly alien to a system of free competition; it would not be
the charter of freedom which its framers intended.488
Because market stabilization achieved through conglomerates is arti-
ficial and with no permanency, Professor Turner's economic value judg-
ment must be rejected. In any event, we are not free to make such value
judgments; Congress, on the basis of its comprehensive economic investi-
gation, has made this value judgment for us. And there is certainly no
evidence in the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver amendment that
will support the conclusion reached by Professor Turner. In fact, the
opposite is true. Looking at the legislative purpose in its broadest per-
spective, one is led to the conclusion that conglomerates are more anti-
competitive (in the sense of contributing to economic concentration) than
either horizontal or vertical mergers. Perhaps, it was such an over-view
that led Congressman Boggs to observe that: "A third avenue of expan-
sion-and this is one of the most detrimental movements to a free
enterprise economy-is the conglomerate acquisition. 489
There is one common factor connecting each of the limitations previ-
ously discussed-individuals, partnerships, failing or bankrupt companies,
and small competing companies. In each of these situations, there is only
a minimal effect on any further concentration of economic power. Viewed
in light of this policy, section 7 is given its broadest application-a
necessity if the trend toward economic concentration is to stop. And as
was declared so many times in the TNEC report, this concentration
must be stopped, if free enterprise is to survive. Regardless of any per-
sonal view as to the importance of free enterprise, we are bound to
accept it, for Congress has decided in favor of its preservation.
7. Conclusion: From this fairly comprehensive examination of the
congressional policy behind the antimerger statute, I conclude that there
is no need to make any serious economic investigation in each merger
488. Id. at 220-21.
489. 95 Cong. Rec. 11496 (1949) (remarks of Mr. Boggs).
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case. Viewed in their proper perspective, the statutory words are clear
enough to apply in most cases that would ordinarily attract public atten-
tion. In oversimplified terms, one could decide merger cases on a balance
sheet examination. It would not matter whether the acquiring company
would have, except for the merger, entered the market. In fact, it would
not matter whether the acquiring company had ever even considered the
market. It would not matter whether there was in fact reciprocity. It
would not matter that the company brought efficiency to a market hereto-
fore occupied by small businesses. It would not matter what percentage of
the market was involved, except perhaps at the lowest level. It would,
however, matter if both companies were small local companies that passed
nothing into interstate commerce-the true sign of being "small."
I do not suggest that all the problems of interpretation have hereby
been resolved. Between the poles of the largest corporate acquisitions and
the merger of small local companies, there will be some difficulty. How-
ever, this could be the reason why Congress used the words "may be. 490
As one moves from the lowest levels to the higher degree of concentration,
a value judgment will obviously have to be made. This represents the in-
evitable area of uncertainty that surrounds the interpretation of any legal
rule. Doubts, however, must be resolved against the merger and in favor
of preserving "free competition."
At this point in the article, it seems clear that Turner has expressed
many policy views that are the very antithesis of the congressional anti-
merger policy. The principal problem with Turner's approach is that he
starts and ends with the statutory words. Without giving sufficient atten-
tion to defining the boundaries of the legislative purpose, Turner starts
with the conclusion that the words of the antimerger statute do not
create an absolute prohibition. He then feels free to examine the statutory
words in light of his own economic philosophy surrounding the term
"Ccompetition."'
Before Professor Turner can be said to be wrong, we must first examine
the statutory words. Though the congressional purpose and policy behind
the antimerger statute are clear and beyond question, they are not, of
themselves, the law. Only that part of the policy which is expressed in the
statutory words can be given any legal efficacy. This legislative purpose,
to the determination of which I have devoted considerable space, is used
for the limited function of clarifying the statutory words. It is just as
erroneous to become preoccupied with legislative purpose as it is to
emphasize a literal and sterile interpretation of the words. The legislative
words and purpose must be examined together if there is ever to be any
rational application of statutes.
490. More will be said about this term in the review of the statutory words.
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VI. STATUTORY WORDS REVIEWED
Read in light of the congressional policy, the words of the antimerger
statute are not too complex. As amended in 1950 by the Celler-Kefauver
Act,491 it provides that no corporation shall acquire the stock or assets of
another corporation "where in any line of commerce in any section of the
country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen com-
petition, or to tend to create a monopoly. 4'* 2 This is not a radical change
from the 1914 wording, the principal difference being the inclusion of
"assets" in the prohibition. The main purpose behind the amendment was
to close all loopholes that had permitted many corporate mergers to escape
the earlier proscription. Though it is the "acquisition" of corporate stock
or assets that is prohibited, since its passage the statute has been con-
strued to cover all forms of mergers, from pure asset to pure stock and
everything in between. 493 It has even been construed to cover corporate
ventures.494 Congress sought to make it clear that it desired a coverage
so broad that no further loopholes would be possible.49 While lower
federal courts have not freely applied this broad coverage, 90 the Supreme
Court has sought to implement the full scope of the congressional com-
mand.49T
Today there is little trouble as to the coverage of the statute; the
principal interpretation problem falls on the statutory terms "may be"
and "substantially to lessen competition." Both of these phrases, brought
forward from the 1914 act,498 are identical to the original terms used
in section 2 (price discrimination) 49 9 and section 3 (exclusive dealing
arrangements) 0' of the Clayton Act. Thus, for added clarity, this stat-
utory language should be considered in light of the total legislative and
economic history from 1914 until the 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendment.
491. Celler-Kefauver Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (1964).
492. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
493. United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 342 (1963).
494. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
495. House Report 11. As Congressman Boggs stated: "Congress thought it had put a
halt to mergers way back in 1914 when it passed the Clayton Act." 95 Cong. Rec. 11497
(1949) (remarks of Mr. Boggs).
496. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348, 359-60 (E.D.
Pa. 1962), rev'd, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
497. The clearest example of judicial adherence to the congressional command is found
in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967) (all mergers must be tested
by the same standard).
498. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1964). There is one minor change that has made
no difference. In the 1914 Act, the statute read "to substantially lessen competition;" as
brought forward in 1950 amendment, the statute reads "substantially to lessen competition."
The difference is in the position of the word "to."
499. Clayton Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
500. Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
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1. Substantially to lessen competition: To understand this phrase, we
must separate and discuss individually the term "substantially" and the
term "lessen competition." This has not generally been done by writers
in the antitrust field, and as a result, their analysis have been incomplete.
The generally accepted interpretation of this total phrase is that Congress
merely provided a general standard, the application of which required an
economic examination of the "impact on competition" of each merger.""'
From this statutory phrase, one develops an antimerger principle to the
effect that: A merger is illegal if it is substantially anticompetitive in
nature.
With this standard, lawyers are left to determine and courts are left to
decide whether economic policy arguments support the legality of the
merger. In other words, the pertinent question would be: What are the
competitive effects of the specific merger? For example: If the acquiring
firm had previously considered going into the market through internal
growth, a subsequent acquisition might be considered anticompetitiveW2
Likewise, if the merger is executed with the designed purpose of effectu-
ating reciprocity agreements-and if the reciprocity agreements are suc-
cessful-then the acquisition is anticompetitive."'3 Even the transfer of
market power of the acquiring corporation over to a market made up of
small competitors has been declared to have an anticompetitive impact.'
Evidence of the legal significance placed on this idea of "impact on
competition" is gleaned from the different standards of proof required for
the different types of mergers, horizontal, vertical and conglomerate.
Under this concept, enforcement officers and courts are obviously more
strict with horizontal mergers. The fact that all competition e.Nsting
between the two corporations is eliminated clearly manifests the "com-
501. See Handler & Robinson, supra note 460, at 667. This "impact on competition"
concept is also the official enforcement policy of the Federal Trade Commision. See
Mueller, The Celler-Kefauver Act: Sixteen Years of Enforcement 23 (Unpublished speech
delivered at the Seminar in Economics and Business, University of North Carolina, Chapel
11, N.C., Mar. 8, 1967).
502. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 US. 568 (1967); United States v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 376 US. 651 (1964). At the Practising Law Institute forum on conglom-
erate mergers (Dec. 2-3, 1966), lawyers were advised that they should make sure that
corporate files are stripped clean of any memoranda from aggressive young corporate per-
sonnel as to the feasibility of entering a new market internally. In fact, the advice was
that these corporate officials should be told of the danger of giving any outward indication
that could be used as evidence of consideration of the possibility of internal expansion.
503. Consolidated Foods Corp. v. FTC, 329 F.2d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 1964), rev'd, 380
US. 592 (1965). Concurring in the Consolidated Foods reversal, Justice Harlan declared
that if there was evidence to establish that the reciprocity was beyond success then the
merger was not anticompetitive. 380 US. at 602.
504. Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1962). This reasoning
came to be called the "deep pocket" or "rich parent" theory.
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petitive impact" of a horizontal merger. Thus, the only remaining question
is whether this competition was substantial. With the vertical merger,
proof of the anticompetitive effects comes from the market leverage that
is created. Finally, with the conglomerate merger, the diversity of busi-
nesses involved makes it difficult to measure with any accuracy the result-
ing anticompetitive effects. As indicated by Professor Turner, rules
developed for horizontal and vertical mergers are generally insufficient
for conglomerate acquisitions.""a The relative hierarchy of these rules
would be: hardest on horizontal, easier on vertical, and least severe on
conglomerate mergers." 0
Following through with this professional logic, one must, after showing
the anticompetitive impact of each merger, show that the impact was
substantial. Considered as a relative term, the word "substantial" is gen-
erally related to the size of the companies, relationship of the companies,
and the effect on competition. It is generally understood or advocated
that a corporate merger is not automatically to be condemned merely
because it involves a "substantial volume of business. '5 0 7 With this term
"substantial," as well as the term "lessening competition," left in a state
of vagueness by erroneous or incomplete statutory analysis, lawyers have
rightfully demanded the formulation of more precise rules. Such a formu-
lation can, however, create only more uncertainty. Where statutes are
involved, clarity is achieved only through a more enlightened and sophis-
ticated process of interpretation. This sophistication of which I speak
calls for an examination of the statutory words in light of the legislative
purpose. Recognizing that statutes are nothing more than a group of
words of an official body that can be understood only in light of the
circumstances under which they were rendered, I will again review the
pertinent statutory terms.
2. Lessening competition: Since the term "competition" is not ex-
pressly defined in the statute, we must presume that Congress used it in
its generally accepted meaning. Many courts have held that words in a
statute must be given their common meaning in the absence of a legisla-
tive intent to the contrary.os On the other hand, technical terms or terms
of art are presumed to be used within their technical meaning."' Thus,
with the term "competition" one must first decide if it has a common or a
technical meaning. If it has both, the term is presumed in the absence of
a contrary legislative intent to be used with its common meaning.5 10
509. Turner 1315.
506. Id. at 1322.
507. J. Van Cise, Understanding the Antitrust Laws 41 (1966).
508. 2 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 4919, at 433-34 (3rd ed. 1943).
509. Id. at 438.
510. Id. at 441.
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Unfortunately, such rules of statutory construction do not always provide
sufficient certainty, especially since each is conditioned on the proviso
that the rule applies unless contrary to legislative intent. '"
By applying these rules of construction to the statutory word "competi-
tion," one quickly finds that the term can stand for two different things.
First, it can refer to the precise "competitive impact" that the corporate
acquisition has on the immediate market-which is the meaning that most
writers and courts follow. Second, the term, literally examined, stands
for the "system of free competition." Consequences flowing from this
seemingly insignificant difference are startling, and directly affect the
type and amount of proof required. If the statutory term "competition,"
refers to the precise competitive impact of each merger, the element of
proof demands some economic measuring standard-balance of competi-
tive and anticompetitive traits; presence of reciprocity; transfer of
economic power (deep pocket); market leverage created; entry by in-
ternal growth; etc. Assimilation and comprehension of such proof requires
the expert testimony of economists, who may or may not agree on the
competitive or anticompetitive consequences of any given merger. Obvi-
ously the testimony will be influenced by the school of economic philoso-
phy with which the witness is associated.
Conversely, if the statutory term "competition" refers conceptually to
the "system of free competition," we are not concerned with the immedi-
ate competitive impact of the merger. Without regard to the relationship
of the acquiring corporation to other corporations in the market, our
inquiry would concern the competitive effects of the merger on the con-
cept of "free competition" or "free enterprise." Under this view, the
varying economic philosophy is of no legal significance; we are concerned
only with the philosophy or economic standard formulated by Congress.
Faced with the two different interpretations of the term "competition,"
we must now decide which to accept. Under the out-dated rules of statu-
tory construction, the conflict would be resolved on the basis of legislative
intent. Under a more sophisticated method of reading statutes, however,
one would examine the statutory word in light of the legislative purpose.
Such an examination makes it obvious that the term "competition" was
used in the conceptual sense to stand for the system of free enterprise.
Starting with the 1914 antimerger statute and leading up to the 1950
Celler-Kefauver amendment, the most basic legislative purpose incorpor-
ates the congressional desire to preserve free competition or free enter-
prise. Too much has already been said about this legislative purpose for
511. Rules of statutory construction have been a major obstacle to our achieving a
sophisticated understanding of statutes. See Thomas, Statutory Construction When Legisla-
tion is Viewed as a Legal Institution, 3 Harv. J. Legis. 191, 208-11 (1966).
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me to repeat it. Besides this basic purpose, it has also been made equally
clear that Congress believed that free competition is reduced by each
additional step toward economic concentration. In fact, the TNEC
report (consistent with the Celler-Kefauver Committee reports) went so
far as to declare that this free competition would be eventually destroyed
unless the merger trend was stopped and reversed.5 12
From the mere mention of the subject of economic concentration most
writers recoil and release a smoke screen to cloud the real issue. One of
the most noted antitrust authorities, Professor Milton Handler, declares
that the antimerger statute does not make economic concentration il-
legal."' While his observation is quite correct, it is totally immaterial and
irrelevant to the principal issue. The statute is too obvious for anyone to
suggest that economic concentration is illegal. Congress, speaking harshly
against the concentration of economic power that had been accomplished
through corporate mergers, accepted the present level of concentration
and showed no desire to turn the clock back." 4 The statute itself ex-
pressly provides that the prohibition against corporate acquisitions is not
to affect or impair any right heretofore legally acquired. 15
Once the smoke screen is lifted, it becomes clear that Congress was in
fact making furtker economic concentration illegal only if accomplished
by corporate acquisition. Thus it is an acquisition that contributes to
economic concentration that is illegal. Expressed in statutory terms, it is
this increased concentration that "lessens competition" (when the term
"competition" is conceptually viewed).
A similar congressional use of the word competition in the 1914 Federal
Trade Commission Act indicates how an erroneous interpretation can
effectively emasculate a statute. When Congress promulgated the rule
that "unfair methods of competition" were illegal, 1 ' it was using the
term "competition" in a conceptual sense. Congress was seeking to give the
Federal Trade Commission sufficient power to remove anything that un-
fairly interfered with the forces of free competition. The courts, however,
chose to fasten a literal interpretation on the word, thereby restricting
the jurisdiction of the Commission. 1 Congress, in order to correct this
aberration, subsequently amended the Federal Trade Commission Act
by adding the words "unfair or deceptive acts.
51 8
512. TNEC Report 9.
513. Handler & Robinson, supra note 460, at 667.
514. TNEC Report 10; House Report 13.
515. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). But a proviso to this clause provides that It shall not be
construed to make lawful anything heretofore prohibited by the antitrust laws.
516. FTC Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
517. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
518. Wheeler-Lea Amendment § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1964).
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Now writers and courts are about to do the same thing with the word
"competition" as it is used in section 7 of the Clayton Act. Under the
erroneous "impact" notion, a merger of two corporations with combined
assets of a billion dollars or more could conceivably be allowed. Such has
already occurred too many times to make this a mere supposition. Conse-
quently, the concentration of economic power continues to increase at a
fast pace.
Only by viewing the word "competition" conceptually, as standing for
the system of free competition, can we make sense of the statute. If we
do so, economic concentration becomes the congressional standard in light
of which we determine if a merger has resulted in a lessening of competi-
tion. With this general standard, the type of merger involved becomes
an immaterial factor. Already, one should see and appreciate the clarity
that this simple verbal shift permits. The only problem about this shift,
however, is that under it nearly every major merger that has gone un-
prosecuted since 1950 would be adjudged illegal. Regardless of the con-
sequences flowing therefrom, one is not allowed to question the feasibility
of an interpretation that is consistent with the statutory words, especially
when such construction is reinforced by legislative purpose. The con-
ceptual interpretation of competition is not supported by legislative
analysis alone; the Supreme Court has, with the Procter & Gamble
case,519 firmly and effectively rejected the erroneous "competitive impact"
notion. If the law as written is too restrictive, it is not for the courts
to soften the blow. Business interests, desiring to merge their facilities,
must look to the constitutional lawmaking body, Congress, for any de-
sired changes.
3. Substantial: As with the word "competition," Congress did not
provide an explicit definition of the term "substantial." Responding to
this apparent deficiency" in the statute, lawyers have hastened to fasten
a quantitative test to this word. In order to measure substantiality,
lawyers have insisted on the measurement of the relevant geographical
and product market.52' From the formulation of market boundaries, the
next legal step was to find or measure a substantial lessening of competi-
tion within that market. In each case, courts were called upon to measure
abstract statutory terms. I might say, however, that this abstractness
comes from a general misunderstanding of the correct way to read a
519. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
520. This outward deficiency comes from the strict judicial construction that has pre-
vailed in the field of antitrust. Think of the consequences of Congress providing a defi-
nition to the word "substantial." Any definition can act in a restrictive manner. The fact
that no definition was provided is indicative of the desire to formulate a broad, unrestricted
prohibition.
521. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
19681
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
statute. Though Congress used these general and abstract terms for the
purpose of avoiding a restrictive interpretation, courts have effectively
narrowed the application of the prohibition.
Recognition of the abstractness in terms means only that the words
must be examined in light of legislative purpose. By eliminating the
"competitive impact" notion through an examination of this legislative
purpose, the problem of defining the boundaries of a relevant market is
rendered insignificant. 22 When viewed in light of the legislative purpose,
the question is: At what point will there be a substantial increase in
economic concentration? No matter how the word "substantial" is de-
fined, there is no defense to most of the mergers being announced today.
Just as the giant mergers (whether they be horizontal, vertical or con-
glomerate) present no trouble as to the word "substantial," there will
likewise be small, local business mergers that will present no problem.
The interpretation trouble arises as we move from the two poles.
Resolution of the interpretation problem requires one to examine the
similar language found in section 3 of the Clayton Act. As noted in the
House report, the "tests of illegality are intended to be similar to those
applied in interpreting the same language in other sections of the Clayton
Act.""'2 Looking at the section 3 language, we find the Supreme Court
saying that an exclusive dealing arrangement (tying agreement) involving
a "not insubstantial amount of commerce" is illegal. 24 In other words,
it appears that the statutory term "substantial" is construed to mean
"not insubstantial." The effect of this interpretation becomes readily ap-
parent to those who are familiar with linguistic analysis. With this
analytical shift, a clearer line of prohibition is drawn-as is illustrated
by a simple demonstration.
First draw a straight line-then at one end put the word "substantial"
-at the other end put the words "not insubstantial."
"substantial" "not insubstantial"
-----------------------------
You will note from this line that the term "substantial" will be measured
by moving in both directions. To the right, it moves toward the point of
522. Congress did not use the market terms ("where in any line of commerce in any
section of the country") to restrict the coverage of the act. This language was used to
gain the broadest application of the statute without bringing in the small local community
business.
523. House Report 8.
524. Standard Oil of Calif., Inc. v. United States, 337 US. 293 (1949); International
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). See also Northern Pacific Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (Sherman Act case).
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"not insubstantial"; to the left, it moves to infinity. Now take the term
"not insubstantial." With this term you move only in one direction with
a definite terminal point-that being "nothing" or "no mergers." The
area of movement is greatly restricted, thereby offering a much higher
degree of certainty.
It remains to be seen if this interpretation of the word "substantial"
is consistent with the legislative purpose. Under section 3, the term "not
insubstantial" includes those things that are not de -minimis in nature. -
The term "substantial" used in the antimerger section must likewise be
so construed. As mentioned earlier, the limitations to the antimerger
statute found in the legislative history involved only those things that
would have a de iminimis effect on any increase in the concentration of
economic power. Individuals and partnerships (with their limited life)
were expressly excluded by Congress' use of the term "corporation." And
then there was approval expressed in the committee reports concerning
the exclusion of small competitors and, of course, the failing and bankrupt
companies. None of these situations effectively contribute to the evils of
economic concentration against which the statute was directed. As the
House report expressed it, the bill would not prohibit inconsequential
acquisitions of stock or assets.526 In the language of the House report,
such acquisitions "would have made no perceptible change in the intensity
of competition in any line of commerce in which such corporations were
engaged.)527
Proper construction of the phrase "substantially to lessen competition"
eliminates most of the problems attached to the statutory term "may be."
However, judicial interpretation of this term has contributed to the
complexity already created by the erroneous construction of "substantial
lessening of competition."
4. May be: Three measurements come to mind when the term "may
be" is used-possibility, probability and certainty. The Supreme Court
has construed the term to require only a showing of probability, not
certainty-which amounts only to recognition that there is a difference
between the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. With some support from
the committee reports, the legal profession has raised, and the courts
have accepted, the distinction between possibility and probability. Beyond
this, little more need be said except for the fact that the legal profession
has transformed this term into an element of proof.eas
525. In the International Salt case, the amount of commerce foreclosed was only
$500,000. 332 U.S. at 395. And in Oxford Varnish Corp. v. Ault & Wiborg Corp, 83 Fad 764
(6th Cir. 1936), the foreclosed competition amounted to only $32S,000 out of a total market
of $66 million. In neither case was the amount considered de mnims.
526. House Report 7.
527. Id. at 8.
528. Senate Report 6.
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Remaining consistent with the legislative purpose (to stop further in-
creases in the concentration of economic power), the words "may be"
merely manifest that there can be no absolute certainty in the application
of the law. To understand fully the significance of this term, one must
consider the anticipated role of the Federal Trade Commission in ad-
ministering the statute. By increasing the power of the Commission over
mergers, Congress charged it with the duty of making the determination
in questionable cases. 29 Even though the power of the Federal Trade
Commission was increased, one should not forget that Congress created
the economic standard under which mergers were to be examined.
Throughout the years when antimerger legislation was being considered,
Congress consistently found that corporate mergers increased the eco-
nomic concentration and that this economic concentration lessened the
effectiveness of free competition. Beyond this no proof is needed. As long
as the concentration is "not insubstantial," we must conclude that the
effect of the merger "may be substantially to lessen competition."
VII. CONGRESSIONAL ENFORCEMENT POLICY
The previous discussion makes it quite evident that the law has failed
to stop corporate mergers, particularly those of the conglomerate type.
Thus the concentration of economic power continues unchecked. One
reason for this is that the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department
has failed to enforce the law with the vigor intended by Congress.
Congress, not unaware of the possibility of such a timid enforcement
policy, created the Federal Trade Commission, an action which, in part,
manifested a lack of confidence in the office of the Attorney General-at
least in the field of antitrust. Conceding that the weak enforcement of
the Sherman Act was due partially to inadequate investigatory power,
Congress in 1914 refused to place such power in the office of the Attorney
General.53° Instead it created a strong Commission that would be inde-
pendent and free from control of the President and the Secretary of Com-
merce.53' Expressing support for the creation of the Federal Trade Com-
mission, Congressman Willis commented:
I am frank to say that, in my judgment, that is one of the reasons why this bill is to be
commended-because it contemplates the creation of a commission that shall not be
subject to anybody in the Government, but shall be subject only to the people of the
529. Id. See also, Celler-Kefauver Amendment of Clayton Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 20
(1964). In the debates on Celler-Kefauver Act, one dissenter argued that the power of the
FTC was increased excessively. See 95 Cong. Rec. 11487 (remarks of Mr. Goodwin).
530. See 51 Cong. Rec. 8845 (1914) (remarks of Mr. Covington). This was, however,
changed on Sept. 19, 1962, when the President signed into law the Anti-trust Civil Process
Act, 76 Stat. 548 (1962).
531. 51 Cong. Rec. 8840-43 (1914) (remarks of Mr. Covington).
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United States. I hope and believe that if this bill shall be enacted into law it will not
be possible to have such a situation as to corporate control and political management
as we find at present. 532
Congressman Willis further declared that Congress desired to "create a
body, a commission, an organization that shall not be under political
domination or control, and that there shall not be the probability
or possibility of such a thing.1533 To insure as far as possible that the
Federal Trade Commission would remain independent of any political
influence, it was provided that the Commission was to have five members,
of which only three could belong to the same political party.53' This
desired administrative independence was to serve as a check on the
Attorney General in the area of antitrust enforcement. It was to play
an integral part in the broad enforcement scheme envisioned by Congress
in the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts.
This congressional design has not yet reached the desired effectiveness.
Though perhaps more strict than the Justice Department, the Federal
Trade Commission has been equally inept in stopping the merger trend.
One reason for this has been that the Commission has come to acquiesce
in the erroneous notion that only anticompetitive mergers are illegal. 35
While on the surface nothing is wrong with this position, the Commission
has, like all others, failed to accept the conclusion that Congress also
determined which mergers were anticompetitive. It is thus left free to ap-
ply its own economic philosophy rather than the single economic standard
formulated by Congress. Furthermore, the Commission may be moving
from its somewhat independent, or antagonistic, position. Commissioner
Elman has suggested a partnership with the Justice Department in the
merger field. He says that the Commission was not created by Congress
to duplicate those functions of the Department of Justice. 3 I don't
suggest that the Federal Trade Commission was created to be totally
antagonistic to the Justice Department; however, it is clear that they
were not intended to be partners that would divide cases up for enforce-
ment. The Commission must serve as a check on the more politically
motivated office of the Attorney General, and where that office refuses to
enforce the law to its fullest extent against mergers, the Commission must
take the lead.
Congress, showing a strong desire to stop mergers, did not place ex-
532. 51 Cong. Rec. 8981 (1914) (remarks of Mr. Willis).
533. Id. at 8982.
534. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1964).
535. Mueller, The Celler-Kefauver Act: Sixteen Years of Enforcement, supra note 501,
at 23.
536. Elman, Antitrust Enforcement: Retrospect and Prospect, 53 A.BAJ. 609, 611
(1967).
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clusive enforcement discretion in the hands of the two official enforce-
ment agencies. Besides the authority granted to the Justice Department
and the Federal Trade Commission, Congress provided "that any person
who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of
the United States . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of the suit including a reasonable attorney's
fee." '537 And to simplify this treble damage action, Congress provided that
a final judgment in any suit brought by or on behalf of the United States
under the antitrust laws shall be prima facie evidence against such
defendant in a private suit. 38 Furthermore, Congress provided that any
person shall be entitled to sue for, and have injunctive relief against
threatened loss or damage by violation of antitrust laws. 30
Though private suits (damages or injunction) have as yet proven
ineffective (principally because of an unsympathetic judicial attitude),
they represent the most potent weapon that can be used against corporate
mergers. In the first place, private individuals, motivated by the treble
damage device, are immune from any ideological, philosophical or politi-
cal pressures. Increased activity in the treble damage arena would quickly
stop the merger movement because such suits would make corporate
mergers unprofitable. With the only check being the official enforcement
machinery, which involves no threat of monetary penalty unless a criminal
action is filed, many corporations are willing to take the risk because of
the tremendous profits that can be reaped from a merger that might
continue for many years while the suit is pending. A number of effective
treble damage suits would, however, remove this profit incentive.
The weakness of the treble damage suit lies in the restricted interpreta-
tion that has been applied to the statute. Because competing corporations
who might be considering mergers themselves would be reluctant to file
a suit, courts must relax their strict interpretation on the issue of stand-
ing. If the treble damage action was created to supplement the enforce-
ment policy, we should, in order to remain consistent with the purpose
of the statute, find that person who is most likely to bring the suit."4"
537. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
538. Clayton Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1964).
539. Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 37 (1964).
540. Courts have construed the statutory terms "business or property" strictly, thereby
limiting the number of persons who would have standing. Only those directly harmed can
bring suit. Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Products Corp., 224 F,2d 678 (2d Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956) ; Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir.
1955). Trade associations, whose members have been damaged, have been held not to have
standing. Northern Cal. Monument Dealers Ass'n v. Interment Ass'n, 120 V. Supp.
93 (S.D. Cal. 1954). Creditors of person injured were denied standing in Gerli v. Silk Ass'n,
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Perhaps with the case of Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc.,5"' we are
moving into an era of relaxation for treble damage suits in the merger
field. In that case, the court held that a salesman who was dismissed as
a consequence of a corporate merger did have standing to bring the action.
If this is upheld, then every employee, every supplier of the acquired
firm, every service organization of the acquired company will have stand-
ing to attack corporate mergers. With these various persons given stand-
ing to sue, one can expect that future mergers will be stopped, and
mergers that have already taken place will come under attack.
But even if the standing issue is resolved, there remains the question
of damages. Reluctance of courts to develop a realistic doctrine of dam-
ages has helped eliminate the deterrent factor of treble damage suits.
Even though the Supreme Court has stated that the wrongdoer must bear
the risk of the uncertainty which his own wrong has created,5" lower
federal courts still show some reluctance to expand the treble damage
action. Professor Areeda explains that we are not willing to frame broad
or rigorous liability rules because private plaintiffs will not invoke them
with reasonable restraint.54 While this statement might be accurate as
applied to lower federal courts, the Supreme Court has shown a willing-
ness to frame broad and rigorous liability rules.5" And this is as it should
be, for Congress in creating the private treble damage action was seeking
to establish a strong and effective enforcement policy. 45
36 F.2d 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1929). A trustee in bankruptcy was held to have no standing in
Bonvillain v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 250 F. 641 (D.C. La. 1918); Callouct v. American
Sugar Ref. Co., 250 F. 639 (E.D. La. 1917). But it has been suggested that a person not
yet in business might file suit if his entry is blocked. P. Areeda, Antitrust Analysis 31 (1967).
It has been suggested that consumers can file an action. M. Forkosch, Antitrust and the
Consumer, 300 (1956).
541. 380 F2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967). Congress has recently considered the private treble
damage suit. See Hearings on S. 2512 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). The hearings involved the
effect of pleas of nolo contendere on the private treble damage suit.
542. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1946).
543. P. Areeda, supra note 540, at 36. There is much support for this policy argument.
See Barber, Private Enforcement of the Anti-trust Laws: The Robinson-Patman Experience,
30 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 181 (1961); Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines
of Damages in Private Anti-trust Suits, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 363 (1954); Timberlake, The
Legal Injury Requirements and Proof of Damages in Treble Damage Actions Under the
Antitrust Laws, 30 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 231 (1961).
544. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967); Bigelow v. RKO
Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment
Paper Co, 282 U.S. 555 (1931); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co.,
273 U.S. 359 (1927).
545. I have merely touched upon the treble damage suit for the sake of time and space.
Following the same philosophy set out in this article, I will at a later date cover this subject
in detail.
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In this article, I have concluded that most, if not all, of the current
mergers are illegal and thus subject to attack from the Justice Depart-
ment, Federal Trade Commission or private parties. And with all the
clarity of section 7 (when the words are viewed in light of legislative
purpose), there is little doubt that a strong enforcement policy could
effectively stop the merger trend and could dissolve many of the corporate
marriages that have already taken place.
Though there is clarity present in an analytical sense, I am not un-
mindful of the several congressional inconsistencies to which one might
point. First, it is inconsistent for Congress to stop all mergers when at the
same time it enacts securities laws to regulate corporate mergers. 40 It is
likewise inconsistent when we observe the special tax laws that to some
extent regulate corporate mergers.547 Other inconsistent acts passed
by Congress include the basing point law, which was mentioned earlier,
and the 1966 Bank Merger Act."8 Now Congress is considering another
act which is inconsistent with the congressional policy of stopping
mergers. Already passed by the Senate, the "tender offer" bill is presently
before the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. From
each of these acts, one can infer that Congress did not desire to stop
mergers that were in the public interest; however, such an inference is
incompatible with the clearly expressed policy against further increases in
the concentration of economic power.
Instead of showing a congressional desire to relax the antimerger
statute, I suggest these inconsistent statutes indicate a congressional
misunderstanding of the legislative process. With Its membership in-
cluding many lawyers, Congress has also been the victim of the miscon-
ceived concept of judicial supremacy. Whatever courts say about a
statute, Congress, is, today, apt to accept it as the correct construction.
Instead of objectively assessing the accuracy of the judicial opinion,
Congress is too quick to conclude that the law has failed. To correct the
supposed gaps in the law, Congress then passes many inconsistent acts
which further weaken the antimerger statute. If Congress passes the
"tender offer" bill, it will emasculate the antimerger statute without the
issue ever coming before the official body. The logical inference that can
be drawn from such a bill will lead to more mergers until the day when
546. Somner, Mergers, Consolidations, Sales of Assets-Rule 133, 16 W. Res. L. Rev. 11
(1964).
547. Sapienza, Tax Considerations In Corporate Reorganizations and Mergers, 60 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 765 (1966).
548. Bank Merger Act, 80 Stat. 7 (1966). With this act, Congress undid what the Court
had done, thereby allowing certain banks to keep the profits of their mergers.
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there is only one company remaining. At that time, Congress will be
forced into the inevitable choice of either breaking up large companies
or imposing stringent controls over the remaining private segment of
the economy.550
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS
If mergers are to be stopped, if we are to decentralize our economic
facilities, Congress must face up to the real issue. No new legislation is
needed. What is needed is a shift in attitudes that can come only through
the educational process. Congress would do well to spend time and money
on hearings and studies concerning the respective authority of the legis-
lative body and courts. The necessary machinery for this has already been
established by the Senate with the creation of the Sub-committee on
Separation of Powers; however, it remains to be seen whether this com-
mittee will be interested in isolating the factors that interfere with an
effective antitrust enforcement policy.551
Likewise, Congress and legal educators must awaken to the times by
giving greater support to private research efforts dedicated to the finding
of causes for failure in statutory areas. Law schools are clinging to the
Langdell tradition at the expense of the effective implementation of the
law. In statutory areas, Langdell must be buried and we must focus the
minds of students on statutory words and the sophisticated process of
construction. It was most encouraging to note that Congressman Celler
has introduced a bill to create a National Law Foundation.a 2 The several
incidents of congressional inconsistencies are sufficient proof of a need
for private legal research which will be encouraged by the National Law
Foundation. Perhaps with corporate mergers we have allowed them to go
too far to ever hope that they can be stopped.3 If so, Congress must face
up to the issue and find an alternative to the disappearing system of
"free enterprise." To close this article, I again repeat the words of Senator
(now President) Johnson: "Reluctant, apologetic administration does
not inspire public confidence; and it does not get the job done. 554
550. See TNEC Report 15-16.
551. The Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary was established by S. Res. 40, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
552. H.R. 13584, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). For the importance of research in apply-
ing law, see a discussion of systems used in other countries in W. Gellhom, Ombudsmen
and Others: Citizens' Protectors In NWine Countries 42-43 (1966).
553. It has been suggested that since the antitrust laws have failed to curb the merger
wave, Congress should impose a "disincentive investment tax" on acquisitions. See, Hearings
on S. 2512 Before the Subconm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
554. 96 Cong. Rec. 16460 (1950) (remarks of Mr. Johnson).
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APPENDIX TABLE 1
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN MANUFACTURING AND MINING 1895-1964
Nelson Series' Thorp Series2  FTC Series3
1895-1919 1919-1939 1940-1966
Annual Annual Annual
Year Total Year Total Year Total
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
43
26
69
303
1,208
340
423
379
142
79
226
128
87
50
49
142
103
82
85
39
71
117
195
71
171
206
438
760
487
309
311
368
554
856
870
1,058
1,245
799
464
203
120
101
130
126
124
110
87
1. R. L. Nelson, Merger Movements in American Industry,
1940 140
1941 ill
1942 118
1943 213
1944 324
1945 333
1946 419
1947 404
1948 223
1949 126
1950 219
1951 235
1952 288
1953 295
1954 387
1955 683
1956 673
1957 585
1958 589
1959 835
1960 844
1961 954
1962 853
1963 861
1964 854
1965 1,008
1966 995
1st qtr. 268
2nd qtr. 292
3rd qtr. 209
4th qtr. 226
1895-1956, Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1959, p. 37.
2. W. Thorp & W. Crowder, The Structure of American Industry, Temporary National
Economic Committee Monograph 27, at 231-34 (1941).
3. Federal Trade Commission. Based on Moody's Industrial Manual and Standard
Corporation Records.
Source: Staff Report 37, table 1.
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